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INTRODUCTION  
en years after the introduction of the euro, a crisis engulfed 
Europe, a crisis that put at risk the survival of the single 
currency and the European Union itself. Despite steps taken to 
strengthen EU institutions, numerous European summits and 
interventions by the governments and the European Central Bank, 
the crisis has not been resolved. It will take years before it is fully 
overcome. 
The crisis has had dramatic effects on Europe’s economic and 
social fabric. This is evident in the rising unemployment (above all 
among youth), the increase in poverty and the decline in family 
income, which in some countries has dropped to the levels they were 
20 years ago. All this has put at risk the well-being achieved since the 
end of the Second World War. 
The economic aspect, while serious, is only the symptom of a 
larger problem. The crisis is above all political and reflects the 
inability of western democracies to resolve more than 20 years of 
accumulated problems that require drastic action to reform the 
economic and social structure. 
Democratically elected politicians are loathe to make unpopular 
decisions that might compromise their re-election. Hard choices are 
delayed until external conditions, such as access to financial markets, 
make them inevitable. The emergency becomes the main driving 
force behind political action and a way of justifying unpopular 
decisions to voters. At that point, however, the situation becomes so 
dire that the cure must be even more drastic. The resulting austerity 
depresses economic activity and threatens political and social 
cohesion. 
While the crisis is not confined to Europe, it has affected 
principally the continent due to the complexity of its decision-
T
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making mechanisms. Europe is impotent because it is incomplete. It 
is incomplete because – as the history of the United States 
demonstrates – the transfer of power from the local level to a federal 
government cannot be realised in a day, or in a few years, and is 
often followed by a profound political crisis. 
The inability to resolve the problems posed by the crisis is not 
necessarily due to irrational behaviour by those who govern, but 
rather to the incentives that exist within the democratic processes 
that are deeply rooted in our societies. If these bonds are not resolved 
there is the risk that the crisis will worsen and endanger the very 
existence of democracy in Europe. 
This introductory chapter examines a number of issues that 
have characterised the decision-making process in industrially 
advanced countries, in particular in Europe, and explain the 
complexity of the crisis that is gripping the west. It traces a common 
thread among the more specific topics that are then considered in the 
various chapters. The first five topics are common to the majority of 
industrially advanced countries while the sixth is specific to Europe. 
A first set of problems is linked to the difficulty that Western 
societies have had in understanding the causes of the current crisis. 
The analysis focuses mainly on the most salient aspects such as debt 
– public or private – which is the result of the imprudent behaviour 
of banks, households, companies and the public sector. The blame is 
very often laid elsewhere, including on banks (American or German), 
the financial sector, governments (of other countries), the rich, China, 
the World Trade Organisation and the euro. Naturally, the search for 
scapegoats has been a widespread response, above all for those who 
govern and those who protect them. This is dangerous because it 
diverts attention from the real problems and the implementation of 
effective remedies. 
If one wants to understand the current crisis and avoid enacting 
incorrect measures to try and resolve it, one must ask why policies 
and practices that encouraged the excessive accumulation of debt 
were followed for such a long period. Why did the governments and 
parliaments of advanced countries deregulate financial markets, 
deregulation that was then exploited by banks to provide easy credit 
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to a wide array of subjects, including those who could not afford it? 
Why did public spending, financed by debt, increase faster than 
income? Why were interest rates left so low for so long? Why was 
bank supervision in many countries so short-sighted as to tolerate 
the assumption of an excessive amount of risk? 
In most industrialised countries the capacity to sustain debt 
was overestimated because the expectations for growth were 
systematically too optimistic. Why were these errors of judgement 
made? 
One hypothesis is that this type of error may be the product of 
the natural tendency of people to overestimate their future earnings 
based on past favourable conditions. As Alan Greenspan, President 
of the US Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006, told the BBC in 2009: 
“The crisis will happen again but it will be different. They [financial 
crises] are all different, but they have one fundamental source. That 
is the unquenchable ability of human beings when confronted with 
long periods of prosperity to presume that it will continue.” 
According to this thesis, the current crisis is not very different from 
those of the past, only more acute because it spread globally. 
A more credible hypothesis is that the overestimation of 
economic growth has deeper roots. The radical changes that have 
been affecting the global economy for more than 20 years – especially 
with regard to the structure of trade and technological processes – 
are calling into question industrialised countries’ growth model and 
the sustainability of their social system. The crisis is structural and 
cannot be confronted only with the classic macroeconomic recipes. 
There must be more profound action that looks to better integrate the 
economic system in the new global context. 
This thesis is confirmed by the differences that have opened in 
Europe since the birth of the single currency. Countries that have 
done the best job adapting to the dynamics of the new international 
context – reforming their labour market while investing in education, 
research and development and infrastructure – are the ones that have 
borrowed less, had more sustainable economic growth and 
confronted the crisis better. The countries that have remained on the 
margins of global integration, those that delayed reforms and based 
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their development mainly on the domestic market, have become less 
competitive, were unable to avoid taking on excessive debt and were 
more affected by the crisis. 
Consider the experience of Italy. The country has opened up 
particularly slowly to international trade in the past 20 years and 
instead has concentrated on the development of the domestic market 
where national companies are protected and competition is limited. 
This development is a product of the inability of those who 
governed, as well as opinion-makers and labour unions, to 
understand and deal with the processes of globalisation taking place 
in the world. The national media has long given ample space to the 
thesis that the Italian economy was less affected than others by the 
crisis and was coming out better. This is in stark contrast to the 
statistical evidence. The cognitive dissonance propagated for years in 
the country has made waking up to reality even more abrupt. 
The second problem is the tendency in democracies to postpone 
politically costly adjustment measures until they become absolutely 
necessary to avoid a financial crisis. The policy actions are prepared 
under emergency conditions when it is obvious to everybody that 
not acting would have dramatic effects. Only on the verge of the 
precipice do unpopular choices become acceptable for politicians and 
people in general. 
The reform of the pension system is a clear example. It has long 
been known that the increase in life expectancy and the trend of 
slowing productivity in advanced countries have made the welfare 
system unsustainable. But as long as the system is funded, including 
through debt, without too much difficulty, the perception of the 
seriousness of the problem remains limited and proposals for reform 
are delayed. The opposition posed by those who defend the so-called 
‘acquired rights’ prevails over the forces of reform. The political cost 
of change is higher than that of keeping the system unchanged. Only 
when financial markets are no longer willing to invest in the country, 
and the difference in interest rates on government bonds – the spread 
– rises does the public wake up to the risk of insolvency and the 
reality that pensions can no longer be paid. Only at that point does 
AUSTERITY  5 
the government accept the need to reform the system and find the 
courage to carry it out. 
In Italy, for instance, a package of fiscal reforms, including a 
robust pension reform, was adopted in December 2011 by the 
government with the telling name of “Save Italy” to explain to 
people that without the changes the country would go bankrupt. 
The inability to make important decisions before the threat of a 
crisis, however, does not affect only Europe. In the United States, an 
agreement on the fiscal cliff was found only a few hours before the 
deadline and only due to the fear that ‘falling over the cliff’ would 
have resulted in serious consequences for the American economy. 
Knowing that other countries have similar problems, however, does 
not provide much comfort. In the European case, the inability to 
make decisions puts at risk the entire institutional structure and the 
survival of the single currency, with potentially much more 
significant effects. 
The third problem, which is connected to the previous one, 
concerns the tendency of governments to adopt incomplete solutions 
that address only part of the problem and aim above all to buy time. 
When decisions are made in an emergency situation, they are 
unlikely to resolve highly complex and long-ignored problems. 
Decisions made in these conditions seek to ‘plug the holes’ and buy 
time until more complete answers can be given at a later date. But 
following the implementation of the most urgent measures, the 
pressure to find comprehensive solutions diminishes. The political 
incentive to carry through on more fundamental changes wanes, 
especially if the changes require structural reforms that hit long-
established benefits. 
The emergency measures generally focus on changing taxes. 
Structural measures, which have an impact on the economy’s growth 
potential and thus on the sustainability of public finances, are instead 
postponed to a later stage. In Italy, the decision to deal with the crisis 
in two steps was even made explicit: a first step of austerity 
measures and a second one for the reform and growth measures. 
First the “Save Italy” package of measures was adopted in late 2011, 
to be followed by “Grow Italy”. The first part immediately produced 
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strong recessionary effects while the second part was drained of 
content. In terms of political consensus, the result of this strategy has 
been rather disappointing. 
Again, this behaviour is not exclusively characteristic of 
Europe. The solution found in late 2012 to the problem of the fiscal 
cliff in the United States produced only a partial answer to much 
broader questions that concern the structure of public finances and 
the American welfare system. The search for more definitive 
solutions was postponed to a later stage. 
The fourth issue concerns the tension between short-term 
measures to quickly exit the crisis and long-term ones aimed at 
preventing a recurrence of the crisis. The dilemma concerns in 
particular the measures regarding the financial system, which must 
be reformed to avoid future extremes of indebtedness. Putting the 
responsibility more squarely on those who provide credit and having 
them take some of the losses in the case of a default generally garners 
strong political consensus. The implementation of these measures 
with the crisis still ongoing, however, risks leading to the flight of the 
few remaining creditors and exacerbating the situation with the 
possibility of precipitating contagion. Conversely, stabilising the 
financial system and keeping open the flow of credit in a recession 
sometimes requires supporting creditors, banks in particular, 
including with public funds. Such action, however, is met with 
strong resistance from the public, because help is extended to those 
who in the past have taken on too much risk and because it is likely 
to create the incentive to continue such behaviour in the future. 
The problem occurred in the United States when the federal 
government decided not to use public funds to save Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, due to the fear of a negative reaction 
from voters just a few weeks before the presidential election. Only 
after the collapse of the market caused by the failure of Lehman 
Brothers did Congress agree to vote a massive financial package to 
support the financial system and avoid knock-on effects. The US 
Treasury used those funds to recapitalise major banks, strengthening 
their assets and avoiding a credit crunch that would have further 
aggravated the recession. The move nevertheless provoked strong 
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criticism in US public opinion and political circles from Occupy Wall 
Street to the Tea Party. 
In continental Europe, there have been no major bank failures. 
The downside of this is that Europeans have not had direct 
experience with the effects of a banking crisis and consequently they 
continue to have a strong aversion to the use of public funds to solve 
the problems of the banking sector. This has discouraged European 
political authorities from taking direct action, as happened in the 
United States, to secure the assets of the banks. The system has been 
progressively weakened, fuelling a ruinous link between sovereign 
risk and bank risk that prolonged the crisis and dried up credit to the 
private sector. 
In Italy, for instance, few banks made use of public funds to 
cope with their difficulties. The onerous conditions attached to the 
use of the funds, which were dispersed in the form of government 
loans made at high interest rates, have led banks to reduce their 
leverage primarily through a reduction in credit extended to 
households and businesses, with sharp recessionary effects on the 
economy. The public’s opposition to government intervention to 
shore up the banking system led to the opposite effect of what was 
desired and accentuated the crisis. 
The fifth issue concerns the role of central banks that emerged 
during the crisis. When they intervene to counter financial turmoil, 
central banks reduce the pressure that markets exert on politicians 
and facilitate the postponement of unpopular decisions. Central 
banks can thus buy time so that temporary solutions can be 
transformed into definitive reforms. One example is the distribution 
of abundant liquidity, which mitigates the difficulties of the banking 
system thereby allowing governments to avoid using public funds to 
strengthen banks’ capital. Another example is the purchase of 
government bonds on the market, which reduces the pressure on 
governments to improve their finances and implement structural 
reforms. In this way, monetary policy is used to deal with financial 
and fiscal problems that are the direct responsibility of governments 
and banking regulators. 
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The central bank is thus faced with a dilemma. On the one 
hand, if it continues to act indefinitely, it transfers the burden to 
taxpayers through inflation. On the other hand, if the central bank 
decides not to intervene it can put financial stability at risk and 
therefore price stability, which is its key responsibility. The central 
bank therefore finds itself with the tools that can directly affect 
financial markets and, through the pressure these exert, also 
governments. In one way or another, the central bank assumes a 
political role, unexpected and in some regard unwanted, without 
legitimacy and with the risk of losing its independence. 
The problem does not exist only in Europe. In the United States, 
the Federal Reserve has made large purchases of government bonds, 
taking on a large part of the risks associated with the system’s over-
indebtedness. This reduced the pressure on the president and 
Congress to adopt measures to adjust public finances. The 
continuation of this policy shifts the cost of adjustment from debtors 
to creditors and ultimately to taxpayers. The central bank has 
become the subject of bitter political debate because of the 
redistributive impact of its policies on people’s income and wealth. 
In the eurozone the problem is even more complex because the 
debt crisis of some countries has endangered the unity of monetary 
policy. The European Central Bank intervened in some countries’ 
government bond markets to stabilise the transmission mechanism of 
its monetary policy. In doing so, it assumed the risk of default of the 
securities purchased, which in extreme cases could result in a 
transfer of resources between countries. The ECB also created an 
incentive for governments to postpone taking steps to improve their 
finances. 
In the summer of 2011, following the commitment of the Italian 
and Spanish governments to realise a number of structural and 
financial measures, the European Central Bank intervened by 
purchasing the two countries’ sovereign bonds. A few days after the 
ECB’s intervention, with calm having returned to the markets, the 
measures taken in Italy by decree were called into question. 
Structural reforms that had been requested by European institutions 
were postponed. Market tensions were reignited, forcing the ECB to 
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intervene even more aggressively, which under those circumstances 
became unsustainable. This is why the European Central Bank 
decided, a year later, that its open market operations would be 
carried out only if the countries agreed to a programme of fiscal and 
structural adjustment that would be monitored by European and 
international institutions. 
The last issue, which is mainly European, concerns the 
incompleteness of the euro and the need for stronger institutions. 
“To overcome the crisis we need more Europe”, is the refrain one 
constantly hears. But “more Europe” entails transferring power over 
important areas of economic policy from the national to the 
European level. This move does not enjoy broad popular backing, as 
shown by the growth of nationalist parties in many countries. The 
same national authorities that say they favour “more Europe” are 
opposing it with their actions because they do not want to relinquish 
their prerogatives unless forced to do so. On the other hand, the 
European Union is founded on the principle of subsidiarity, which 
assigns powers to the EU only if they cannot be exercised better at 
the national level. One or more crises may be necessary to convince 
people and their governments that the exercise of power at the local 
level is inadequate and that greater integration is needed. 
A further complication arises from the fact that those who 
decide at the European level, that is to say the heads of government 
and their ministers in the various configurations of the European 
Council, are elected by the voters in their respective countries. “All 
politics is local”, not only in Europe, as noted in the celebrated 
phrase of Tip O’Neill, speaker of the US House of Representatives in 
the 1970s and 1980s. In Europe, the problem is more complicated 
because granting new powers to the supranational level can 
legitimately take place only with the consent of all countries. For 
competencies that have already been allocated to the EU, such as the 
single market, decisions are made by qualified majority vote. For 
national competencies that still must be transferred to the EU, there 
is no way around the need to have the consent of all member 
countries. This applies in particular to the creation of new 
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institutions, such as the European bail-out fund, which did not exist 
at the time the monetary union was launched. 
Obtaining the consent of all governments and their respective 
electorates to give more powers to the EU takes time, time that does 
not necessarily coincide with the functioning of financial markets. In 
addition, governments do not perceive the need for change without 
the pressure imposed by the markets. This explains the difficult 
process of European integration where ineffective and partial 
decisions, often made at the last minute, must be reviewed and 
corrected. This is nevertheless the way the EU has been built up to 
now. Even in the United States, the Federal Reserve was founded 
only in 1913, more than a century after a currency union and 
following numerous banking crises. The federal welfare system came 
about in the second half of the 1930s, following the Great Depression. 
The six issues outlined above help explain why the euro crisis 
has lasted so long and why it will not be resolved quickly even if a 
repeat of the most acute phases of recent years is avoided. The 
tendency of nationally elected European politicians to make 
decisions only when under pressure from the markets, without a 
comprehensive long-term vision and with the fear of offending 
domestic political sensibilities, explains why the adjustment was 
strongly recessionary and threatens to undermine the internal 
cohesion of the individual countries and the confidence in the 
European project. It also explains why the integration process has 
nevertheless proceeded, even if in small steps, and why the euro has 
not collapsed as many had predicted. 
The fundamental condition for the European Union to continue 
down the path of integration depends on the ability of the region’s 
citizens and their leaders to understand, even in the face of 
difficulties, that to overcome the crisis far-reaching economic reforms 
and further progress towards European unification must be 
achieved. Although difficult and in some cases painful, these choices 
are nevertheless preferable to the disaster of immobility or 
backtracking. 
This is the lens through which the following pages should be 
read. The themes of the book are developed in 20 short chapters, 
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which are not strictly related to each other and discuss issues that 
have been widely debated since the outbreak of the crisis. The 
conclusions point to the roads European democracies can follow to 
avoid finding their backs against the wall in times of trouble while 
expressing to the fullest their sovereignty in the fundamental choices 
they will have to make. There follows a chronology of the main 
European economic and political events from the end of 2009 to the 
end of 2012. 
This book is the result of reflections and numerous discussions that 
took place throughout 2012 with many colleagues, in particular those of the 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. I 
extend my deepest thanks to them, although the opinions I’ve expressed are 
strictly personal. 
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1. DEAD ON ARRIVAL 
he euro’s demise was foreseen even before the currency had been born. 
Martin Feldstein of Harvard University wrote in 1997 in the journal 
“Foreign Affairs” that a currency without a state cannot survive for long. 
Now the euro risks undermining the peace that Europe brought about following the 
Second World War. 
The crisis, which broke out just after the euro’s ten-year anniversary, 
appears to confirm Feldstein’s prophecy. Europe found itself 
unprepared to deal with a period of acute financial instability. 
Countries diverged ever more. Political tensions were exacerbated, 
particularly among creditor and debtor countries, that is to say, 
between the continent’s north and south. Confidence in European 
institutions fell to historic lows. 
Europe is at a crossroads. To overcome the crisis and avoid the 
implosion of the euro and with it the whole European project, there 
must be further progress towards full political integration. The basic 
question is whether countries can make further progress towards the 
political unification of the continent so as to make it resistant to 
future crises. The opposition to further transfers of sovereignty to the 
EU is strong, especially in some countries. The margin for amending 
the treaties is virtually non-existent. Although important steps were 
taken at the beginning of the crisis, which immediately reduced the 
risk of a break-up, the economic and social differences among 
member countries remain large and may even increase. This is why 
many international investors withdrew their money from the 
continent, especially from the weaker eurozone countries, 
prolonging the crisis. The fear is that the creation of the euro is the 
result of a political will that does not sufficiently take into account 
the differences between the member countries.  
T 
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This negative view on the future of the euro, very common 
outside Europe, focuses on the political dimension of the project, 
which is certainly important. Germany’s unification following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall altered the equilibrium on which the EU had 
been constructed since the beginning and gave the German currency 
an even more dominant role than it already had after the end of the 
Second World War. Germany’s growing monetary hegemony created 
many problems for other countries and put at risk the economic and 
political integrity of the European Community. The refusal by the 
German central bank, the Bundesbank, on multiple occasions to help 
the weaker countries cope with the tensions in the financial markets 
led to devaluations of these countries’ currencies in the 1980s and 
1990s, and were regarded as national humiliations. For example, in 
the spring of 1983 French President François Mitterand was forced to 
change government and economic policy in order to avoid an 
excessive devaluation of the French franc. Another episode came in 
September 1992 when the Italian lira and British pound were forced 
out of the European Monetary System after the Bundesbank refused 
to loosen the monetary conditions that anchored the system. 
The goal of the single currency was to take away from Germany 
an instrument of financial and political dominance that was 
considered to be excessive. The euro was supposed to enable the 
continent to counter American financial hegemony that is exercised 
through the dollar’s role in international markets. With their 
currency Europeans thought that they would be in a better position 
to protect themselves from American policy choices. 
A monetary union, however, requires certain prerequisites, 
some of which were missing in Europe. The economic literature, 
inspired in particular by the work of Nobel laureate Robert Mundell, 
defined the criteria to assess whether an economic and monetary 
area is optimal. The literature considered in particular the extent of 
the integration and flexibility of financial markets and the mobility of 
the means of production – capital and labour. If a region is hit by a 
negative event that reduces income or employment, adjustment can 
come about through the reduction of prices and costs if there is 
adequate market flexibility or through mobility as labour moves to 
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more productive areas. Without these adjustment mechanisms, the 
areas most adversely affected by the negative event risk becoming 
further depressed thereby jeopardising the stability of the system. 
The comparison with the US shows that Europe does not come 
close to meeting the requirements of being an optimal currency area. 
European markets are less flexible than in the US, while at the same 
time labour and capital mobility is more limited. In addition, Europe 
lacks the instruments to redistribute wealth to compensate for the 
lack of flexibility and mobility. The European budget represents 
about 1% of the continent’s GDP, not enough to absorb the effects of 
any differences between the member countries. 
The monetary union was born incomplete, and now risks 
breaking apart. This incompleteness is not new and has in fact from 
the beginning been a constant of, if not the motive for, the move 
towards European unification. Trade integration initially focused on 
only a few products and then developed into the single market for 
goods and services in the second half of the 1980s. Integration came 
to the financial system only in 1990, when capital movements were 
liberalised, while the banking system has remained subject to 
national regulations, albeit within the framework of progressively 
more demanding EU rules. 
The single currency was also incomplete when it was created. It 
was clear from the outset that the monetary union would not be 
accompanied by a fiscal union, or, as the Germans call it, a transfer 
union. There was no consensus – in fact, there was strong opposition, 
not only in Germany but also in France – for the transfer of 
budgetary matters from the member countries to the European 
Union. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) even contains a rule forbidding 
countries from assuming the liabilities of other EU members. This 
provision was needed to convince those, especially the Nordic 
countries, that feared that the monetary union would over time 
become a system for transferring resources from richer countries to 
poorer ones similar to what exists internally in some countries such 
as Germany (between west and east) and Italy (between north and 
south). 
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Why was the decision taken to proceed with the creation of the 
euro even though it was known that it was flawed and could create 
significant problems in the future? Why did politics prevail over 
economic considerations, which are now taking their revenge? 
To answer this question, one must ask what the alternatives 
were. There were at least three. 
The first was to continue with the existing system that had been 
in place since the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in the 
summer of 1971, trying to maintain a certain degree of monetary 
stability in Europe through bilateral agreements aimed at limiting 
fluctuations between the currencies of various countries. The system 
had, however, proved to be ineffective. The so-called ‘currency 
snake’ and the subsequent European Monetary System were unable 
to ensure stable exchange rates between the currencies of European 
countries. The multiple changes in the parity exchange rates, and the 
eventual widening of the fluctuation band in August 1993, resulted 
in exchange rates that did not always reflect countries’ 
competitiveness. On the contrary, they fuelled trade tensions and 
endangered the single market. 
Without monetary stability it is impossible to promote a deep 
and lasting integration of markets, which is necessary to foster 
sustained economic growth. Mundell demonstrated the impossibility 
of achieving exchange rate stability when there is complete freedom 
of movement of capital if individual countries remain in charge of 
their monetary policy. One of three conditions must be given up – 
financial integration, currency stability or monetary sovereignty – 
otherwise there is the risk of a return to protectionism. French 
President Jacques Chirac’s public grievances against Italy following 
the country’s exit from the EMS in 1992 and the devaluation of the 
lira highlight the damage that a big variation in exchange rates can 
inflict on other countries’ economies. 
The experience of the two decades that followed the end of 
Bretton Woods showed that while Europe, especially continental 
Europe, is not an optimal currency area, it is also not an area in 
which it is desirable to have currencies fluctuating freely. Greater 
economic and financial integration were necessary to reduce the 
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possibility that countries gain a competitive advantage through 
fluctuations in exchange rates. 
The second option was to strengthen monetary stability around 
the strongest currency, the German mark. This solution, however, 
posed a number of obvious political and economic problems. 
Germany itself did not want to assume the burden of implementing a 
monetary policy for the whole EU. The mandate of the Bundesbank 
was to ensure the stability of the mark, not other currencies. 
It is worth remembering one of the episodes that best shows the 
way the European Monetary System worked. On 5-6 September 1992, 
the ministers and governors of central banks of European countries 
met in Bath, England, to try to resolve the tension that had been 
unleashed on the currency markets over the summer and risked 
bringing down the system. The German central bank had in the 
previous months raised interest rates to counter the inflationary 
pressure that had emerged following unification. The increase in 
yields in Germany attracted capital from other European countries, 
driving up interest rates across Europe at a time when economic 
activity was slowing. Public disagreements among monetary 
authorities in the various countries fuelled ongoing speculation in 
the financial markets that the monetary system would not last. In 
Bath, Helmut Schlesinger, the Bundesbank president, was repeatedly 
asked to help reduce tensions by giving a sign that there would be 
some easing of monetary policy. Schlesinger refused, pointing out 
that the Bundesbank’s mandate was to ensure price stability in 
Germany and not in other countries. He even threatened to leave the 
meeting if his counterparts made the same request again. 
That event – which effectively put an end to the existing 
monetary system and perhaps hastened the advent of the euro – 
demonstrated, if that was still necessary, that monetary stability in 
Europe could not be placed only in the hands of the German central 
bank. Only a European Central Bank could ensure stability. 
To make sense of the changes that have occurred in the last 20 
years, it is interesting to note how two decades after Bath almost the 
same situation arose, but with a different outcome. On 6 September 
2012, in Frankfurt, the Governing Council of the European Central 
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Bank approved the programme of potentially unlimited open market 
operations to counter the risk of the break-up of the euro. The 
President of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, voted against the 
programme, the only one to do so. His vote had no effect on the final 
outcome because ECB decisions are taken by majority vote and 
nobody has veto power. 
The third solution would have been to create a more ‘exclusive’ 
eurozone restricted to countries that were already strongly 
integrated into a sort of macro-area. Membership would have then 
been subsequently extended to other countries when they had 
reached an adequate degree of convergence. 
This solution also posed a series of problems. 
The first was the risk of splitting Europe in two. This was feared 
by the more European-oriented Germans such as Helmut Kohl, the 
German chancellor at the time monetary union was being discussed, 
who wanted to protect their economy from the effects of competitive 
devaluations of other currencies. This solution also worried countries 
that might be forced to stay out such as Italy and Spain as well as 
France, which feared remaining isolated in a mark-centric currency. 
The second problem was how to select the group of countries 
that would initially take part and the criteria to use when deciding 
which countries would be admitted later. Using gross domestic 
product per capita was politically unacceptable because it would 
create a euro only for the ‘rich’ and would leave out poorer countries 
such as Spain and Portugal that were rapidly catching up.  
Using the level of public debit could have been another 
criterion, but it would have excluded for many years Italy and 
Belgium, two founding members of the EU, but not Spain and 
Ireland, which later showed themselves to be much weaker. The only 
easy-to-apply objective criterion was that of government deficit, 
which was not to exceed 3% of GDP in the year preceding the 
evaluation of the level of convergence. 
In the second half of the 1990s most European countries had a 
deficit higher than the threshold. At that point the decision could 
have been taken to postpone the adoption of the single currency until 
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the conditions of convergence were fully met by a sufficient number 
of countries. Instead, European leaders decided to launch the euro as 
foreseen in the treaty, on 1 January 1999, since several countries 
enacted extraordinary public finance measures to meet the criteria in 
the last possible year. The monetary union began with 11 countries, 
and a year later Greece joined. As with many political decisions, the 
choice to launch the monetary union was probably not optimal, but 
the alternatives were no better. 
In hindsight, it is legitimate to question whether it would have 
been better to postpone the launch of the euro. 
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2. A PREMATURE BIRTH 
he birth of the euro could have been postponed for a few years to allow for 
the full economic and political convergence of the member countries. This 
would have avoided putting the cart before the horse, but then monetary 
union probably never would have happened. 
Markets cannot fully integrate as long as there are different 
currencies. And without the integration of markets there cannot be 
the optimal conditions for a monetary union. It is the dog chasing its 
tail. A single currency promotes the integration of markets, but the 
process takes time. 
The euro’s first ten years provided a strong push towards 
economic and financial integration in Europe, but the integration did 
not advance enough to contain the impact of the global crisis. 
Predictions that the euro would push countries to reform their 
markets, in particular to make them more flexible and able to absorb 
external shocks, have proved optimistic. The Lisbon Agenda, 
launched in 2000 in parallel with the euro, was not enough to induce 
the member countries, especially the biggest laggards, to implement 
the reforms necessary to make their economies more competitive. It 
was an illusion to believe that reforms would be made just because 
Europe asked for them. 
The euro may even have put a brake on structural reforms, 
especially in countries that had initially received a strong economic 
boost from entry into the monetary union due to the lower interest 
rates and stability provided by the new currency. This is what 
happened in Spain, whose economy grew rapidly in the early years 
of the euro creating jobs and raising the standard of living. In this 
favourable context there was no longer the political incentive to 
eliminate the rigidity that characterised the labour market, in 
particular with regard to wage indexation. Only after the explosion 
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of the crisis and the rise in unemployment was there an awareness 
that the labour market needed to be reformed and only then was the 
political will found to do it. 
One can question whether the incentive to carry out the reforms 
would have been stronger if the countries had not joined the euro. 
Actually, the possibility to devalue the currency at the first signs of 
crisis has often been an easier way out for troubled countries because 
it helps them regain competitiveness while avoiding reforms that 
often are politically costly. In Italy, major reforms, such as that made 
to the pension system, are realised in periods of crisis such as 
immediately after the exit of the lira from the EMS in September 
1992. 
The opposite view – that reforms can also be made by countries 
using the euro – is confirmed by Germany, which carried out 
important structural reforms during the government of Gerhard 
Schröder. At the time the economic environment was also very 
negative. At the beginning of the monetary union, Germany was 
considered the ‘sick man’ of Europe: economic growth was at an 
historic low and unemployment was higher than any time since the 
1930s. Faced with these difficulties, Germany was able to find, thanks 
to a far-sighted leader, the impulse to implement reforms that in a 
few years transformed the country into the most competitive in 
Europe. 
It is worth remembering that the accomplishment cost the 
chancellor his job. As Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s Prime 
Minister, famously said: “We know what reforms need to be done, 
but we do not know how to win elections after they have been 
made.” 
In theory, reforms should be made when the economy is 
healthy and public finances are sound. Some leeway in the budget 
can then be used to relieve the political cost of reforms and possibly 
compensate those most negatively affected. But when the economy is 
doing well there is less incentive to promote change. The political 
consensus to start the reforms tends to form when the economic 
situation is difficult and there are neither alternatives nor scapegoats. 
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The decision to launch the monetary union was made when it 
became apparent that the fluctuations between European currencies 
and the repeated currency crises impeded economic convergence. 
The need to change the system emerged only when it became clear 
that it was not possible to guarantee monetary stability in a system of 
full capital mobility if every country continued to have its own 
monetary policy. Only after repeated currency crises did it become 
evident that the monetary system had to be changed through greater 
integration. 
It was not an easy decision. Many national authorities, 
including the central banks, did not want to lose their autonomy or 
their illusions of autonomy. Jacques Delors, President of the 
European Commission at the time, skilfully convinced the central 
bank governors that under certain conditions the union could be 
achieved. The unanimously approved Delors Report became the 
basis for the negotiations on monetary union. 
This is, after all, the way in which the European Union has been 
built since its birth, adopting new policies or institutions and 
modifying them to overcome the problems that had arisen in earlier 
stages of integration. The European Coal and Steel Community was 
created in 1952 to avoid damaging competition in sectors regarded as 
strategic for post-war reconstruction. The common market, created 
by the treaties of 1957, was the direct extension of that agreement. 
The expansion of the internal market in the mid-1980s to allow full 
mobility not only of goods but also of services, capital and people, 
became necessary to complete the integration of trade. 
The principle of subsidiarity on which the EU is based dictates 
that competencies should be exercised as close as possible to the 
people and that they should shift away from the member states only 
when the EU can do a better job. To transfer sovereignty it must be 
evident to everybody that the exercise of power at the national level 
is inefficient and creates problems that can only be overcome 
through a centralisation of power. The existence of these problems 
emerges only when a crisis erupts. The crises are, in fact, the engine 
of the EU. Without a crisis, the status quo prevails. 
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Jean Monnet, one of the European Union’s founding fathers, 
coined a symbolic phrase to describe the way European integration 
proceeds: “Europe will not be built all at once. It will be built during 
the crises and will be the result of the solutions adopted in those 
crises.” 
Many people, including the founding fathers, were aware that 
the monetary union was fragile and incomplete when it was created. 
It was known that sooner or later problems would emerge, although 
nobody could have anticipated the extent of the global crisis that hit 
the euro only ten years after its birth. It was assumed that as in the 
past, when a crisis emerged the advantages of proceeding with 
integration would in any case exceed the costs of turning back, thus 
creating the conditions for further institutional integration. Europe is 
like a cyclist, if it stops moving forward, it falls over. 
Having faith in Europe’s ability to move ahead in the face of 
any crisis presupposes strong political cohesion among the member 
countries, a cohesion that could someday fray. Placing the currency 
ahead of policy is like putting the cart before the horse. The 
consequences can be permanent. And in any case, this way of 
constructing the EU through the various crises is highly unstable and 
very inefficient. The question is whether there are better ways to 
move forward. 
The failure of the European Convention and the Constitutional 
Treaty, which was rejected by French and Dutch referenda in 2005, 
shows that Europeans resist grand institutional designs they do not 
understand and that shift power away from their country. The 
principle of subsidiarity is deeply rooted, not only among the public 
but also within the governments. 
Regarding monetary union, the Werner plan of 1973 called for 
the transfer of a wide range of responsibilities to the European 
Community, including fiscal policy, that were in some way related to 
money. The plan was never carried out because it was too 
comprehensive. Insisting on pursuing this approach would not have 
yielded any results. 
The alternative, continuing with a step-by-step approach to 
integration, led to other problems that countries have tried to solve 
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with partial solutions. Governments were convinced that even 
without a full fiscal union, basic rules embedded in a stability pact 
would be enough to maintain fiscal discipline. In addition, the 
market would have watched, and punished, as necessary, countries 
that strayed. The great fear, particularly in Germany, which was 
about to give up the mark, was that the euro would bring about the 
transfer of resources from the richer countries to the less developed 
ones. Only Kohl’s promise that there would never be a system of 
European transfers made it possible to overcome German scepticism. 
The same was true in other areas such as financial regulation 
and banking supervision. Despite the widespread belief, at least in 
academic circles, that a single currency required a banking union 
with a single regulator, the conservative forces entrenched in 
national institutions prevailed for a long time. The aversion towards 
the harmonisation of banking regulation continued during the early 
years of the euro and curbed the creation of a truly integrated 
financial market. The crisis showed, as will be demonstrated later, 
that the system had to be changed. But until the crisis hit, it was 
difficult to convince naysayers that a decentralised supervisory 
system would not work. 
The national authorities wanted to transfer only monetary 
matters to the European Union while holding onto the rest. In this 
context, the alternative would have been to postpone the start of the 
monetary union. It is not a given that the delay would have created 
the conditions for the strengthening of the countries’ will to move 
ahead with the political union ahead of the monetary union. It is an 
illusion to think that Europe’s political union could have followed a 
different path from what actually happened in recent years (a 
gradual transfer of responsibilities). Starting with the currency was 
probably not the best way to move eventually to political union, but 
perhaps there was no other way forward. 
It is not only the European experience that shows that political 
integration occurs in spurts and often during a crisis. It took more 
than a century and a half to build the federal system of government 
in the United States. The pooling of the states’ debt was decided by 
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton at the end of the 18th 
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century, to share the costs of the American Revolution, in exchange 
for the centralising of taxing authority. Nevertheless, the federal 
budget had a limited role until the 1930s, when Franklin Roosevelt 
launched a series of federal spending programmes. The individual 
states continued to pile up debt individually and only after several 
bankruptcies, connected also to the Civil War, were stringent budget 
rules imposed. The Federal Reserve was created only in 1913, 
following several banking crises, to act as the lender of last resort 
during liquidity crises. 
The euro is an unprecedented experiment in that it is the 
currency of different countries that are not fully politically and 
economically integrated. Only in a dream could it have been born 
equipped from day one with all the institutional characteristics of a 
consolidated currency. 
Postponing the introduction of the euro was possible, but it is 
not a given that the ideal conditions for achieving a full monetary 
and fiscal union would have come about in the future. Monetary 
unification took place first because the monetary issues were 
relatively simpler to solve, although the way in which they were 
resolved contributed to creating other, more complex problems. The 
most difficult issues are typically addressed only when they can no 
longer be avoided and the process of European integration has not 
proved to be an exception to this rule. 
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3. NO TURNING BACK 
xit the euro, adopt a new currency (even temporarily) to clean up the 
country’s finances, devalue and then potentially re-enter…seems like an 
appealing solution. It has been proposed, like sabbaticals enjoyed by 
university professors, to allow distressed countries to have time off so they can 
regain competitiveness and make adjustments to then rejoin with a more 
favourable exchange rate. Only when perched on the edge of the precipice did it 
become clear that exiting the euro was a leap into the unknown. 
A country’s exit from the euro would be a dramatic event. Greece got 
close with the two elections held in the spring of 2012, when voters 
realised the possible consequences and decided to remain part of the 
eurozone. 
The complexity of a move such as the exit from the euro makes 
it practically impossible to achieve. The Maastricht Treaty does not 
provide for this eventuality. There is an explicit reference to the 
irrevocable fixing of exchange rates of existing currencies and the 
conversion to the new currency. The treaty, which was ratified 
democratically by all member states, was not modified in this regard, 
not even as part of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty that instead provides for 
the possibility of an exit from the EU. The exit of a country from the 
euro would therefore bring with it a total withdrawal from the 
European Union. 
A unilateral decision to leave the euro would set in motion a 
series of disputes between the country leaving and the rest of the EU 
as they argued over the losses incurred following the 
redenomination of contracts in the new currency. If the currency of 
the country that leaves decreased in value against the euro, the 
residents would probably not be able to repay their euro-
denominated debts. The country would not be able to repay the aid 
received. The national central bank would not be able to repay the 
other eurozone central banks the debt owed, which are recorded in 
E
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the EU’s internal payment system known as Target2. The insolvency 
would cause significant losses for players in other euro countries 
including the central banks and governments themselves. 
The disputes would encompass the relationships among private 
individuals as well as those between the private and public sector. It 
is unlikely the country exiting the euro would be able to issue bonds 
denominated in the new currency in the financial markets because 
investors would fear that they would quickly lose value. The national 
central bank would have to buy up the new debt creating the 
conditions for runaway inflation. The price increases would reduce 
the real value of debt and wages, especially in the public sector. 
One way to limit the possible disputes with the other EU 
countries would be to negotiate the exit from the euro while 
adopting a new treaty that would have to be ratified by all countries. 
The expectation that a country was preparing to leave the euro 
would lead people to withdraw their bank savings immediately and 
keep it in cash or move it abroad. To avoid the collapse of the 
banking system, the government would have to intervene by putting 
a limit on the daily amount of cash that could be withdrawn. The 
outflow of savings to other countries could only be stopped by 
imposing controls on capital movements, such as those put in place 
in Argentina when the government suspended the convertibility of 
the peso. People’s savings would effectively be expropriated. This 
move, which would contradict the EU provisions on the free 
movement of people and capital, would illicit strong negative 
reactions in the country. 
People would seek to protect their income and savings from the 
risk of the devaluation of the new currency and inflation by 
continuing to use cash in euros or by pegging prices to the euro. 
There would in effect be a double circulation of money. The ‘good’ 
currency, the euro, would be used mainly for transactions between 
individuals while the ‘bad’ currency, the new one, would be used 
primarily by the public sector such as for the payment of salaries and 
pensions. A similar system is in place in many Balkan countries 
where many transactions are carried out in euros. 
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The dual currency system would defeat the attempt to regain 
competitiveness through the introduction of a new currency. The 
constant reference to the euro would cause a large proportion of 
prices to remain unchanged thus preventing the adjustment 
connected to the devaluation of the new currency. The fixing of 
salaries in euros, or pegged to the euro, especially in the private 
sector, would not lead to a change in labour costs and exports would 
not become more competitive. 
The introduction of the new currency would impoverish the 
part of the population most dependent on the public sector and those 
unable to protect their savings against inflation. The rise in inflation 
would benefit mainly the state by reducing the real value of public 
debt and all financial activity. This would lead to a redistribution of 
income within the country from savers to debtors. The country’s 
social cohesion would be put to the test. 
The exit from the euro would close the door to international 
financial markets, and the country would no longer be able to 
borrow. Aid from the international community would become 
necessary for the country to obtain the foreign currency necessary to 
purchase imported goods. The shortage of foreign supplies in key 
areas such as healthcare could lead to a genuine social crisis as was 
seen in Greece in the summer of 2012. 
The scenario faced by a country exiting the euro promises to be 
complex and full of economic, political and social uncertainties. It is a 
leap into the unknown and can strain the country’s social stability 
and democratic credentials. The Greeks realised this when in the 
spring of 2012 they voted twice in favour of parties that opposed 
Greece’s exit from the euro. Forced to pick between the ‘good’ and 
the ‘bad’ currency, the Greeks chose the former, well aware that the 
country’s exit from the euro would not solve the structural problems, 
such as tax evasion, an inefficient bureaucracy, a rigid labour market 
and an inefficient judicial system. The exit from the euro and the EU 
would not have facilitated any reforms. 
A country’s decision on whether to stay in the euro ultimately 
depends on the perception of the economic and social costs of the 
exit compared to the costs of staying. It is not an easy assessment to 
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make because the costs of staying in the euro are immediately felt by 
the economic system while the costs of an eventual exit can only be 
estimated. Moreover, it is in the interests of opposition political 
parties and those carrying out an election campaign with populist 
promises to present the exit from the euro as an easy alternative. If 
people are attracted by these appeals, they risk pulling the country 
dangerously close to the precipice. 
The exit of a country from the euro would cause knock-on 
effects in the rest of the eurozone, as seen in the period of greatest 
tension that preceded the Greek elections. Financial markets would 
immediately wonder which other countries might follow down the 
same path. The risk that other countries could leave the euro would 
push people to withdraw their bank deposits, provoking a banking 
crisis. Contagion would be impossible to avoid without a European-
wide safety net able to counteract the movement of capital that such 
an event would trigger. 
In sum, a country’s exit from the euro would have economic, 
social and political repercussions for both the country leaving and 
the rest of the system whose very survival would be called into 
question. It took time, probably too much time, for this to be 
understood – not only in Greece, but also in other parts of the EU 
such as Germany where for a long time there was a strong 
temptation to have Greece exit in the illusion that a smaller eurozone 
would be more cohesive. People were late in realising that the 
responsibility for the social and political drama caused by the exit 
from the euro of a country such as Greece would ultimately be 
attributed, rightly or wrongly, to Germany. All across Europe strong 
negative reactions towards Germany would have been triggered, 
with a huge political cost for the German leadership. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel came to understand this only in the 
autumn of 2012 when she flew to Athens to demonstrate her 
solidarity for the fiscal adjustments implemented by Greece. Perhaps 
she could not have done it before the Greek vote in favour of the 
euro and the new government’s decision to follow unambiguously 
the path of fiscal restructuring. 
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On the other hand, the threat of leaving the euro, as was 
publicly discussed in Italy during the 2013 election campaign, does 
not seem to be an effective negotiating strategy. Its main effect is to 
destabilise the markets with counterproductive effects for the 
country. 
Resorting to blackmail also generates a climate of mistrust 
among the other European countries and is not conducive to 
convincing them to grant aid, which the Italian and Greek 
governments saw firsthand in the fall of 2011. It is no coincidence 
that the resignation of Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou 
occurred just a few days after his announcement that the country 
would hold a referendum on the euro, something the other eurozone 
countries rejected outright. It is also no coincidence that Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi resigned after his country’s hypothetical 
exit from the euro had been floated in private talks with the 
governments of other eurozone members. 
The debate on countries possibly leaving the euro aroused fear 
that strong currency members such as Germany or Finland might 
seek an exit. Some thought this scenario could play out if Northern 
European creditor countries got tired of transferring funds to finance 
the adjustment of those on the eurozone periphery. This fear would 
increase if the debtor countries decided not to reimburse their loans, 
thus leading to a loss for taxpayers in the creditor countries. 
A strong country’s decision to leave would produce the 
opposite effects of an exit by a weak country. There would be an 
influx of capital from other countries, as investors sought to take 
advantage of the presumed appreciation of the new currency. The 
transfer of deposits would create difficulties for the banking systems 
in other countries. To avoid this scenario, the country would have to 
restrict currency exchanges to residents only, again violating 
European law. To counter a possible revaluation of the new 
currency, the central bank would have to intervene, buying large 
sums of euros. A similar situation occurred in some countries that 
sought to avoid the appreciation of their currency during the crisis. 
Switzerland, for example, decided in September 2011 to put a cap on 
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the appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro and declared it 
would buy unlimited amounts of euros to achieve this goal. 
The appreciation of the new currency would result in a loss on 
euro-denominated investments held by the country’s residents. The 
country’s financial system would risk suffering heavy losses, which 
would also extend to the state due to the loans granted to other 
countries and to the central bank for its credits in euros accumulated 
with other banks in the system. By some estimates, which have a 
wide margin of error, the potential loss to countries like Germany 
and Finland, due to their exit from the euro, would be about 20% of 
gross domestic product. 
Given these effects, leaving the euro would also dictate an ‘exit’ 
from the EU due to the repudiation of the joint commitments. The 
political tensions that would result from this scenario would put at 
serious risk the integration process, which would be unlikely to 
survive such a shock, especially if the country to leave had 
significant political weight such as Germany. The exit of Germany 
from the euro would effectively bring an end to the EU as it was 
conceived in the post-war period with resulting global political 
repercussions. Germany’s exit from the euro, as some provocative 
commentators and rash politicians have called for, would precipitate 
the EU into an unprecedented political crisis and call into question 
the whole integration process.  
On the whole, an exit from the euro by a weak or strong 
country would produce consequences that go far beyond the 
economic aspects on which academics dwell. It would have an 
impact on the future of the European Union and the international 
community. The euro is not only an economic project. It is part of a 
wider process of European political integration that began more than 
60 years ago. “The collapse of the euro would be the collapse of 
Europe”, said Angela Merkel in front of the German parliament, 
adding that “it must not happen”. 
Yet the possibility of a break-up of the euro, or a country’s exit, 
is still being discussed. The crisis will not end as long as the idea 
remains on the table. 
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4. A CRISIS THAT GOT OFF ON THE 
WRONG FOOT 
he euro crisis could not have started in a worse way. The discovery that 
Greek public accounts had been falsified for years created a climate of 
distrust among European governments and toward the EU institutions 
responsible for ensuring that rules are respected. This made it much more difficult 
to create a political consensus around extending financial help to Greece, and later 
other countries. Strengthening the EU’s decision-making mechanisms also became 
more challenging. Had the crisis begun in Ireland or Portugal, it probably would 
have been resolved more rapidly and effectively. 
The crisis erupted with the discovery of the hole in Greece’s public 
accounts that Kostas Karamanlis’ conservative government had 
caused in the run-up to the October 2009 election. The steep rise in 
public spending, made to try to win the election, had more than 
doubled the deficit in a couple of years from 6% to 15% of gross 
domestic product. The public debt had risen to 130% of GDP, 15 
percentage points more than forecast. 
The discovery was not immediate. The government that 
emerged from the elections, headed by the socialist leader George 
Papandreou, did not disclose immediately the extent of the problem 
and the continuous increase in the deficit figure from the autumn of 
2009 and into early 2010 damaged the government’s credibility. 
Corrective measures, presented in early 2010, were inadequate. 
International investors began to worry and interest rates on Greek 
government bonds rose rapidly. 
In early 2010, Greece’s European partners were faced with a 
country that essentially had lost control of its public finances, not 
due to external factors linked to the global crisis, but because of the 
previous government’s mismanagement carried out in order to win 
the election. The new government did not give, however, any 
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indications that it understood the gravity of the problem or that it 
would be able to solve it.  
Further analysis showed that Greek public finances had been 
on an unsustainable path for years. The pension system was 
outdated and allowed people to retire at a much younger age than in 
all other European countries. Wages in the public sector had more 
than doubled in less than a decade. Some expenses, in particular 
military spending, had remained hidden under the guise that it was 
necessary to protect state secrets, and official data would be revised 
after many years. The system for collecting statistics, which is linked 
to government offices and therefore not entirely independent, for 
years did not report budget figures accurately. The tax system was 
plagued by widespread corruption and inefficiency that favoured tax 
evasion. An updated land registry did not exist. 
The emergence of such administrative backwardness and waste 
of public resources, at a time when the Greek government was 
asking for aid from the international community, provoked negative 
reactions in public opinion in other countries, particularly in 
Germany. “Why should a German worker who pays taxes and retires 
at 65 help a Greek who doesn’t pay taxes and retires at 50?”, said a 
headline in Bild Zeitung, a newspaper read daily by about 10 million 
Germans.  
The discovery of the situation in which the Greek economy 
found itself fuelled a climate of distrust in Europe that complicated 
the decision-making process even within the individual countries. 
Many asked themselves: “Why didn’t we realise this earlier?” 
Although the problem exploded in 2009, the data had been incorrect 
ever since the introduction of the euro. Subsequent reviews showed 
that the Greek deficit had always been more than 3% of GDP, the 
limit stipulated by the treaty, even in the year the country entered 
the euro. Many strongly criticised the European Commission, which 
annually checks the state of the public finances of member countries 
and assesses their compliance with the criteria of the Stability Pact. In 
reality, the Commission bases its analysis on data supplied by the 
member states and therefore cannot know if the data are correct. The 
fault therefore rests with the countries that provide the data and the 
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national statistics offices that often are not independent of 
government control. 
When the reform of the Stability Pact was launched in 2005, the 
European Commission tried to include rules to strengthen the 
independence of national statistical offices while also giving 
Eurostat, the European statistics institute, supervisory power over 
the national institutions. The proposal was rejected by the member 
states, in particular France and Germany, which did not want to give 
up their national prerogatives, even when it comes to statistics. 
As often happens, the blame fell on the European institutions, 
even though they are not responsible for these problems nor do they 
have the powers to resolve them. These are powers that national 
governments have not wanted to cede. In addition, in the summer of 
2009, the European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, Joaquin 
Almunia, had tried to alert the finance ministers that the Greek 
government accounts seemed dubious. However, nobody listened to 
him. 
The state of disrepair of Greek public finances was long 
underestimated, even after the European Council began to examine 
the issue in early 2010, in the wake of the financial turmoil that 
increased the risk premium on Greek bonds. The proposal for 
corrective action on the budget was clearly insufficient given that the 
hole in the Greek public accounts was so much larger than originally 
thought. The uncertainty about the data led to several 
postponements on the decision regarding the aid package. Angela 
Merkel, in particular, feared that the German parliament would not 
approve a financial package without an independent opinion. The 
request for the International Monetary Fund to get involved was not 
only to have an independent evaluation, but also to negotiate with 
the Greek government an adjustment and monitoring programme.  
The ECB and the European Commission initially opposed the 
involvement of the IMF. How can a currency remain independent if 
the intervention of an international organisation is requested, 
especially if that organisation’s largest shareholder is the United 
States and the second-largest is China? A currency that needs the 
IMF is unlikely to be seen as credible and cannot aspire to become an 
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international reserve currency that can rival the dollar. On the other 
hand, the EU’s institutional mechanisms proved unfit to handle a 
complex situation like the one created by the Greek crisis in which 
the country had to be persuaded to change course quickly to 
safeguard the stability of the euro’s entire framework. The European 
Commission is in theory independent and has the power to assess 
and negotiate adjustment programmes with member countries. But 
after having underestimated Greece’s budget hole and the 
restructuring measures required, it had lost the confidence of 
European governments. The European Central Bank could not and 
did not want to take on a role similar to that of the IMF, which would 
entail negotiating and monitoring a financial programme with one of 
the eurozone countries. The Eurogroup – the meeting of eurozone 
finance ministers – should have played a prominent role, but as the 
experience of the first decade of the euro has glaringly shown, the 
finance ministers do not like to criticise each other or interfere in 
other countries’ policies. They prefer to delegate this role to someone 
else – if not to the European Commission, then to the International 
Monetary Fund. 
The decision to involve the IMF was the product of European 
politicians’ lack of confidence in Greece, the European Commission 
and ultimately themselves to manage relations with the Greek 
government. And so they decided to form the troika, bringing 
together the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB. The troika 
became the link between the European Council and the Greek 
government. As with all IMF programmes, the disbursement of 
financial aid was conditional on the troika’s favourable opinion of 
the programme’s progress. This did not, however, avoid conflicts 
between the troika, Greek authorities and other eurozone countries 
in various stages of their adjustment programmes. 
The crisis got off on the wrong foot because it exploded in a 
country that not only had long falsified its public finances, but also 
had an economic and social framework that proved unable to 
implement the adjustments necessary to bring the country back on 
track within a reasonable timeframe.  
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The government was unable to implement the measures agreed 
in the programme regarding taxation, spending cuts and structural 
reforms. The lack of an updated land registry, for example, made it 
practically impossible to adopt a property tax, in particular on high-
value properties. The widespread corruption in the public 
administration prevented the implementation of the government-
mandated reforms. For example, an investigation was launched into 
the involvement of the Greek finance minister regarding the 
concealment of a list of tax evaders that had been sent by the French 
government. Local political pressures blocked the country from 
proceeding with its commitment to privatise state assets. 
In addition to Greece’s structural backwardness, the situation 
was exacerbated by a fragmented and litigious political system that 
did not facilitate the creation of a political consensus around the 
adjustment programme, as would happen in Ireland and Portugal. 
Throughout the entire crisis and up to 2012, the opposition battled 
the Papandreou government, undermining the social cohesion that 
was necessary to get the reforms accepted.  
At the European negotiating table, the Greek government from 
the start grated on the nerves of the other countries’ finance ministers 
by trying to call into question the previously agreed provisions. In 
just over two years, there were five Greek finance ministers and each 
one tried at the beginning of his mandate to renegotiate the terms of 
the programme. The firmness of the troika and the other countries 
throughout the negotiations with the Greek government can be 
explained in large part by the Byzantine behaviour of some of the 
Greek representatives in international forums. 
The adjustment programme for Greece had been calibrated for 
a country with characteristics similar to those of an advanced 
economy, such as Ireland, Portugal or Latvia. The analysis carried 
out on the ground subsequently revealed a very different reality, one 
more like that of a developing country with a bloated public sector, a 
corrupt administrative system and an inefficient economy dependent 
on subsidies that was able to stay on its feet only through borrowing. 
The adjustment was ineffective because it was too heavily weighted 
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on the fiscal side for a country in which it was impossible to carry 
out reforms quickly. 
If the nature of the situation had been known from the start, the 
structure of the programme would probably have been different, 
although it is not easy to understand in what way. Had Greece been 
given more time from the start to implement the adjustment policies, 
the financial cost to the other countries would have been even higher 
than €110 billion, about 60% of Greek GDP, paid in May 2010. It is 
unclear whether there would have been a political consensus, in 
particular from the IMF, in favour of an even bigger financial 
package. The alternative would have been to restructure 
immediately a large part of Greece’s public debt. This would have 
reduced the contribution of other countries, but, as we shall see later, 
it would have brought the risk of the collapse of the Greek financial 
system and strong contagion to the rest of the eurozone. 
Greece should not have joined the euro as early as it did, but 
after the launch of the single currency, European leaders did not 
want the EU to become a club restricted to a select few. The decision 
to have Greece enter the euro in 2001 was greeted with enthusiasm 
throughout Europe, just as would happen later when Slovakia, 
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Estonia joined. Looking ahead, the entry 
of new countries will be examined much more closely, not only with 
regard to the convergence criteria laid down in the treaty, but also 
the ability of countries to implement economic policies necessary to 
participate in the single currency. 
In hindsight, there can be extensive discussion on the way the 
Greek case was dealt with and what other solutions could have been 
more effective and caused less contagion. It must be remembered, 
however, that the Greek case was not just about economics. It called 
into question one of the fundamental points of the contract signed by 
the founding countries of the euro, a contract based on the reciprocal 
trust between governments with each country taking responsibility 
for its public accounts. It was not, therefore, only a financial crisis 
with the associated knock-on effects on the rest of the eurozone, but 
rather a political crisis that affected the very foundations of the EU. 
The solution to the crisis therefore could not address only Greece, 
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and instead had to consider the entire institutional structure. This is 
why the crisis has lasted so long and requires complex solutions. 
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5. NOT A CRISIS FOR EVERYBODY 
he euro crisis has been complex to manage for several reasons including the 
fact that it manifested itself differently in the various EU countries. In 
countries directly affected by the crisis the impact was dramatic for millions 
of households and companies. In other countries the economic and social climate 
continued to be favourable and the negative repercussions of what was happening 
elsewhere were not felt for a very long time. The different economic effects in the 
various eurozone countries complicated the decision-making process and made 
resolving the crisis more difficult. 
After the collapse of economic activity that followed the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it took about a year for the 
European economy to rebound although the rate of growth was 
different in the various countries. In those countries most open to 
international trade, such as Germany, the recovery was rapid, while 
in the more insular countries, such as Greece and Spain, the 
slowdown continued into 2010 and then worsened. 
Germany and other Northern European countries were already 
on the road toward consolidating their economic recovery when the 
tensions over the Greek debt erupted in early 2010. In these 
countries, the recession had limited effects thanks in part to a series 
of temporary measures and to the flexibility of the labour market that 
limited the negative impact on employment. Germany’s 
unemployment rate fell to below 7% in 2010 and then to about 6% in 
2011. The average German worker has suffered relatively little due to 
the global economic crisis. Salaries even started to grow again after 
years of stagnation. German companies – which were able to latch 
onto the international recovery and demand coming from emerging 
markets – continued to invest in the most dynamic sectors, thanks in 
part to relatively favourable credit conditions. 
On the whole, until the middle of 2012, there was no hint of a 
crisis in Germany or in most of Northern Europe. The decline in 
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interest rates, which pushed down yields on government bonds, led 
to significant savings for the public accounts and stimulated 
investment. 
The relatively favourable economic and social conditions made 
it more difficult to grasp the gravity of the financial crisis hitting 
other countries and the eurozone as a whole. The different economic 
performances led some to think that the problems were mostly due 
to economic policy mistakes committed in other countries and the 
loss of competitiveness accumulated over the years. Data coming out 
of Greece confirmed this view. Ireland’s difficulties, which emerged 
later and were due to excessive debt accumulated in the real estate 
sector, and in Portugal, where the external deficit was caused by a 
loss of competitiveness, have shown that the causes of the crisis were 
mainly internal to the individual countries. As a result, the solution 
could only be to “put your own house in order”, that is change 
policies and regain competitiveness. From that vantage point, it was 
not a crisis of the euro, but rather of some countries and therefore the 
adjustment had to be carried out mainly by those who had 
accumulated imbalances (the same speech that the ant makes to the 
grasshopper in Aesop’s fable).  
A reason to intervene in support of a distressed country and to 
help it avoid bankruptcy is the risk that the problems will spill over 
to other eurozone members and threaten the strength of the 
currency. It was not easy to get the public to understand that what 
was happening in Greece, which accounts for about 2% of the 
eurozone GDP, or in Ireland and Portugal, could have a strong 
negative impact on other countries that were continuing to 
experience economic growth. Unlike in the United States, where the 
national news reaches all states and there is a single financial market, 
in Europe public opinion is formed in the individual countries. 
Rarely are people interested in what is happening in other countries. 
Data on the stock markets and interest rate spreads are reported by 
the media in countries in crisis, not in those that are performing well. 
It is therefore not surprising that there has not been a full awareness 
of the potential contagion that a crisis, even limited to a single 
country, could trigger for the whole EU. 
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The seriousness of the crisis was long underestimated partly 
due to the low degree of financial sophistication of the political class 
and European society as a whole, especially in Germany. The great 
distance that separates Berlin and Frankfurt, the political and 
financial centres, is not only geographical, but also cultural. Post-war 
German society does not have experience confronting financial or 
currency crises. The stability of the mark has long protected the real 
economy from fluctuations in the markets. The German economy 
does not have a very large financial component. Companies, 
especially the small and medium enterprises, which are the backbone 
of the system, prefer self-financing and make limited use of the stock 
market. Although they are savers, the Germans entrust the 
management of their capital above all to banks, in particular to 
savings banks. As a result, the German public has a limited 
understanding of financial markets and does not hold the banking 
system in high esteem, especially the international system that is 
held responsible for the crisis. In May 2010, Merkel, the chancellor, 
had to ask International Monetary Fund Managing Director 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn and European Central Bank President Jean-
Claude Trichet to testify in the Bundestag to explain why the euro 
would be in danger if help was not given to Greece. 
Under these conditions it was not easy for countries such as 
Germany or the Netherlands to understand that a financial crisis in 
Greece could infect the whole eurozone and endanger the single 
currency. Although the crisis later involved Ireland and Portugal, 
and then in the summer of 2011 also Italy and Spain, it was seen as a 
problem of a part of the currency area and not of the euro as a whole. 
The capital outflows from distressed countries in fact moved to 
eurozone countries considered by international markets to be more 
stable. The rise in yields on the government bonds of peripheral 
countries was accompanied by a reduction in the yields of German, 
Dutch and French bonds that were considered less risky. Despite the 
internal tensions, the euro remained strong and fluctuated between 
$1.20 and $1.35. 
The divergence of the economic situations within the monetary 
union, which intensified during the crisis, strengthened the belief in 
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the more stable countries that the solution should take place 
primarily through strict measures to correct the imbalances 
accumulated in the countries in trouble rather than with financial 
help and changes to the institutions providing the framework for the 
euro. This belief was based on the fear that helping a country that 
had violated the rules, as in the case of Greece, would induce others 
to follow the example, thus undermining the foundation for further 
progress towards political unification. The experience of some 
virtuous countries such as Germany – which in a few years had gone 
from being ‘the sick man of Europe’ to being the healthiest, thanks to 
the reforms carried out by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder at a time of 
great difficulty – confirmed that putting the accounts in order while 
enacting structural reforms was the only sustainable way out of the 
crisis. If Germany had succeeded in setting things right, why 
couldn’t other countries do the same? 
The adjustment made by Germany at the launch of the euro 
took place in a relatively favourable international environment. 
There was no global crisis at the time and international markets 
continued to finance public debt, which remained at low levels. 
Driven by emerging countries, the world economy was growing 
faster than 3% a year between 2002 and 2005. The German deficit 
exceeded 3% of GDP and its debt rose from about 60% to 68% of 
GDP without causing an increase in interest rates. In this context, it 
was possible to spread the budgetary adjustment over a longer 
period of time because markets allowed it. 
The problem at the time was not the financial markets, but 
rather the rules of the Stability Pact, which do not allow a country to 
have a deficit of more than 3% of GDP for more than a year without 
incurring sanctions. The aim of these rules is to force countries to 
correct the excessive deficit quickly to avoid losing access to financial 
markets. If the markets start to waver, the effort needed for the 
readjustment can in fact turn out to be excessive and can cripple the 
real economy. At that point, it becomes necessary to resort to 
international aid. This is why there are institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund, which provides loans to distressed 
countries, thereby giving them support in the aftermath of a crisis. 
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Germany was able to obtain from the other countries a waiver 
for its obligations under the Stability Pact to give it more time to 
implement major reforms. It was a difficult decision that many later 
disavowed. In 2003, Germany would have had to enact a restrictive 
budget to return within the next year under the 3% ceiling mandated 
in the treaty. Given the negative growth and its reform efforts, which 
were undermining consensus in Germany, the German government 
asked to have another year before returning to below 3% so as to 
avoid the sanctions foreseen by the treaty. The European 
Commission objected, based on the principle that the rules apply to 
everyone, even when they are “stupid”, as Commission President 
Romano Prodi defined them. The Commission, nevertheless, 
proposed to the Council of Ministers that Germany be sanctioned. 
The Council, under the Italian presidency, opposed by a narrow 
majority and adopted an informal document in which a one-year 
exemption was granted to Germany to bring its deficit back below 
3%. 
That event was the subject of two opposing interpretations. 
The first was that it was a mistake to make an exception as it set 
a bad example for other countries. The decision also created a rift 
within the EU, particularly between large and small countries. This 
interpretation was also adopted by the next German government, 
which placed the responsibility on Gerhard Schröder. This is why 
Germany asked to reinforce the fiscal rules when the EU bailout fund 
was created. The fiscal compact, approved in 2012, now makes it 
harder for the Council of Ministers to vote against the Commission 
and strengthens the automatic nature of the sanctions. 
The second interpretation is more pragmatic and is based on 
the results obtained with that decision. Thanks to that exemption, 
Germany was able to consolidate its public finances and push ahead 
with reforms, thus becoming economically stronger. The same result 
might not have been obtained if Germany had been sanctioned. 
Maintaining that the German experience led other countries, 
including Greece, to adopt undisciplined public finance measures 
does not take into account that the Greek deficit was well beyond the 
mandated limit for years before Germany got the extension. What 
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happened in 2003, on the other hand, shows that public finances 
cannot be managed only with simple rules, especially in times of 
crisis. Rules are important, but they must be managed in accordance 
with specific circumstances, including the possibility of exceptions 
and gradual adjustments, with special monitoring procedures. 
However, this requires a certain amount of political judgment, which 
can only be achieved through greater integration of the European 
Union. 
If this second interpretation had achieved a larger following, 
and the 2003 decision had been presented as a success, which it was, 
instead of an error, perhaps the country that drew the most benefit, 
Germany, would have had a different attitude during the crisis, 
particularly regarding the public deficits of other countries, which – 
with the exception of Greece – were not the cause of the crisis, but 
rather the symptom. 
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6. A MISUNDERSTOOD CRISIS 
ven though the euro crisis began with the destabilisation of Greek debt, 
public finance was not the principle cause. The impact on public accounts 
is a symptom of wider imbalances that had built up within the monetary 
union and are connected in particular to the differences in competitiveness and the 
fragility of the banking system. Not having understood this dragged out the crisis 
and led to partial solutions. Correcting public accounts is necessary, but not 
sufficient to overcome the crisis. 
The crisis has an origin and a global dimension. It was born from the 
excessive amount of debt accumulated in most advanced countries, 
chief among them the United States, on the basis of expectations of 
economic growth that proved to be too optimistic. The debt was not 
incurred only within individual countries, by the public and/or 
private sector, but also with the rest of the world. It is not a 
coincidence that the countries that were most affected by the crisis 
are those with the highest current account deficits on their balance of 
payments. 
Historical experience shows that after a crisis caused by 
excessive debt, the adjustment is long and costly. An initial sharp 
contraction in economic activity is followed by a slow recovery that 
is hindered by the need to repair the balance sheets of the public and 
private sectors as well as those of financial institutions. In a global 
system, the adjustment involves all geographical areas. The eurozone 
has had the hardest time recovering for two main reasons. The first 
has to do with the accumulated internal payment imbalances. The 
second stems from the fragility of the banking system, which is also 
highly indebted. Both problems were underestimated, both before 
and during the crisis. 
For many years it was thought that payment imbalances within 
a currency area were not important because in the absence of 
currency risk they could easily be funded. Since the launch of the 
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euro, many countries have financed their development, which in 
some cases proved to be excessive, with capital inflows from the rest 
of the world. Lower-income countries, such as Spain, Greece and 
Ireland, benefited from the fall in interest rates that came with the 
entry into the euro. That fostered investment also in sectors not 
exposed to international competition, which did not help to improve 
competitiveness. However, the demand for credit came mostly from 
the real estate sector and particularly in Spain and Ireland. 
Following the launch of the euro, the labour market in many 
countries failed to adapt to the demands of the single currency. 
Salaries grew faster than productivity and were disconnected from 
the country’s labour situation. In the ten years preceding the crisis, 
Italy’s average productivity remained broadly unchanged while 
wages in the private sector rose 2.5% per year. Productivity in 
Germany during the same period increased 3% per year while wages 
grew only by about 1% per year. This reduced unit labour costs with 
a favourable effect on employment. The differences in the 
competitive positions of various countries have led to a gap in the 
balance of payments. Between 1999 and 2008, Italy’s competiveness 
relative to Germany fell more than 30% in terms of average unit 
labour costs. Spain lost about 40%, and Ireland and Portugal about 
20%. With the loss of competitiveness and the growth of domestic 
demand outstripping GDP, external deficits increased. In 2007, 
before the outbreak of the crisis, Greece recorded an external deficit 
of 15% of GDP, Spain and Portugal 10% and Ireland by 5%. 
With full capital mobility and a single currency, for a long time 
these imbalances were financed easily. In ten years, the foreign debt 
of Greece, Portugal and Spain rose from around 30% of GDP to 
100%. Ireland went from a surplus to a net debt of more than 100% of 
GDP. This led many investors to believe that the imbalances within 
the eurozone were not a problem. They could even be justified, since 
some countries had to grow faster than others to close the income 
gap. 
With the financial crisis, capital movements slowed and took 
more account of a country’s ability to sustain its debts. The financial 
deleveraging prompted investors to reassess the credit risk of their 
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investments and reduce their exposure to the most indebted 
countries. The reduced capital inflows had recessionary effects and 
led to a deterioration of public finances. 
The inability of policy-makers to understand the origins of the 
crisis drove them to adopt policies that were too recessionary. The 
recovery mainly aimed at correcting public finances, which was a 
symptom of the financial crisis and not the cause (with the exception 
of Greece). The problem was the excessive balance of payment 
deficit, which can be more effectively corrected with the recovery of 
competitiveness, which favours the resumption of exports and 
stimulates growth. This alternative strategy, however, depends on 
the ability to liberalise and reform the market for goods and labour 
so as to promote the growth of the sectors most exposed to 
international competition. The more open a country is to 
international trade, the easier the adjustment and recovery of 
competitiveness are, above all if there is economic growth in the rest 
of the world. This explains why, despite the sustained recovery in 
exports from countries such as Spain or Portugal, where that sector 
accounts for only a small portion of economic activity, the external 
deficit has been reduced much more slowly than in Ireland, which 
had a current account surplus already in 2010. 
The difficulties in adjusting the external imbalance had a 
negative impact on economic growth and consequently on public 
finances. In fact, the greater the reduction in domestic demand 
needed to balance the current account, the greater the decline in tax 
revenues and therefore the impact on the government deficit. The 
fiscal crisis stems from the way in which the external imbalances 
were corrected, primarily through a reduction in demand rather than 
through a recovery of competitiveness. If the economic system had 
been more flexible and resilient, the fiscal adjustments would have 
been less recessionary. Most European governments focused on the 
symptoms of the crisis, imbalances in public finances, and instead 
ignored the causes. The reforms needed to restore competitiveness 
were pushed to the background and postponed, fundamentally 
because they required a stronger political commitment. As such, the 
adjustment came from the fiscal side and was more costly. 
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The difficulties of the banking system further contributed to 
disrupt the adjustment measures. In the eurozone, more than two-
thirds of loans to businesses and households are provided by the 
banking system, twice as much as in Anglo-Saxon countries where 
the lion’s share comes from bond markets. Taken as a whole, 
European banks play a much larger role in their underlying 
economic system than American banks do. A banking crisis can 
therefore produce much more serious effects in Europe. And, vice 
versa, a strong economic slowdown tends to weigh more on the 
stability of the European banking system. This makes even more 
significant the risk of linkage between economic and banking crises. 
The effectiveness of the economic adjustment thus depends on the 
solidity of the banking system. 
European banks entered the crisis with high levels of debt that 
had been fuelled by the low interest rates that have long prevailed in 
the markets. The situation was further aggravated by the 
overlapping effects of the economic slowdown, the increase in public 
debt and the drying up of international financial markets, which 
together worsened the credit quality of the banks in the most 
negatively affected countries. The recession, which began at the end 
of 2008, increased the share of troubled or non-performing loans. The 
increase in public debt and the risk associated with government 
bonds made the balance sheets more fragile and weakened banks’ 
capital base. Tensions on financial markets made it more difficult to 
refinance debt at sustainable rates. 
Governments and regulators did not realise in time that the 
solution to the problem called for a rapid recapitalisation of the 
banking system, even with public funds if necessary. The 
recapitalisation should have taken place when the markets were still 
relatively calm, as happened in the US in 2008. This did not take 
place in Europe due to the political difficulty in intervening in the 
banking sector. In most countries public opinion is opposed to using 
public funds to recapitalise the banking system. The reasons are 
understandable given that the banks are partly responsible for the 
excess debt accumulated by the system, which they supplied without 
proper risk assessment. But this reluctance pushes political 
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authorities, and regulators, to minimize the problem. This was the 
case with the stress tests that aimed to assess the banking system’s 
soundness and which Europe carried out only in 2010. Without 
decisive action, the banking system remained fragile and unable to 
cope with the crisis. 
The uncertainty regarding the health of the banking system 
slowed the flow of capital to countries with external deficits and 
made the adjustments even more urgent. The inability of 
policymakers to understand the true causes of the crisis coupled with 
domestic political obstacles to improving competitiveness and 
making changes to the financial system created a situation in which 
the adjustment could only be done mainly through fiscal measures, 
which proved to be highly recessionary. 
The error risks being repeated. As policy makers realise the 
recessionary impact of the adjustment policies that they 
implemented, they try to revive domestic demand through 
expansionary policies. These measures however create the conditions 
for a new widening of external imbalances, which are at the origin of 
the crisis. As long as it is not understood that the way to put public 
finances in order is by rendering the economic system more 
competitive, there is the risk of repeating the same error of adopting 
policies that curb growth and ultimately do not lead to debt 
reduction. 
This interpretation makes it possible to understand the policy 
errors made in Italy over the last 20 years. 
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7. WITHOUT A SAFETY NET 
he euro was created with the expectation, or rather the illusion, that there 
would never be a financial crisis. Therefore there was no need for a safety 
net to help distressed countries. When the crisis erupted, a quick remedy 
was needed, but haste is not always a good counsellor. 
The rules for public finance set out in the Stability Pact were thought 
to be sufficient to keep government budgets in check. This is why aid 
to distressed countries was not foreseen except in cases of natural 
disasters. The Maastricht Treaty even included a clause that prohibits 
member countries and EU institutions from assuming the debts of 
others. 
The reality turned out to be very different than expectations. 
The rules may ensure countries do not adopt overly expansive 
policies. But incorrect policy choices are not the only way public 
finances can fall into crisis; a sharp unexpected decline in economic 
activity that transforms private debt into public debt can have the 
same effect. Until the outbreak of the crisis, for example, Spain and 
Ireland had limited budget deficits or even surpluses. Public finances 
in both countries deviated from the norm only after the real estate 
bubble burst and brought with it devastating effects on the banking 
system and the real economy. The drop in tax revenue and use of 
public resources to recapitalise financial institutions crippled public 
finances. In Portugal and Italy, on the other hand, many years of 
weak economic growth left public finances fragile and unable to bear 
the impact of the crisis. 
Another aspect that had been ignored at the launch of the euro 
was the possibility that a country struggling with its public finances 
could lose access to financial markets, with the result that once a 
country was no longer able to borrow on the markets, it would not 
have the resources to cover its public spending obligations (pensions, 
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salaries, health care costs, etc.). At this point, the crisis is no longer 
just about public finances but becomes economic and social. 
A country in this situation is nevertheless confronted with the 
need to fix its public finances rapidly. If the adjustment is too abrupt, 
the impact on the real economy risks accentuating the recession and 
further increasing the public debt. On the other hand, a gradual 
adjustment requires the ability to obtain financing for the period 
necessary to complete the correction. This depends on the 
willingness of financial markets to continue to purchase that 
country’s bonds. Otherwise, the country is forced to make a 
draconian adjustment or default on its debt. The only solution at that 
point is to seek help from other countries or from international 
institutions. 
The possibility that eurozone countries could make loans to 
distressed countries was not foreseen when the single currency was 
created. It was believed that the absence of a mechanism for 
providing mutual help would strengthen budgetary discipline. But 
when fiscal problems arise from external shocks, the absence of a 
safety net can lead to the bankruptcy of the state with devastating 
effects on the economic system. In addition, when there is a clear 
separation between fiscal and monetary powers, as is the case with 
the euro, the absence of a safety net can generate fear in the markets 
that a temporary budget crisis can quickly turn into a problem of 
solvency that affects the entire country with spillover effects to the 
rest of the eurozone. 
The International Monetary Fund does not have sufficient 
resources to help an industrial country, such as those in the 
eurozone, to cope with debt financing problems. In the case of 
Greece, for example, IMF rules allowed it to cover less than a third of 
the €110 billion provided in the first aid package. Additional funds 
were needed and Europe did not have a proper mechanism to meet 
this need. 
At the outbreak of the Greek crisis, the governments of the EU 
countries did not realise that the problem had systemic dimensions 
and could only be addressed by creating a safety net. They initially 
worked under the illusion that the crisis could be resolved through 
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bilateral loans. This required the activation of budgetary procedures 
by the 16 countries with parliamentary ratifications that in some 
cases were very difficult to get. The complexity of the procedure, and 
its fragility, including the right of veto on the part of each country as 
was originally threatened in particular by Slovakia, alarmed financial 
markets. International investors began to doubt the ability of the 
euro countries to repeat the operation if another country were to find 
itself in difficulty. Without a permanent safety net, the EU would not 
have been able to help another of its members avoid default, which 
might have lead to an exit from the euro. This explains why tensions 
did not decline in the days following the agreement on Greece, but 
rather increased. 
The idea of a European Monetary Fund began to spread in the 
spring of 2010. Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, had 
been the first to launch a proposal to establish a European Fund to 
help distressed countries provided they followed rigorous 
adjustment programmes that were largely modelled on the IMF. The 
idea, however, was initially opposed, especially by the creditor 
countries and inside Germany itself. 
The debate on the creation of a European Fund has pitted 
against each other differing views on the role of financial aid that 
traditionally divide Europe and explain why it is not able to speak 
with one voice at international organisations such as the IMF. There 
are two main reasons for this divergence. 
The first is moral hazard, which occurs when there is an 
institutionalised rescue mechanism. If the safety net is too generous, 
it risks encouraging undisciplined behaviour. Northern European 
countries traditionally argue that the IMF should not be a lender of 
last resort to countries, because that would push them to behave 
recklessly with the expectation that they will be bailed out if need be. 
Other countries, including Anglo-Saxon ones, support the opposite 
view, namely that a lender of last resort that intervenes when the 
financial markets do not lend anymore is necessary to avoid 
contagion in the event of a crisis. Moral hazard can be reduced by 
tying financial help to a rigorous adjustment programme. 
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The debate has been going on for years and is repeated every 
time the IMF discusses proposals for new financial mechanisms or 
assistance to individual countries. The first group of countries is 
generally opposed to the creation of overly generous facilities, which 
are instead supported by the other countries with the intent of 
enhancing the ability of the IMF to intervene when there is a crisis. 
The second reason for the divergence on whether to create a 
European Fund is linked to the different visions of the role and 
function of financial markets. According to the thesis often promoted 
by Northern European countries, the ability of a country that has lost 
access to international markets to return quickly to financing 
depends mainly on the credibility of the adjustment measures. If a 
country “does its homework” and “puts its house in order” it can 
quickly regain the confidence of the markets. In this context, making 
too much funding available creates an incentive to delay the 
adjustment and encourages countries to ask for more funding in the 
future. In the opposite view, markets do not behave in a linear 
fashion when a country is no longer able to borrow at sustainable 
rates and there is the risk the country will get pushed into a 
deflationary spiral unless it resorts to external aid. The monitoring of 
adjustment programmes by international institutions is needed to 
ensure that the loans are not disbursed unless there has been 
adequate progress. 
These two points of view faced off also during the crisis. The 
creation of a European Fund requires the consent of all countries 
because it creates a new competency for the EU. The debate would 
have continued indefinitely if the crisis had not pushed 
governments’ backs against the wall. The European Financial 
Stability Facility – the so-called bailout fund – was created over the 
weekend of 8-9 May 2010 in the face of growing tensions in the 
financial markets and had an initial endowment of €440 billion. It is 
the core of the European safety net that was missing. The fund was 
however temporary and was supposed to be turned into a 
permanent institution within a few months. 
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While the crisis pushed the countries to seal the agreement 
quickly, the haste caused a number of problems, which were only 
partially resolved later. 
The first problem is the decision-making procedure, which 
requires unanimity in deciding whether a country should receive aid. 
In some cases, countries asked that the vote of their representative on 
the board of directors of the fund be subject to a prior decision taken 
by the national parliament. This procedure poses a risk to the 
delivery of aid, especially when some parliaments ask for additional 
conditions, as was the case when Finland demanded guarantees in 
the form of collateral. The procedure creates even greater problems 
when the Fund intends to intervene directly in the markets for 
government bonds, as the speed of execution and the element of 
surprise is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the operation. 
Northern European countries wanted the rule on unanimity for 
fear of being outvoted by the debtor countries, which if they were in 
greater numbers could get together to water down the conditions for 
the delivery of financial aid. In effect, it is not sound management 
principle to have the majority of votes in a cooperative-type 
institution in the hands of borrowers. However, it would have been 
more effective to establish thresholds for qualified majority voting so 
as to give more power to the creditor countries without risking a 
paralysis by giving all a veto power. 
The result is somewhat paradoxical. A eurozone country’s 
request for financial aid goes before two institutions: the 
International Monetary Fund where it is decided by majority voting 
and where European countries have only 20% of the votes, and the 
European Fund where decisions are adopted only after a unanimous 
vote by eurozone countries. 
The second problem concerns the conditions for granting the 
loans, which were initially inspired by the praxis used by the 
International Monetary Fund and did not take into consideration the 
specificity of the monetary union. It became clear from the beginning 
that the interest rates on the loans were too burdensome and 
repayment deadlines too quick, especially for countries that cannot 
54  LORENZO BINI SMAGHI 
devalue their currency. Only after long negotiations were the 
conditions revised and made less onerous. 
The last problem is the relatively small size of the fund’s 
available capital. The interventions to help Ireland and Portugal 
almost halved the fund’s resources. The remainder is not sufficient to 
deal with requests from larger countries such as Spain or Italy. This 
fuelled concerns in financial markets that the euro did not have 
enough resources to help all the countries in distress and avoid 
contagion. Only a very large fund – the so-called ‘bazooka’ as US 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson called it – would calm the markets. 
The fund’s resources are limited by the fact that it is financed by 
countries that do not request aid. The greater the number of debtor 
countries, the greater the portion that must be paid by the creditor 
countries that remain. A fund that is too large can deliver more 
resources, but the burden falls on a limited number of solid countries 
putting at risk their financial stability. 
Various proposals were examined to try and increase the 
capacity to intervene without boosting the resources. One hypothesis 
was to use the initial allocation of funds as capital in order to gain 
financing through the European Central Bank using securities 
purchased on the market as collateral. Another option discussed was 
to use the funds to guarantee a part of the losses sustained by 
investors, thus boosting the amount of securities that could benefit 
from the guarantee. 
These proposals were discarded due to the opposition of the 
creditor countries that saw them as a way to increase the total credit 
exposure beyond what had been decided by the respective countries 
and parliaments. The German Constitutional Court, in particular, 
pointed out that any increase in the risk assumed by the fund that 
had to be paid by Germany would always have to be approved by 
the German parliament. 
The stability mechanism’s endowment can only be increased by 
a unanimous decision of the member states. Whenever the discussion 
came up about the need to increase the size of the fund, the creditor 
countries maintained that the funds already approved had to be used 
up before it could be augmented. The fear that too big of a fund 
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would encourage undisciplined behaviour prevailed here as well. 
While this is an understandable position, it creates the fear in the 
markets that when the need to increase the size of the fund emerges a 
country will use its veto. 
One of the key aspects of the mechanism concerns how a 
country’s share of the fund is decided. The size of each country’s 
contribution is calculated in the same way as with the ECB and is 
based on the GDP and population of the various countries. Germany 
is the largest shareholder, with 27%, followed by France with 20.3%, 
Italy with 17.7% and Spain with 11.9%. During the crisis some 
observers suggested the system was distorted in favour of Germany 
and France, the two banking systems most exposed to Greece, and 
therefore the fund had to be redesigned to take into account the 
credit positions of the respective countries. That proposal is 
impractical and counterproductive for a country like Italy that 
depends on external credit and is vulnerable to contagion coming 
from other countries affected by a crisis. This is certainly at odds 
with the practices of major international institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank that provide aid to countries in need that is not 
dependent on who paid into the system. Implementing variable 
amounts depending on the countries being helped would be difficult 
and would remove certainty from the system. Moreover, this 
proposal does not take into account the fact that the principal holder 
of the government bonds of the European countries in crisis is their 
respective domestic financial system. Finally, this system would 
encourage the national authorities of the creditor countries to put 
pressure on their banking systems to avoid lending to debtor 
countries, thus reducing the degree of market integration at the 
expense of countries such as Italy that need to borrow extensively in 
the markets. 
The creation of the bailout fund in May 2010, however, did 
stabilise the markets. That is, until it was decided to turn the fund 
into a permanent institution. 
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8. HOW TO HURT YOURSELF 
earching for the best option often leads to missing out on a good option. 
Without a crisis, change does not occur, and yet crises are often not the 
best time to change the institutional framework. The European bailout 
fund was modelled on the International Monetary Fund, but with some important 
differences that played a role in aggravating the crisis. 
Creating the bailout fund in the midst of the crisis triggered two 
types of problems. The first concerns the violation of the rule set out 
in the Treaty on European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty) 
that prohibits countries from assuming the debts of others (no 
bailouts). This clause was considered essential by the countries with 
traditionally stronger currencies before they would adhere to the 
euro. In Germany, where the population was reluctant to abandon 
the Deutsch Mark, Helmut Kohl, the Chancellor at the time, was able 
to convince parliament to ratify the treaty because of the inclusion of 
this rule. Germany’s main fear was that the monetary union would 
become a ‘transfer union’ in which the more fiscally disciplined 
countries would transfer resources to the undisciplined ones, as has 
happened in Italy with large transfers to the south and in Germany 
to the east. 
The bailout fund is compatible with the treaty, something the 
German Constitutional Court has also recognised, because though it 
allows loans to be made it prohibits paying off the debts of other 
countries. A loan is not a transfer of resources if it is refunded. The 
bailout fund intervenes as the IMF does, making loans to countries in 
need offering them lower interest rates than the market would offer 
and longer maturities in exchange for an adjustment programme that 
if fully implemented can restore the confidence of the markets and 
attract new private funding. 
S 
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Aid to Greece in the form of a loan with conditions similar to 
those made by the IMF is not a transfer of resources and therefore is 
not prohibited by the treaty. It would be prohibited only if Greece 
does not repay the loan. At that point, the taxpayers of the creditor 
countries would effectively have to assume the Greek debt thereby 
flouting the ban. 
How can one be sure that countries that accept loans from the 
fund will repay them? One way is to give the bailout fund privileged 
status, such as that enjoyed by the IMF, which guarantees repayment 
priority over earlier loans. This privilege is justified by the fact that 
the IMF intervenes when other potential creditors are no longer 
willing to finance the country. A creditor that intervenes last takes on 
more risks and therefore must be protected, above all in the case that 
the debtor is unable to repay all the debt and must restructure or 
default. When the bailout fund was established in the spring of 2010, 
the IMF opposed the extension of privileged status to other 
institutions because the more privileged creditors there are the 
harder it is to safeguard that privilege in the case of a debt 
restructuring. The May 2010 agreement established that the bailout 
fund would not have a statute comparable to that of existing 
international institutions. 
In the process of being ratified by the national parliaments in 
the summer of 2010 and in the discussion surrounding the 
transformation of the fund into an EU institution established by 
treaty, many countries voiced their concern that without privileged 
status the loans granted by the fund could easily end up being 
restructured with taxpayers absorbing the losses. Without privileged 
status, creditor countries would have reduced the amount of funds 
they made available and the mandated adjustment conditions for 
distressed countries would be more stringent. These considerations 
led member countries to change the bailout fund, giving it 
preferential status similar to that of the IMF, despite the IMF’s 
opposition. 
The evolution of the crisis has shown, however, that this 
privilege can become a problem. In fact, if the crisis worsens and a 
country is unable to meet its debt obligations and must restructure to 
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reduce the value of the debt, the ‘haircut’ made to loans held by non-
preferential creditors is all the larger the bigger the share of debt held 
by privileged creditors. In other words, the higher the share of 
‘privileged’ debt the more drastic the restructuring of the debt held 
by private non-privileged investors will have to be.  
Private investors therefore have the incentive to sell their 
remaining securities and not renew funding. This creates the paradox 
that without special treatment the official lenders are reluctant to 
intervene, but the help of official creditors that enjoy preferential 
treatment tends to discourage private creditors. The political 
objective of encouraging other EU members to come to the aid of 
distressed countries by protecting their loans comes into conflict with 
the goal of restoring market stability and encouraging private 
lenders to continue funding the troubled countries. 
The issue arose in the case of Greece when in 2011 creditor 
countries were asked to grant new aid that would cover up to two-
thirds of Greece’s total debt, leaving only a third to private creditors. 
This triggered a massive sale of Greek bonds as investors feared they 
would be harder hit by a possible debt restructuring. The contagion 
effect on the system was immediate. 
The ECB, which had bought Greek bonds as part of its market 
interventions started in May 2010, also demanded preferred creditor 
status – refusing to incur losses in the event of a Greek debt 
restructuring. This further reduced the share of private creditors who 
shouldered the burden of the restructuring. On the other hand, any 
loss would have forced the ECB to boost its capital base by using 
public funds. This would have amounted to an indirect transfer of 
taxpayers’ money to Greece. The central bank would have been 
exposed to the criticism that its intervention sought to finance Greek 
debt rather than stabilise the markets and improve the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. This would have compromised the 
central bank’s ability to intervene in a similar fashion in the future. 
The ECB’s bond-buying programme has drawn criticism in 
several countries, particularly in Germany, as it may provide an 
indirect way to side-step the ban on financing state debt. The 
criticism is based on the assumption that the price at which a bond 
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can be purchased on the market does not necessarily reflect the 
associated risk and that losses can be higher than expected, in which 
case it would be a transfer of resources among the member states 
that are ECB shareholders. Given such concerns, the ECB would have 
larger scope for action if it had privileged status and was thus 
shielded from incurring losses arising from its actions. 
This is why in October 2012 EU countries opposed an IMF 
proposal to restructure official aid granted to Greece. This would 
have made the debt burden more sustainable, but it also would have 
hit creditor countries’ taxpayers thereby showing that the loans were 
effectively direct transfers and hence in violation of the treaty. This 
would have stirred strong negative reactions among the public and 
reduced the scope for future use of the bailout fund. 
The conditions imposed by political considerations in order to 
launch the bailout fund have triggered a short circuit between official 
aid and private funding. Far from acting as a catalyst – reassuring 
markets and attracting fresh funds – support from European 
institutions has spooked investors delaying a bailed-out country’s 
return to the markets. This has increased the likelihood of a debt 
restructuring and discouraged the offer of new aid unless creditor 
countries were protected by preferred status in the case of a 
restructuring. 
This downward spiral destabilised financial markets beginning 
in the spring of 2011, when talks on a second aid package for Greece 
began, until the autumn of 2012, when the aid package was finalised 
with a third debt restructuring in just over a year. European 
institutions continued to insist that the Greek case was unique, but 
uncertainty on the markets did not keep the contagion from 
spreading to other countries. 
Given the large share of Greek debt now held by other 
European countries, it is inevitable that at some point a restructuring 
will have to be taken into consideration also for that part. There are 
precedents within the Paris Club involving in particular poor 
countries or Eastern European countries following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. To be politically palatable for creditor countries to accept 
a restructuring, they must first see significant progress in Greece’s 
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economic adjustment programme. To not run aground of the norms 
in the treaty (no bailouts), the operation will also have to aim to 
lengthen the maturity of the loans and lower interest rates to the 
level the IMF charges poor countries. 
The bailout fund’s second problem concerns the private 
creditors’ involvement in the resolution of a financial crisis. National 
parliaments, especially Germany’s, called to ratify the accord on the 
fund voiced concerns that resources would be used to repay private 
creditors, specifically large international banks, that had made 
reckless investments. In theory, when taxpayer money is being used 
to help a country, private investors should also take part in the 
bailout by accepting a haircut on their bonds. This idea, championed 
by Germany, translated into a request to tie the fund’s help provided 
to a troubled country to a restructuring of the recipient’s debts held 
by private creditors. 
To tie together financial aid and a restructuring may appear 
only fair. The greater the loss inflicted on private investors with the 
restructuring, the smaller the aid other countries’ taxpayers must 
provide. However, in the midst of a financial crisis, a proposal of this 
kind cannot but upset international markets. Whenever the 
International Monetary Fund helped a distressed country after 
World War II it would contemplate the possibility of a debt 
restructuring only in extreme cases – when it was clear that the debt 
was not sustainable. Such extreme cases have been very rare. As long 
as the debt is sustainable, a restructuring is not necessary as the help 
of international institutions can spread out the necessary adjustment 
over a longer period and encourage the return of private lenders. 
Tying the aid provided by the bailout fund to a restructuring of 
the debt, regardless of whether it may be sustainable, pushes private 
investors to dump the assets of a country at the first sign of trouble. 
The prospect of the Fund getting involved destabilises markets 
because it causes the value of private investments to fall. The crisis 
thus intensifies, taking away any positive impact of the decision to 
help a distressed country through public funds and an adjustment 
programme.  
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Having private creditors shoulder some of the losses became a 
concrete reality in the agreement that Germany and France reached 
at Deauville in mid-October 2010. To give a green light to the final 
version of the bailout fund, Germany wanted stronger budgetary 
discipline, giving the EU Commission more control over national 
budgets. France was against it. During a walk on the beach at 
Deauville, French President Nicolas Sarkozy gave into the German 
request of private sector involvement in exchange for the German 
chancellor dropping her demand that the Commission be given more 
powers over national budgets. A few days later the bilateral 
agreement was accepted by the heads of state of the other euro 
members during a tumultuous summit.  
However, it was not the governments of the other eurozone 
countries that put up resistance – they were only too happy not to 
give the EU Commission more powers – but rather the ECB. Jean-
Claude Trichet, president of the ECB, on several occasions at the 
summit warned the governments of the effects that the clause on 
private sector involvement would have on financial markets. 
International investors would immediately cut their holdings of 
euro-denominated assets, especially those made in the weakest 
countries, for fear of being dragged into a pre-emptive debt 
restructuring. During the Deauville summit Sarkozy severely 
reproached Trichet for opposing a political accord reached at the 
highest level that could not be obstructed by the central bank. It was 
the governments, and not the ECB, that saved the euro in the spring 
of 2010, Sarkozy said. Since it was taxpayers’ money, governments 
were responsible for any decision and the ECB could not oppose it. 
No one sided with Trichet, not even the representatives of those 
countries that were most exposed to a possible negative market 
reaction. Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European 
Council and an economist by training, understood the problem but 
lacked the courage to support Trichet. 
In the press conference that followed the summit, Sarkozy told 
reporters of the decision regarding the involvement of the private 
sector in the crisis resolution and also mentioned Trichet’s 
opposition, boasting of “the victory of politics over technocracy”. It 
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took only a few minutes for financial markets to grasp the scope of 
the deal and begin selling in bulk euro-denominated bonds, 
especially Greek, Irish and Portuguese, as well as those of other 
countries seen as potentially weak. Interest rates started rising again 
undoing the stabilisation effect of the massive interventions carried 
out by the ECB after May 2010. Trichet returned to Frankfurt saying: 
“they stabbed us in the back”. 
Sarkozy and the leaders soon realised they had made a mistake. 
But it was politically difficult at that point to change path and 
convince national parliaments and the public that the agreement 
caused huge damage. Some, such as German Finance Minister 
Schäuble, tried to soothe markets by pointing out that the rule on the 
involvement of private creditors would come into force only in 2013, 
with the final version of the bailout fund, but his comments 
backfired. Financial markets base investment decisions on future 
events so the coming into force of the rule in 2013 would hit any 
bonds maturing after that date, and therefore a big chunk of Greece’s 
debt. 
Without openly breaking with Angela Merkel for fear that a 
public disagreement with Germany would also penalise French 
bonds, Sarkozy told his representatives who were supposed to 
conclude the agreement at the technical meetings to discuss some 
aspects of the accord so as to obtain the consent of the central bank. 
After long and exhausting negotiations between the central bank and 
Germany, with France between the two, the October 2010 agreement 
was modified two months later. The European Council’s conclusions 
of December 2010 diluted the provision on private sector 
involvement in financial crises. An explicit reference was added 
saying the bailout fund would follow the same procedures of the 
IMF in which the involvement of the private sector is not automatic 
and is foreseen only in extreme cases of insolvency. 
The ECB’s demands had been accepted, but the damage was 
not easily repaired. The suspicion that European countries would 
now be able to restructure their debts more easily than under the 
current praxis had crept into financial markets. The flight from 
riskier assets was further favoured by a media campaign – fuelled by 
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academics, commentators, and in some cases also by market 
participants sometimes with an obvious conflict of interest – to 
support an ‘orderly’ debt restructuring, as if such a theoretical 
concept was feasible in practice. It was a costly illusion. 
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9. THERE ARE NO PAINLESS CURES 
here are three ways to reduce excessive debt: a restructuring that reduces 
its nominal value, a reduction in its real value through inflation and a  
budget tightening that over time reduces its weight relative to output. 
The first seems to be the easiest and least painful: reduce the debt and start over, 
just as a company in financial difficulty might do. But countries are not 
companies.  
Since the beginning of the crisis, financial markets have called into 
question the ability of some countries to support the debt they 
accumulated over the years. The solvency of a country is different 
from that of a company or a bank. A country is solvent not only if it 
has the capacity to pay, it must also have the will. 
When the situation in Greece began to deteriorate in the spring 
of 2010 a debate started about whether to restore the sustainability of 
public finances with extraordinary restructurings. The choice of 
whether to enact this type of intervention depends on the 
comparison between the effects on the financial and economic 
systems and the social and political cost of implementing protracted 
austerity policies. The strongly recessionary effects of the Greek 
adjustment programme led some commentators to conclude that a 
debt restructuring would probably have been less costly. In its ex 
post evaluation of the Greek programme, the IMF suggests that debt 
restructuring should have been implemented earlier, since May 2010. 
This position was based on the idea that it was possible to arrange a 
relatively painless and effective debt restructuring. 
A debt restructuring entails exchanging existing securities with 
new ones that have a longer maturity and/or a lower interest rate. 
The lower value of the new securities saddles investors with a capital 
loss. The transaction can be imposed by a unilateral decision of the 
issuer that will trigger numerous lawsuits, especially on the part of 
T 
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international investors, or on a voluntary basis through an exchange 
of securities. 
The question to ask is why an investor holding a government 
bond would accept to exchange it for one with a lower value. The 
answer is that without the exchange the debt is unsustainable and 
the value of the bonds could decrease further. The exchange is 
effective if the vast majority of creditors agrees to the terms and if the 
reduction in value makes the new stock of debt sustainable. This type 
of operation is extremely complex. The individual investor is 
incentivised not to accept the exchange and to keep the old securities 
in the hope that the operation is successful thanks to the 
participation of other investors thus allowing the state to repay all 
the bonds, including those that have not been exchanged. If 
everybody does this, however, the voluntary restructuring fails, 
which is why this type of operation must be strongly encouraged by 
the authorities as part of an agreement with the principal investors. 
There are not many cases of an orderly debt restructuring. 
Uruguay in 2002 is generally held up as a model. Following the 
contagion from the Argentine default, Uruguay suffered a liquidity 
crisis when markets were no longer willing to refinance foreign debt. 
The Uruguayan government however was able with the help of the 
IMF to negotiate with the creditors a lengthening of maturities, 
limiting the effective loss to about 11% of the value of the securities. 
In most other cases, such as Argentina in 2001, the reductions in 
the value of the bonds needed to make the debt sustainable are much 
more drastic and the losses the creditors are forced to absorb make it 
difficult to implement the exchange on a voluntary basis. If the 
restructuring is forced on investors it invariably will trigger fights, 
especially with international investors, and lawsuits that drag on for 
years. The country loses access to markets and risks having to live in 
autarky, as happened with Argentina. 
Another often-cited example is Iceland in 2008 where banks 
were allowed not to repay their debts to foreign investors while at 
the same time they honoured their obligations to residents. This type 
of operation is not replicable in the European Union where the rules 
of the internal market do not allow countries to treat their citizens 
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preferentially compared those of other member countries. Banks and 
European countries cannot fully repay their debts to residents while 
restructuring only the debt held by foreigners. This is why it was not 
possible in the eurozone to seek a solution similar to that of Iceland. 
A forced debt restructuring, or one that is strongly encouraged, 
triggers chain reactions in the markets and contagion that transform 
a local event into a systemic crisis. The first type of contagion comes 
from the collection of insurance purchased to protect against the 
effects of a restructuring (credit default swaps). Financial institutions 
that sold these securities immediately find themselves in difficulty 
and some may fail. The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 immediately triggered protection contracts that had been sold 
by insurance companies, in particular American Investment Group 
(AIG), causing them to collapse. To avoid contagion, the American 
taxpayers had to allocate much more funds than would have been 
necessary to save Lehman Brothers. 
The second type of contagion comes from the standard market 
reaction after a restructuring, which pushes market participants to 
question what other countries could follow the same path. The flow 
of investment to these countries immediately drops, driving up 
interest rates and further threatening debt sustainability. Financial 
markets have experienced this type of contagion since the end of 
2010. This was also one of the reasons why the rating agencies 
reduced the credit rating of some European countries. Whenever 
fears about the restructuring of Greek debt surfaced, immediately 
interest rates on government bonds rose, not only on Greek bonds, 
but also on those of the other weak countries that were under the 
markets’ spotlight. In the spring of 2011, when the idea of a Greek 
debt restructuring began to take shape, investors begun dumping the 
securities of other countries considered to be vulnerable to a 
restructuring and moved their money into lower-risk assets. The 
restructuring, agreed to at the European Council meeting in June 
2011, included a voluntary exchange with the major banks holding 
Greek debt and led to an effective reduction in value of just over 
20%. The market reacted negatively because the operation was not 
sufficient to re-establish the sustainability of Greek debt, and, in fact, 
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a new restructuring would be necessary a short time later. The 
interest rates of all distressed countries began to rise beginning in 
July 2011 with contagion to Italy and Spain happening at this time. 
These mechanisms explain why the problems of a country that 
accounts for little more than 2% of the eurozone GDP led to a 
massive crisis that even called into question the euro’s very 
existence. 
The most important – and often underestimated – effect of a 
debt restructuring is not so much on the international markets, but 
rather on the country’s financial system itself. When a substantial 
part of the debt is held by domestic investors, the consequences of a 
restructuring affect mainly the citizens of the country involved. Since 
government bonds are a savings instruments typically used by the 
weaker and less financially sophisticated part of the population, a 
restructuring may cause unpredictable consequences for social 
cohesion. Confidence in the state is seriously undermined with a 
chain reaction of destabilising events. It is no coincidence that the 
restructurings of public debt rarely occur in countries that are 
democratic or remain democratic. 
The banking system, one of the main investors in government 
bonds, is the first to be affected by a restructuring of public debt. The 
banking system risks collapsing if losses are not offset through a 
capital injection. However, a country that restructures its debt does 
not have enough funds to strengthen the balance sheet of its banks. 
Debt restructuring ends up crippling the financial system and 
carrying the real economy down with it. The only way to raise new 
funds is to ask the international community for help. 
Without external assistance to recapitalise the financial system 
and allow the state to continue making payments, participation in 
the single currency is put in jeopardy. The risk of a debt default 
becomes the risk of leaving the euro. The hypothesis of a ‘Grexit’ 
(Greek exit) spread through the markets in spring 2011 in connection 
with the Greek debt restructuring and the continuing difficulties of 
the other eurozone countries to agree on aid to Greece. 
 A debt restructuring does not solve an economy’s underlying 
problems, in particular the lack of competitiveness and low growth 
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potential. The risk is that, as happened in the case of Argentina, the 
restructuring creates the illusion of having solved the public finance 
problems and leads to a delay in the implementation of the reforms 
needed to treat the underlying problems that led to the unsustainable 
debt load. This is precisely what happened in Greece. The hypothesis 
of a debt restructuring began to circulate in early 2011 with the 
emergence of the first political difficulties in the implementation of 
the adjustment programme, especially with regard to structural 
reforms and privatisations. The Greek authorities began to consider 
the possibility of a debt restructuring in the hope that this would 
allow them to ease the adjustment. This created an unholy alliance 
between opposing political interests – Greece and Germany. On the 
German side, the government did not feel it could ask parliament for 
a second bailout package without a debt restructuring and the 
involvement of private investors. The fact that the banks would have 
contributed to the restructuring made it more acceptable to ask for 
more public funds to help Greece. 
From the political point of view the exchange seemed like a 
good idea, but it omitted a crucial aspect. Much of the Greek debt 
was not held by foreign banks, but rather by Greek banks. The 
largest losses in the event of a restructuring would have been 
sustained in Greece. To avoid the collapse of the country’s financial 
system additional help was therefore necessary. The savings from the 
restructuring of the debt would be largely offset by the increased 
funds needed to recapitalise the Greek banking system. 
The domestic political objectives of the two countries prevailed 
and there was no opposition from other governments, not even those 
most likely to suffer contagion. Only the European Central Bank 
opposed a forced restructuring and asked governments to negotiate 
an appropriate reduction in the value of securities with private 
investors that would allow Greece to restore its debt sustainability 
without triggering excessive contagion effects. This proved not to be 
possible. The agreement, reached in extremis at a European Council 
meeting in June 2011, was too favourable to private creditors. The 
interest rate on new Greek bonds increased right after the exchange, 
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indicating the expectation that a new restructuring would soon 
follow. 
Another important lesson that should have been learned from 
previous experiences had been forgotten. A debt restructuring never 
happens in a single stage, but is rather a series of successive 
operations that lead to unstable market conditions for a long time. 
For international investors the Greek operation marked the first case 
of a debt restructuring by a Eurozone country. The risk of further 
losses not only on Greek debt, but also in other countries, had 
become real. The European Council stated officially that the Greek 
case was unique and there would be no other restructurings, but the 
market did not believe it. 
As expected, the effects of the restructuring proved to be 
damaging, also in political terms. The reduction of Greece’s debt load 
did not solve any of the country’s problems. Indeed, the political 
situation worsened up to the 2012 elections. European partners’ 
confidence in Greece, which was already low, fell further. Financial 
markets got jumpy and for a long time considered the collapse of the 
euro a real possibility. 
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10. THE GAME OF ‘CHICKEN’ 
n the film “Rebel without a Cause” James Dean and another boy drive their 
cars toward a cliff to show the girls how courageous they are. Whoever 
swerves first loses and appears weak. However, if nobody swerves as they 
both wait for the other to do it first, then they both die. The ‘chicken’ is the one who 
swerves first. This dynamic is used in game theory to explain the interaction 
between investors, countries and institutions. It helps explain many actions taken 
during the crisis. 
The game ends well if one of the two players manages to convince 
the other that he will not back down at any price and the other 
adapts to avoid dying. The game ends badly if those who say they 
will not back down are not credible or if there is an unexpected event 
as is the case of the film. 
The game can also end badly in real life. When Dick Fuld, the 
head of Lehman Brothers, realised that what he had heard repeated 
for days from the US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson was true, 
namely that the US government would not use public funds to save 
the bank, he understood that his bluff had not worked and he no 
longer had time to find a buyer. He had held out thinking that 
eventually Paulson would back down, given that the cost of rescuing 
Lehman would have been well below the consequences of failure on 
financial markets and the US economy. Paulson did not have the 
funds to save Lehman. He had repeatedly said this publicly, but Fuld 
had not believed him. This is a typical case in which the game of 
chicken ends badly. 
During the euro crisis, the interaction between the authorities in 
different countries took on characteristics similar to the game of 
chicken. In discussions with its European partners, the Greek 
government was fully aware that the country’s exit from the euro 
would have enormous costs for the Greek economy, but also for the 
rest of the EU. Greek authorities knew that the European institutions 
I 
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had an interest in avoiding that Greece would leave the single 
currency. This prompted the Greek government on several occasions 
to try to renegotiate the terms of the bailout agreement in a bid to get 
additional aid even though it had not fully implemented the 
measures foreseen in the adjustment programme. The European 
institutions, for their part, knew Greece would bear the brunt of the 
cost of its exit, but they were also aware that the contagion would hit 
other euro countries and they therefore had an interest in granting 
more aid to avoid Greece’s exit. 
If chicken had been played only once, Greece would most likely 
have won. It would have obtained more aid on more favourable 
terms and a longer period of time to implement the restructuring. 
And in fact, in the early months of the adjustment programme, 
Greece was able to obtain a relaxation of the conditions it was 
supposed to fulfil to receive disbursements from the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund. The problem arose when the 
negotiation was repeated. At that point the decision was no longer 
dependent only on the costs and benefits of the individual choice but 
also on the impact that the choice would have for the future 
credibility of the strategy. Each time a player loses because he yields 
before the other it becomes less credible that he will change strategy 
in the future, and thus win. Each time the European institutions gave 
into Greece’s requests, granting more aid with less restrictive 
conditions, the expectation that they would give in again the next 
time increased. The Greek government thus had the incentive to ask 
repeatedly for further extensions, postponing the measures called for 
by the adjustment programme. 
This is the moral hazard problem, which occurs when an action 
generates the expectation that it will be repeated systematically in the 
future. In this context, a choice that seems optimal in the short term 
becomes counterproductive because it creates perverse incentives in 
the medium term. This is why the economic policy cannot be 
subjected to too much discretion and should preferably be subject to 
rules, even if those rules may appear too rigid when the effect is 
evaluated on a case by case basis. 
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In the face of repeated Greek requests for more aid and to 
postpone the measures agreed in the programme, the EU institutions 
had to become more rigid in defending their position, in particular in 
2012 at the time of the election. To persuade Greek authorities and 
the country’s public that the programme agreed with the 
international institutions had to be implemented, European leaders 
came close to threatening to let Greece leave the euro. During the 
summer of 2012, Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker and 
others caused further tensions in the markets by publicly stating that 
Greece’s exit was not ruled out. Only then did the new Greek 
government and the parties that supported it understand that the 
European institutions would not continue to give into the demands 
that the programme be diluted. 
Unlike Fuld, Antonis Samaras, the Greek Prime Minister who 
emerged from the June 2012 elections, realised it was no longer a 
good idea to test the determination of the European authorities and 
its strategy, deciding to put into action the agreed to programme. 
Two years of publicly going back and forth in clear view of the 
financial markets created considerable uncertainty regarding the 
capability of the EU institutions to resolve the crisis. 
Countries were not the only ones to play chicken. European 
institutions also played among themselves, in particular the 
European Central Bank against the European Council. The most 
noteworthy case was the creation of the bailout fund in the spring of 
2010. In the first week of May, tensions in the financial markets had 
not subsided despite the agreement reached on the financial support 
for Greece. The lengthy process and the political difficulties in 
reaching the agreement on the fund stoked doubts in financial 
markets that the same type of operation could be repeated if the 
crisis spread to other countries. Without a mechanism to help 
distressed countries, it was feared there would be neither the funds 
nor the political will to save another country – as happened in the 
United States when after the rescue of the first investment bank, Bear 
Stearns, there was no appetite to save also Lehman Brothers. 
The only way to calm the markets and convince them that the 
European countries were determined to avoid a new crisis was to 
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institutionalise the mechanism put in place to aid Greece and 
provide it with sufficient funds. The crisis was rapidly worsening 
and there was little time to reach a deal. An intervention by the 
European Central Bank would have been able to reduce tensions and 
buy time to allow the countries to reach an agreement. If the bank 
had decided to buy securities of the distressed countries on the 
market, interest rates and the spreads would have been reduced 
rapidly thus calming markets. At that point, however, the pressure 
on governments to establish the bailout fund rapidly would have 
diminished. The central bank would have found itself in the position 
of having to intervene for a long period of time without having any 
leverage on governments to find a definitive solution quickly. The 
intervention would push monetary policy into the area of budgetary 
policy with potentially distorting effects on the markets and threats 
to the independence of the central bank itself. On the other hand, 
even if the fund was created quickly, the practical implementation 
would take time during which the markets would still have to be 
kept at bay. 
European governments were confident, therefore, that the 
European Central Bank would not let the markets collapse. It was 
widely expected that the intervention could be carried out even 
without a prior agreement among the governments. To bring the 
governments back to reality, the president of the central bank on 6 
May 2010 had to intervene publicly to say that the bank would not 
act before the governments had taken the decision to create the fund. 
The European Council decided on 7 May to establish the bailout 
fund. The European Central Bank intervened on the markets on 
Monday 10 May after the finance ministers had completed the details 
of the deal. 
In order to be believed by the governments, the central bank 
had to express publicly that it was against a preventive intervention. 
The strong negative reaction of the market pushed the governments 
to reach an agreement. The institutional step forward came when it 
became clear what the consequences of a failure would be. Only at 
the edge of the cliff and without the protection of the central bank 
did the governments decide to act. 
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The game of chicken can be destabilising if it is played between 
countries and institutions in front of the financial markets, which 
become an active player in the game. Experience shows, however, 
that this is perhaps the only way to push governments to act in times 
of crisis.  
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11. THE PRICE OF PRIDE 
overnments try to confront crises on their own for fear that a request for 
help from international institutions will lead to a loss of sovereignty. Aid 
is therefore requested at the last minute when the pressure from financial 
markets can no longer be contained. At that point, the situation is compromised 
and the measures necessary to stabilise the markets must be much more drastic, 
and painful. 
The tendency to minimise the difficulties and postpone the request 
for external aid was apparent with Greece, which in the early months 
of 2010 despite the rapid deterioration of its financial situation 
continued to defer the request for aid. The postponement was also 
encouraged by the German government of Angela Merkel, who did 
not want to present the matter to the German parliament before the 
regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia. On March 8th, six 
weeks before Greece’s official request for aid, George Papandreou, 
then Greek Prime Minister, and Angela Merkel declared in a joint 
press conference that “Greece will not require any financial aid” and 
“Greece doesn’t need help.” To deny the reality was one of the 
recurrent themes of political institutions during the crisis. 
The request for aid was finally advanced in May after Greece 
had lost access to financial markets and interest rates on its debt had 
risen to unsustainable levels.  
Ireland went down the same road. The request to the IMF and 
the EU for aid was made only in late November 2010, after months of 
negative data on public finances and growing worries about the Irish 
banking system. In Portugal, the government tried to postpone the 
request for aid until after the elections scheduled for June 2011, but 
the deterioration in market conditions did not allow for the delay. All 
the main parties signed the aid programme before the election. 
G 
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The reluctance of governments to seek financial support from 
international institutions until they are basically obligated to do so 
can be explained in two ways. The first is political. By asking for 
external help, a government is acknowledging in front of parliament 
and the public its inability to solve the country’s problems on its 
own. Governments requesting outside aid rarely survive the next 
election. This is confirmed by events in Greece and Ireland, where 
the governments that signed the programme lost the subsequent 
elections. It is unclear, however, whether the negative perception of 
the voters is due to the request itself or the policies that led to the 
need to request aid. Moreover, the tendency of governments in 
power to lose elections is very widespread in Europe and not only in 
the countries that requested aid from international institutions. 
The second reason outside help is refused or delayed is because 
it involves accepting measures to restructure the budget and 
structural reforms that are seen as external impositions and are 
interpreted as a loss of sovereignty that humiliates the country. 
In reality, the economic policy measures contained in the 
adjustment programme are needed in any event to reduce 
imbalances and regain credibility on the markets. They are 
accompanied by financial aid that reduces the cost of external 
financing and allows the pain of the adjustment to be diluted over 
time. They also help restore a climate of confidence in the markets 
and attract new capital. This is the experience of most countries that 
in the past, sometimes even against their will, have turned to the 
International Monetary Fund for aid. Over the last 15 years, countries 
such as Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and Indonesia received help 
from the IMF, through which they restored the health of their 
economies that have since become among the most solid and fastest 
growing in the world. There are, of course, exceptions such as 
Argentina, although the country at a certain point decided to stop the 
IMF’s programme and defaulted. 
A country may also try to convince the markets of its solvency 
without recourse to external aid. But it must act quickly with credible 
measures that have immediate effects on the imbalances 
accumulated over time. The more actions are delayed, the more 
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investors are likely to lose confidence and the more drastic are the 
measures that have to be taken. When markets lose confidence it 
takes a long time to get it back and in the meantime the financing 
costs increase making the adjustment more painful. 
In summary, although a call for external aid signals the inability 
of the ruling political class to solve the country’s problems, not 
asking for help imposes a significant cost on the economic system. 
In September 2011, with Italy having trouble adopting 
measures for a credible restructuring, in particular regarding 
structural reforms, the IMF offered the country a precautionary type 
of programme of financial aid with soft conditionality and the 
availability of financial resources to confront the risk of the 
instability of the government bonds. The Italian government refused, 
concerned about the political cost to be paid for accepting help from 
the International Monetary Fund a year and a half before elections. 
Markets reacted negatively, interpreting the rejection as confirmation 
of the country’s inability to take the necessary steps to rectify the 
situation. The refusal did not help the government headed by Silvio 
Berlusconi, who resigned a few weeks later to make way for a new 
government headed by Mario Monti, whose restructuring 
programme had to be even more drastic than what the international 
community would have accepted just a few weeks before. 
The second reason why countries tend to avoid turning to 
external aid is that financial markets do not always react favourably 
to the request. In the case of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the 
financial conditions worsened immediately after the request for aid, 
interest rates increased and access to international credit became 
virtually impossible. The aid basically had to cover the entire 
financial needs of the countries for a couple of years with 
disbursements on an unprecedented scale. 
In Ireland’s case, interest rates rose precipitously in 2011 after 
the country entered the programme and began to decline only in 
2012, returning progressively to levels below those prevailing before 
the acceptance of aid. One of the causes was also connected to the 
contagion of the debt restructuring. The experience of Greece, which 
restructured its debt twice at a cost to private creditors of more than 
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70%, led the market to believe that such a big ‘haircut’ might also be 
carried out in other countries. The delay with which countries asked 
for aid exacerbated the market conditions. 
The ECB’s decision on 6 September 2012 to prepare a 
programme of open market transactions (OMT) to buy government 
bonds, potentially in large quantities, to reduce the risk of an exit 
from the euro, increased the benefits a country can enjoy from an 
adjustment programme agreed with the IMF and the European 
Union. In fact, the effectiveness of measures taken to adjust public 
budgets depends also on other economic policies, in particular 
monetary policy. As textbooks point out, to be sustainable a 
restrictive fiscal policy must be accompanied by an accommodative 
monetary policy that translates into lower interest rates not only for 
the public sector, but also the private sector. In the European context, 
a country that does not resort to external aid because it refuses the 
conditionality cannot fully benefit from the expansionary monetary 
policy implemented by the central bank. 
Without the benefit of low interest rates and an expansionary 
monetary policy, fiscal tightening risks making things worse. The 
problem comes not only from the interest on the public debt, 
measured by the so-called ‘spread’, but also the negative effect 
produced by the high interest rates on the conditions under which 
bank credit is granted to the private sector. Monetary conditions that 
are too restrictive frustrate the fiscal adjustment. 
Nevertheless, countries such as Italy or Spain – which even 
after the ECB’s September 2012 announcement continued to have 
interest rates that were higher than those in other eurozone states – 
did not ask for help from international institutions as they sought to 
make the adjustments on their own. The political cost for the 
government in office was evidently considered higher than the 
advantage of a lower interest rate, which would surely have 
benefited the economy. In the Italian case, the adoption of an 
adjustment programme signed by all parties before the February 
2013 elections, as happened in Portugal in 2011, might have reduced 
political uncertainty. 
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One must reflect on the need to reduce the incentives 
governments have to delay the request for aid, which entails 
significant costs for the system and risks spreading contagion to 
other countries in need. One way would be to create a system of 
automatic aid that kicks in when the interest rate differential (spread) 
exceeds a certain threshold. The mechanism could be similar to that 
provided in the treaty for the excessive deficit procedure that is 
triggered when the deficit exceeds 3% of gross domestic product. In 
this case, a country would begin a programme, possibly also as a 
precaution, when the differential on interest rates exceeds a 
predetermined level, for example 200 basis points, which is also the 
threshold for evaluating the degree of convergence of a country that 
is seeking to join the euro. If a country is not allowed to join the euro 
with a yield differential of more than 200 basis points, neither should 
it, once within the single currency, be able to hit such a large spread 
without having to adopt corrective measures. 
The adoption of fiscal and economic measures agreed with 
European or international institutions should not be demonised. 
Membership in the single currency entails in itself a loss – or a 
sharing – of sovereignty, including on public finances. EU rules 
already obligate countries to submit annually a stability programme 
to show that their multi-year budgetary plans are consistent with the 
3% limit set on budget deficits. If they breach the limit they are 
subjected to strict monitoring procedures. The fiscal compact rules 
adopted in 2012 further strengthened EU procedures by reducing the 
room for manoeuvre that countries have over their budgetary 
policies. 
Structural reforms are the main sticking point when comparing 
existing procedures to an adjustment programme agreed with the 
European Union. These measures are the competency of member 
states and there are no binding mechanisms comparable to those that 
apply to national budgets. A mechanism of heightened 
macroeconomic surveillance was agreed at the end of 2011. Based on 
structural indicators, it aims to identify imbalances and find 
corrective measures. However, structural reforms are the hardest for 
national parliaments to approve because they threaten the interests 
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of lobbies that are usually well represented in parliament. This was 
the case with Greece and other countries that requested help. The 
difficulty of carrying out structural reforms should provide a 
compelling motive for a country to resort to external constraints on 
its sovereignty. 
The reluctance of countries to undergo adjustment programmes 
arises from the lack of awareness by the public and the political class 
that the monetary union is de facto already a political union, 
imperfect as it is. Europe is often asked to do more, but when the 
institutions give recommendations for areas still overseen by 
national authorities, it is considered interference. The most evident 
example was French President François Hollande’s negative reaction 
at the end of May 2013 to the European Commission’s 
recommendations for implementing a series of structural reforms, 
including of the overly generous pension system, in exchange for 
having two more years to reduce the budget deficit below the 3% 
threshold. According to the French newspaper Le Monde, Hollande 
did not want to be perceived by the French people as being subject to 
European institutions, although the latter were fully legitimated – 
and even required – to make such recommendations. This is the 
contradiction in which Europe and its citizens permanently live. 
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12. IT’S THE BANKS’ FAULT 
he banking system is at the centre of the European and global crises. The 
banks lent too much and were not rigorous enough in deciding who to 
lend to. They were saved by taxpayers and they did not lend enough to 
help the system emerge from the crisis. For a system that should have been better 
regulated, it suffered many faults, perhaps too many. 
In Europe the banking sector plays a central role in providing 
financing for the economic system. The situation is different in the 
United States where capital is raised mainly through the stock and 
bond markets. The overall size of the European banking system 
increased in the years preceding the crisis due to the strong demand 
for credit from households and businesses, especially in high-growth 
countries like Spain and Ireland. The banks’ role grew also because 
they began to borrow from other banks by issuing bonds on the 
market, thereby increasing the system’s financial leverage and 
making it more fragile. 
The banks went in this direction for several reasons. In high-
growth countries, financing domestic demand required an influx of 
foreign capital, which the banking system was mainly tasked with 
intermediating. The banks in countries with deficits turned to the 
capital and interbank markets, increasing their ability to lend. Even 
in countries with a high propensity to save, such as Germany, banks 
had the incentive to take on debt because of the relatively low 
interest rates, such as those for the liquidity provided by the 
European Central Bank or directly on the market. These funds were 
then invested in the interbank market and in the government bonds 
of other countries, taking advantage of the spread between interest 
rates and the absence of exchange rate risk. 
In the years before the crisis, German banks were among the 
biggest borrowers both on international markets, thanks to their 
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good credit standing, and through the liquidity provided by the 
central bank. German banks in turn lent to the banks in the rapidly 
expanding countries in southern Europe or in international markets. 
This increase in financial leverage allowed the lenders to improve 
profitability and boost their stock prices. 
At the outbreak of the crisis various points of fragility in the 
European banking system came to the fore. First, it had lent to 
sectors such as real estate that had grown disproportionately and 
had to be scaled back due to the bursting of the speculative bubble. 
This led to significant losses for the banks. In addition, the system 
was heavily interconnected and the ripple effects quickly spread the 
contagion. Given the large size of the banks’ balance sheets, not only 
with respect to the capital they had lent but also considering the 
economies of their respective countries, any bank bailout would 
necessarily be very costly and could cripple public finances. 
The segmentation of bank regulation and supervision helped 
make the system even more fragile. The monetary union was 
launched without integrating the oversight of the banking system. 
Each country continued to monitor its banks with potentially 
perverse incentives. The objective of each bank supervisor, in fact, 
was not only to guarantee the stability of its system, but also to 
promote its competitiveness. This encouraged national authorities to 
protect their systems by limiting the licenses given to foreign banks. 
This was possible, despite the integrated financial market, thanks to 
the margin of discretion that European legislation left to the national 
authorities. The lack of controls or reporting on the countries’ use of 
the discretion granted to them hindered the creation of a truly 
integrated banking system. Some banks appealed against the 
decisions of the regulatory authority, but with little success. 
In some countries, the national authorities tried to favour the 
oversized growth of their banking system through ‘light’ regulation 
in order to attract new banks and develop the country’s financial 
centre. The respective governments encouraged this trend because of 
the tax revenue derived from the banking sector. When the first 
difficulties emerged, the national authorities were reluctant to reveal 
to other countries the extent of the problem for fear that foreign 
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banks could come forward to acquire ailing domestic lenders. 
Solutions were sought at the local level so as to protect the domestic 
banks. 
In summary, the decentralised system proved to be inefficient, 
undermined competition, hindered financial integration and when 
problems arose exacerbated the cost for taxpayers. 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 showed 
how risky it is to let a bank fail in the midst of a financial and 
economic crisis. The cost to the taxpayer ends up increasing 
considerably. In theory, if a bank is in trouble the ideal solution is to 
have it acquired by a healthier rival that can absorb the losses. When 
this is not possible, the only option is to use public funds to 
recapitalise the bank, restructure it and put it back in condition to 
operate profitably. This solution, if carried out quickly and 
transparently, makes it possible to prevent the flight of depositors 
and potential creditors. It avoids spreading contagion to the rest of 
the banking system and maintains the stability of the financial 
system. 
This type of intervention, however, is opposed by the 
shareholders of the banks, because it dilutes their shares. Bank 
executives are also against it because government intervention is 
usually accompanied by legislation that restricts their actions and 
limits their remuneration. The intervention by the state is also 
opposed by the public, which does not understand why taxpayers’ 
money should be used to prop up banks that made huge profits in 
the past and were partly responsible for the crisis due to their 
reckless investment decisions. The rescue of the banking sector is 
costly not only financially, but also politically. 
It takes great strength and political will to overcome these 
obstacles and act decisively to resolve a banking crisis. There are 
plenty of precedents, particularly in Northern Europe during the 
crisis of the early 1990s. 
The US government dealt with the crisis by subjecting the 
biggest banks to a stress test to evaluate the adequacy of their capital 
base in relation to their balance sheet and to see if there were any 
negative situations regarding the banks’ economic activity or the 
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value of their shares and loans. When the minimum amount of 
capital was not satisfied, the bank had to carry out a capital increase 
within a brief period of time.  
The banks that failed the stress test were to receive an injection 
of public money if they were unable to raise the funds on the market. 
The result of the stress tests carried out in the United States in early 
2009 highlighted a number of critical issues that regulators and the 
Treasury addressed with an immediate recapitalisation of all the 
banks. The American operation was successful. The capital increases 
calmed the markets and the banking system remained solid. Within a 
year many banks were able to return the capital they had received 
and the taxpayer lost nothing. 
In Europe things turned out differently. The stress tests on the 
banks were done only in the first half of 2010 by the national 
authorities with limited coordination at the European level. Some of 
the basic assumptions, such as the change in housing prices, were too 
cautious. The impact of a wider variation in the prices of government 
bonds was not taken into consideration. In the Irish case, the most-
troubled bank was not even submitted to the test with the excuse 
that it had already been nationalised. Initially the publication of the 
results was not planned. 
The results, published in July 2010 under pressure from the 
markets, were not well received. Fewer than ten banks were found to 
be below the minimum capital threshold, a non-credible result. The 
markets became convinced at that point that the national authorities 
were minimising the problems of their banking systems and had no 
intention of confronting them seriously. The confidence in the ability 
of authorities to deal with the euro crisis effectively became so 
tarnished that the crisis began to extend to other countries and the 
financial sector. 
The publication by international institutions, particularly the 
IMF, of much bigger estimates for non-performing loans undermined 
further the credibility of the decentralised system of regulation. 
The connection between bank risk and sovereign risk has also 
long been underestimated. European banks invested heavily in 
government bonds thanks in part to regulations that drove them to 
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do so. The progressive deterioration in the credit quality of the public 
sector was transmitted directly to the banking system. The more a 
country’s public debt is at risk, the more risk there is for the banks 
that have a high proportion of their assets tied up in that public debt. 
A sovereign debt restructuring may cause the default of the banking 
sector, as happened in Greece. Conversely, a distressed banking 
system that must be stabilised with public funds can put public 
finances in danger. Saving the insolvent banks threatens to make the 
public debt unsustainable and the risk is that the banking default 
causes a sovereign default as seen in Ireland.  
Doubts about the solvency of the banking system hindered the 
proper functioning of the interbank market beginning in 2007, a 
situation that became more pronounced in the second half of 2010. 
The banks in countries with savings surpluses progressively stopped 
extending loans to countries running external deficits. Financial 
markets were no longer willing to buy bonds issued by banks in 
those countries. Without external financing, the banks would have 
rapidly had to reduce their loans to households and companies. The 
economic system risked collapsing. 
In such difficult conditions only the European Central Bank 
could step in to finance the banks. This type of intervention, 
however, can only be a temporary solution for restoring confidence 
and ensuring the system has enough liquidity. It cannot solve the 
real cause of the problem, which is connected to the insufficient 
capital base. With national authorities tasked with determining 
which banks in their own jurisdictions should be recapitalised and 
under what conditions, there is an incentive to underestimate the 
problems so as to induce the European Central Bank to continue 
providing liquidity to all, including insolvent banks. 
If the banking system is not recapitalised through public or 
private funds, financial leverage is reduced on the asset side. This 
can be done in two ways. The first is to reduce the share of 
government bonds held by the banks. However, if the banks stop 
buying their country’s public debt, the risk increases that the 
demand for that debt will be insufficient and the impact on interest 
rates can destabilise public finances and the banking system as a 
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whole. The national authorities therefore have an incentive to 
pressure the banking system to purchase public debt, especially 
when the interest rate differential is high and the success of the bond 
auctions is at risk. 
These pressures are not entirely unjustified if the country is 
solvent. In a highly volatile market, any funding difficulties, which 
can arise in particular with dysfunctional markets, are immediately 
transferred to the share prices of the banks. It is therefore in the 
interest of the banking system that the state is adequately financed. 
Moreover, given the advantageous rates at which banks obtain 
liquidity from the ECB, investing in government bonds is profitable 
and over time allows the bank to increase its capital if profits are not 
all redistributed. However, if the banks purchase government bonds, 
the link between sovereign risk and bank risk can become 
destabilising. 
To decrease their leverage, the only thing banks can do is 
reduce their loans to the private sector. Financing dries up with 
recessionary effects on economic activity. This strategy leads to self-
inflicted wounds because the economic downturn caused by the 
difficulty in obtaining loans increases the likelihood of defaults in the 
banking sector by weakening its capital base. The inability to 
recapitalise the banking system adequately risks producing highly 
recessionary effects on economic activity, which is already burdened 
by the consequences of a tight fiscal policy.  
The political system is unable to escape the perverse web of 
contrasting forces: people’s disdain for the banks, bankers’ aversion 
to public intervention, regulators’ fear of revealing critical situations 
in the banking sector, fear of the effect on government bonds and the 
pride of governments that motivates them not to seek help from 
international institutions. The result is inaction, which in turn leads 
to a credit crunch – a drying up of bank credit –which strangles the 
economy. 
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13. BANKING UNION 
o break the unhealthy link between sovereign risk and bank risk, which 
threatens the euro’s very existence, the European banking system must be 
fully integrated with a single set of regulations, a single supervisor and a 
single mechanism for crisis resolution. To accomplish this, national authorities 
must cede a part of their sovereignty, but they are willing to do this only when a 
crisis forces their hand. 
In the United States the financial system is the main mechanism for 
absorbing economic crises that develop locally. When one of the 
states is hit by economic or financial difficulties the local banking 
system is only partially affected because it is integrated into a larger 
system. In 2009-10 many small US banks failed without much 
consequence for the regional economic systems because an important 
part of the credit had been granted by national banks, banks based in 
other states less affected by the crisis or capital markets. The troubled 
local public finances did not dramatically impact the banking system 
because the banks had not invested heavily in municipal or local 
securities and the rescue of troubled banks was not carried out with 
public funds from the states, but with federal funds. The local 
economy and local public finance are therefore not linked to the 
banking system as in Europe. 
Since the beginning of the monetary union some have sustained 
that it is not possible to govern an integrated financial system, such 
as that of the euro, without a single regulatory authority and 
integrated supervision. It was argued that keeping national systems, 
even under the umbrella of European legislation, would hinder 
market integration for the reasons outlined in the previous chapter. 
Without a unified system, an economic crisis or problems with a 
member state’s public finances would have caused a chain reaction 
that could have threatened the very existence of the euro. 
T 
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After the launch of the euro, various working groups were set 
up to consider the need to move towards an integration of the 
regulatory systems and banking supervision. The most noteworthy 
groups were led by Alexandre Lamfalussy, former President of the 
European Monetary Institute, and Jacques de Larosière, former 
Director General of the International Monetary Fund. The two 
reports, published respectively in 2001 and 2009, both concluded that 
the present system was not adequate, but they did not have the 
courage to propose the institutional leap towards a fully integrated 
system. It took the euro crisis to convince the European Council, in 
June 2012, to create a banking union. 
National authorities have long opposed the unification of 
banking supervision with the argument that the costs of banking 
crises are ultimately paid for by taxpayers of the respective countries: 
“Banks can be born European, but they die nationally.” This is why 
national authorities, who must answer to their country’s political 
institutions, have maintained the responsibility for banking 
supervision. 
From the second half of the 1990s there has been the tendency 
to separate supervision and monetary policy, giving the former to an 
institution that reports directly to the government. The reason for 
this separation is the potential conflict of interest between monetary 
policy and supervisory activities, which can lead to an 
underestimation of the banking system’s solvency risk and induce an 
attempt to use monetary policy to solve prudential problems. 
According to this view, a central bank that is responsible for both 
supervision and monetary policy might be tempted to steer the latter 
to solve problems linked to financial stability at the expense of price 
stability. For example, the central bank could be tempted to delay an 
increase in interest rates to foster more profitable conditions for the 
banks and enable them to overcome a difficult period. Errors in 
supervision can more easily be covered by the central bank through 
targeted injections of liquidity aimed at compensating the banking 
system’s solvency problems. 
The euro crisis showed that these fears were unfounded. 
Keeping surveillance at the national level and separated from 
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monetary policy was a mistake. In an integrated monetary system 
the problems that can arise due to insufficient supervision are paid 
not only by taxpayers from that country, but from all countries in the 
currency area. The Irish experience showed that the rescue of a 
banking system that was supervised poorly and had been allowed to 
grow too big was paid for not only by Irish taxpayers, but also by 
those in other eurozone countries: in a direct way through the aid 
provided to Ireland and indirectly through the contagion to the 
banking systems of other countries. 
It is therefore in the interest of each country’s taxpayers that 
their national banking system is well regulated and supervised, but 
also that those of the other eurozone countries are as well. 
Supervisory authorities therefore cannot be accountable only to the 
taxpayers of their country, but also must answer to the other EU 
countries. This requires an integrated system. 
With regard to the conflict of interest between banking 
supervision and monetary policy, the experience of the crisis showed 
that a separation of the two activities creates problems for both. To 
avoid financing banks that are having solvency problems and not 
merely a liquidity crisis, the central bank needs to know the health of 
each bank, in terms of its capital base, asset quality and liability 
profile. During the crisis, the European Central Bank had to make do 
with the information provided by the national authorities, which in 
theory certainly have the ability to assess the conditions of their 
banks, but which also have the incentive to underestimate solvency 
problems. The ECB therefore was unable to assess whether the 
liquidity injected into the banking system was adequate or if instead 
it risked creating distortions. 
The separation between the two activities has had a negative 
effect not only in the eurozone, but also in countries like the United 
Kingdom where the Bank of England lost its supervisory role in 1997. 
In summary, the problem regarding conflict of interest is 
relevant only if the central bank is not independent and does not 
have a clear mandate. However, if the statutory objective of 
monetary policy is price stability, it is unlikely that a central bank 
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would have the incentive to make monetary decisions to favour the 
banking system while jeopardising the realisation of its mandate. 
Another argument that has been used to argue that the 
European Central Bank should not have a supervisory role is that 
such activities cannot be independent of political authorities given 
the effect a banking crisis has on public finances. This view in reality 
hides the desire to exert political influence on the regulator. 
Supervisory decisions may in fact have an impact on taxpayers that 
is as important as monetary policy. Moreover, experience shows that 
in countries where supervisory activities are handled by institutions 
that are not independent, such as in the UK and Germany, the cost to 
taxpayers has been higher. The less independent institutions are in 
fact more easily influenced by banking lobbies and tend to 
deregulate the system and monitor it in a more friendly way. Also, 
when difficulties arise in the banking system, political influence 
leads to a delay in finding solutions for fear of having to ask 
parliament and public opinion for public funds. The result is that the 
difficulties worsen and the impact on public finances increases. 
At the height of the crisis in June 2012 the heads of government 
in the eurozone realised that for the euro to survive institutional 
steps had to be taken to solve the fragility of the single currency’s 
construction. The first of these steps was the banking union. 
The agreement on the banking union was an important turning 
point that put an end to the attempt, which had lasted since the 
launch of the euro, to maintain supervision of the banking system at 
the national level. The decision, reached in December 2012, lays the 
foundation for an integrated system of supervision. The practical 
implementation will depend on the ability of the European Central 
Bank to complement the activities carried out so far by the national 
authorities. The process will take time. The biggest risk for the 
central bank is to its reputation. In the past, the credibility of central 
banks, also with regard to monetary policy, was negatively affected 
mainly by problems encountered in the field of supervision. This was 
one of the reasons that led some countries in the past to separate the 
two activities, a step that has however proved to be counter-
productive. The problem of reputation can be solved by separating 
AUSTERITY  91 
inside the central bank the decision-making bodies responsible for 
monetary policy from those that look after supervision. A total 
separation, however, is neither possible nor desirable. There are in 
fact synergies between the two areas that must be exploited to the 
fullest in order to obtain the best possible result. 
The real solution to the problem is the independence of the 
supervisory authority, which is one of the cornerstones of 
international regulatory principles. A central bank that is 
independent from both political authorities and banking lobbies is 
less susceptible to pressures and therefore less tempted to cover up 
any insolvency issues. From this point of view the European Central 
Bank, which is further removed from the individual governments 
and banks than its national counterparts (in the same way that the 
European antitrust authority is freer from local pressures), should be 
able to regulate autonomously and scrupulously. 
The second component of the banking union concerns deposit 
insurance. A single system reduces the risk of contagion by allowing 
for the repayment of depositors up to a maximum amount without 
weighing on a country’s public finances. This entails, however, 
having the depositors of all countries willing to bear the 
consequences of a banking crisis that affects another country. This is 
acceptable if all banks are subject to the same regulations and 
supervision, otherwise there is a risk of moral hazard. 
Given the size of bank deposits in Europe and the limited scope 
of integrated banking supervision, a single system of European 
deposit insurance for now remains a mirage. 
The third component of a banking union is a regime of crisis 
resolution that can count on a single fund. In this case an integrated 
system avoids burdening the public finances of a single country 
thereby reducing the potentially explosive link between sovereign 
risk and bank risk. This mechanism however can only come into 
force after all the banks have been subjected to the same regulator. 
A stronger banking union can help accelerate the recovery from 
the crisis by restoring credibility to the system and easing the credit 
crunch that threatens to linger in various parts of the continent. 
Integrated supervision in fact would allow for a more credible 
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assessment of the financial conditions of European banks, reducing 
the natural tendency of the national authorities to underestimate the 
problems. It would also make it possible to give the governments of 
the member countries clear choices in terms of recapitalising the 
system, as happened in the United States in 2009, without 
preferential treatment and with effective measures. It would facilitate 
the implementation of counter-cyclical measures in a uniform and 
credible way in all the member countries so as to counteract the 
tendency to reduce leverage too quickly, which aggravates the 
economic situation. 
These favourable effects on the European economy are 
contrasted with the political costs to those who currently hold the 
powers in these matters and would have to give them up. 
| 93  
 
14. DYING BY AUSTERITY 
he budgetary measures put in place to restore the health of public finances 
had strong recessionary effects and worsened the debt dynamics in the 
short term. The adjustment should be spread over time to dilute the 
recessionary effect, but this is possible only if, and until, the state can borrow on 
the financial markets in a sustainable manner. 
The economies of European countries that have implemented 
restructuring measures to cope with the financial crisis entered a 
long, worse-than-expected recession. The debt burden increased. 
This has led some to question the suitability of the economic policy 
followed in Europe. There is no doubt that austerity puts the brake 
on growth, at least in the short term, and that without growth it is 
not possible to set right public finances in a lasting way. On the other 
hand, if the public finances are not cleaned up in time, debt becomes 
unsustainable and the country may lose access to financial markets. 
At that point, austerity is no longer avoidable and it has an even 
more negative impact on growth. 
The objective of economic policy is therefore to ensure the 
sustainability of the public debt by fine tuning the fiscal 
consolidation measures so as to favour a budgetary adjustment that 
is not excessively recessionary. International Monetary Fund studies 
have shown that the recessionary effect of recent austerity policies 
was larger than expected. A fiscal adjustment may produce a more-
than-proportional decrease in income, increasing debt in the short-
term. This does not mean, however, that public finances do not need 
to be put in order. But the adjustment must be implemented in the 
most gradual way possible to avoid excessive austerity that produces 
a debt spiral. 
Whether austerity becomes excessive is mainly a question of 
how and when the adjustment of public finances takes place. Let’s 
T 
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start with the how. To avoid an excessively recessionary impact, one 
must first understand what factors caused the deficits. There is a 
difference if the deficit was caused by a reduction in tax revenues or 
an increase in public spending and this must be taken into account in 
the adjustment. If the problem is an increase in spending, as was 
clearly the case in Greece where salaries in the public sector more 
than doubled in ten years, the correction should be carried out 
mainly on that side. If the correction is instead made on the revenue 
side through an increase in taxation, it becomes much more 
detrimental to economic growth. Likewise, if the deficit has arisen 
from an overestimation of economic growth, which in turn leads to 
lower tax revenues than expected, an adjustment carried out through 
a tax increase can be detrimental because it contributes to reducing 
growth further. If the deficit is instead caused by an unsustainable 
tax cut, raising taxes may be unavoidable. 
When the public finance measures do not aim to correct the 
causes of the imbalances, one cannot speak of excessive austerity, but 
rather of erroneous austerity measures. The problem is not the size of 
the correction, but the unbalanced mix of expenditures and revenue. 
In Italy, for instance, the efforts to cut the deficit have mainly 
focused on the revenue side of the equation even though the main 
causes were the constant increase in public spending and insufficient 
economic growth. 
From 1999 onwards, the budgets were almost always based on 
growth forecasts that turned out to be higher than what actually 
occurred due to an overestimation of the potential growth of the 
Italian economy (on average 1 percentage point per year from 1999 to 
2006 and 1.6 percentage points from 2007 to 2012). Tax revenues 
therefore came in lower than expected thus increasing the borrowing 
requirement. The few times where growth and thus tax revenues 
were higher than estimates, such as in 2000 and 2007, the extra funds 
were used to finance increased spending rather than cut taxes or the 
debt. 
Public spending in several sectors grew more than gross 
domestic product. The salaries of civil servants offer one example. If 
following the introduction of the euro public salaries had increased 
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at the same rate as in the private sector and the number of civil 
servants had remained unchanged, in 2010 the Italian deficit would 
have been about 3 percentage points less of GDP. This means not 
only that austerity measures would not have been necessary, in 
particular in 2011 and 2012, but also that the country would have 
been better sheltered from the financial market turmoil with positive 
effects on growth. 
One wonders why public finances tend to be brought in line 
through adjustments on the revenue side (i.e. tax hikes). The first 
reason is that corrective measures are put in place in emergency 
situations when the confidence of the markets is at stake. At that 
point, raising funds through a tax increase is more likely to work. In 
addition, the increase in revenue is simpler to implement given the 
relatively limited number of taxes on which to intervene. A reduction 
in spending instead requires selective measures, the effectiveness of 
which depends on the ability to modify existing contracts and control 
local spending. In Italy, in 2012 it took several months to implement 
a spending review that proved to be complex and produced limited 
savings. Even linear cuts, with similar cost cuts across all sectors, 
which seem easier to implement, prove difficult because they unite 
the opposition of all the beneficiaries of public spending. 
It is a paradox that the austerity measures implemented on the 
revenue side that are the most damaging to economic activity are 
politically easier to adopt in emergency situations. The discontent in 
public opinion rises after the emergency has passed and the 
recessionary impact on growth becomes apparent. It is equally 
paradoxical that the structural reforms that increase the potential for 
economic growth and help reduce the recessionary impact of the 
deficit cutting measures are the most difficult to pass, even in an 
emergency, due to the opposition of vested interests well-
represented in parliament. Even when facing an emergency the 
reforms are postponed until after the fiscal adjustment, when market 
pressure will have diminished and the powers seeking to conserve 
their profitable positions will have grown stronger. Without reforms, 
austerity becomes excessive because it is applied to a rigid and 
uncompetitive economic system. 
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The second yardstick to assess whether austerity is excessive 
concerns the timing of the deficit reduction measures. 
Putting off fiscal rigour, or diluting it over time, is possible only 
when financial markets are willing to finance the public sector’s 
borrowing needs at sustainable rates. This depends on several factors 
including the level of public debt, the credibility of the adjustment 
programme, the country’s political stability, the potential that 
contagion will spread the crisis to other countries and the financial 
markets’ degree of risk aversion. It is not possible to identify with 
precision the impact that each factor can have on the continually 
changing assessment that financial markets make regarding the 
sustainability of a country’s public debt. Markets do not react in a 
linear fashion to an economy’s underlying performance, including 
the imbalances in public finances. Markets can continue to finance 
deficits for a long time in the expectation that sooner or later 
corrective measures will be taken. At the same time, markets can 
quickly change their opinion in the face of unexpected events and 
can call into question the sustainability of the country’s debt. 
Until 2008, the financial markets considered the public debt of 
countries like Italy and Spain to have a degree of risk comparable to 
that of France or Germany. The Greek crisis, and then the meltdowns 
in Ireland and Portugal, initially infected the other Mediterranean 
countries only to a limited extent and interest rates remained at 
sustainable levels. The markets rapidly changed opinion in spring 
2011 and began to consider Italy and Spain increasingly at risk of 
insolvency. The interest rate differentials, which until then had been 
contained, widened to extremely high levels. It is not easy to 
determine with precision what factors influenced market 
expectations. An important aspect was certainly the deterioration of 
growth conditions, which made it more difficult to bring down 
deficits and put at risk the sustainability of public debt. Another 
factor was the political difficulty in both countries in adopting 
corrective measures. An important role was also played by the 
contagion arising from the Greek debt restructuring that began in the 
spring and was implemented in stages. Some of these factors were in 
part unpredictable just a few months before and the governments 
AUSTERITY  97 
probably thought they had more time to implement adjustment 
programmes only to find themselves unprepared when the market 
situation worsened. 
The problem is that governments look at markets through the 
rear-view mirror while the markets are busy trying to anticipate 
governments’ next moves. Governments have a tendency to think 
that favourable debt financing conditions will last forever and that 
there is always more time to take corrective measures on the budget. 
The adjustment effort therefore gets diluted over a long period of 
time as part of a gradual approach to consolidation of public 
finances. When the general market conditions change due to an 
economic slowdown, a domestic political crisis or contagion caused 
by external factors, the timing of the adjustment must be rapidly 
shortened. Recovering confidence at that point requires much more 
drastic and punitive measures for the economy. When governments 
are too slow in implementing the changes needed to ensure the 
sustainability of the country’s public finances and act only under the 
pressure of financial markets, austerity becomes excessive. The 
problem is that at that point there are no alternatives. 
If the Greek government of Papandreou had taken convincing 
steps beginning in the fall of 2009 to regain control of public finances, 
the country’s adjustment and that of the entire eurozone probably 
would have been less dramatic. The same applies to the other 
countries that subsequently entered into crisis, from Ireland to Italy, 
and adopted corrective measures only after losing the confidence of 
the markets. At that point draconian measures were needed to regain 
confidence and continue to finance the debt at sustainable interest 
rates. 
The excessive austerity is not a product of the fiscal 
consolidation itself, but rather of having waited too long to 
implement it. No government is willing to recognise this. It is easier 
to blame the financial markets that have stopped funding the 
country’s public debt at a low cost. 
The other favourite scapegoats for those unable to consolidate 
public finances preventively are the European institutions and the 
governments of creditor countries that are guilty of imposing too 
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much austerity. Experience shows that, if anything, the European 
institutions should have monitored more rigorously in periods of 
buoyant financial markets so as to prevent governments from 
delaying for too long the corrective measures needed to improve 
their public finances. They also should have taken into greater 
account the fact that the apparent good condition of public finances 
in some countries before the crisis, such as Ireland and Spain, was in 
part due to the unsustainable growth of domestic demand that 
boosted tax revenues. Moreover, without the help of the European 
institutions the countries that lost access to the financial markets 
would have had to implement even more restrictive adjustment 
policies. Greece, Ireland and Portugal would probably have 
defaulted, with even worse recessionary effects. European aid 
allowed countries to spread their corrective measures over time. The 
problem, as pointed out in Chapter 11, is rather that struggling 
countries accepted external aid only at the last minute. Excessive 
austerity is the price to pay for national pride. 
The search for scapegoats and dumping on others the job of 
implementing consolidation measures, which is the responsibility of 
the individual countries, undermined confidence within the EU and 
towards the EU. It did not help countries focus on the causes of the 
crisis or find a consensus to resolve them. Countries consequently 
realised too late what problems they faced and responded with 
excessive measures, which at that point had become inevitable. 
The risk of dying by austerity is attributable only to the inability 
of political institutions to make the right decisions at the right time. 
| 99 
 
15. NATIONAL AUSTERITY AND EUROPEAN 
GROWTH 
f structural reforms are postponed until after fiscal consolidation, the 
political costs of those reforms increases and they tend to be watered down. 
Growth stagnates and at that point the only option is to appeal to Europe to 
promote growth policies. And though Europe does not have effective tools for 
stimulating growth – which the member states have not wanted to grant to the EU 
– it gets accused of not doing its part. 
The euro crisis is largely a balance of payments crisis, which was 
thought could not occur within a monetary union with full capital 
mobility and no exchange rate risk. But when a country grows 
systematically beyond its potential and loses competiveness, it 
borrows too much from the rest of the world – as has happened in 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal that in less than ten years accumulated 
external debt of about 100% of GDP – and the risk of investing there 
rises to worrying levels and can lead a sudden stop of financial 
flows. At that point, the adjustment becomes very painful. 
In a monetary area an external deficit can be corrected through 
a combination of measures that aim to suppress domestic demand so 
as to reduce imports and stimulate supply by improving the 
competitiveness of exports. The combination of the two types of 
measures depends on each country’s economic policy choices. The 
adjustment on the demand side has a direct impact on the external 
deficit, but the negative effect on growth and employment is just as 
strong. The adjustment on the supply side has a more favourable 
impact on economic activity because it promotes sectors driven by 
demand coming from the global economy. However, it is more 
complex because it requires structural reforms and cost control 
measures that are politically difficult to implement. 
I 
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The competitiveness of a country depends on its ability to 
attract productive investments and the relative prices of its exports. 
There are several indicators that measure the competitive positioning 
of a country, both structural and in terms of costs. Nearly all the 
structural indicators place Italy, Spain and other Southern European 
countries at the bottom of the rankings due to the hurdles companies 
face as a result of a complex bureaucracy, a slow judicial system, 
corruption, outdated infrastructure and a high tax burden. These 
countries lost competitiveness also in terms of costs as salaries rose 
faster than productivity and as a result of a high tax wedge, which 
represents the difference between the gross salary paid by companies 
and the net received by the worker. The obsolete infrastructure also 
inflates the costs of international transportation. If the time necessary 
for logistics and bureaucratic proceedings at the Italian port were the 
same as in the Netherlands, Genoa could become one of the main 
hubs for global trade, benefitting Italian firms and the local economy. 
The competitiveness of individual companies largely depends 
on the ability of their home country to provide services at costs 
similar to or lower than those of other countries. Improving 
productivity thus requires action at a national level, in order to align 
costs and procedures to those of other countries. Such measures, 
however, are not easy to adopt in a country that has an ingrained 
aversion to change and is bound by a commitment to reduce its 
budget deficit and public debt. To boost their competitiveness these 
countries must intervene in all the areas where they lag behind the 
best performers: public administration, judicial system, overdue 
payments from the state to companies, corruption, labour market, 
research and development, liberalising closed professions and 
infrastructure. The continued failure to act along these lines explains 
why a country like Italy for years has recorded the lowest growth 
rate among European countries. 
 These reforms are politically costly because they promote 
competition and threaten sheltered positions. The opposition of 
vested interests blocks a democracy’s ability to reform. In order to 
overcome resistance, economists suggest compensating those 
affected by the reforms. This is difficult, however, when public 
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resources are scant. Reforms are generally tackled only after fiscal 
measures have been adopted to face the emergency situation at 
which point there are no resources left to give to those who have 
been hurt by the reforms. 
Moreover, competitiveness depends also on the tax burden, 
which distorts the allocation of resources. The experience of the 
higher-growth European countries shows that public funds should 
be directed with priority to education and research and 
development, which have an effect on medium-term growth 
potential. Fiscal policy is a tool used both to make it attractive to 
invest and to reduce the tax wedge with the goal of cutting labour 
costs. These measures do not weigh on the budget if they are offset 
by counterbalancing measures that penalise current public spending 
– in particular the salaries of public employees and intermediate 
consumption – and steer taxation towards consumption and income. 
In Italy, public finances have for years gone in the opposite 
direction of what was needed to improve the country’s 
competitiveness. Current spending rose at the expense of research 
and development, which is among the lowest in Europe, and 
taxation tried to incentivise consumption and real estate. The result 
has been the slowest growth rate in Europe over the last 20 years. 
Competitiveness depends ultimately on the dynamics of prices 
and costs. Italy and Spain also lost competitiveness in this field prior 
to the crisis and subsequently have been unable to reduce the gap. 
Inflation remained above the eurozone average after 2008 despite the 
countries’ lower growth. In 2012, Italy’s real effective exchange rate, 
which measures the inverse of competitiveness with the main 
trading partners, was about 40% higher compared with the launch of 
the euro, the same level reached in 2008 before the crisis. Spain 
instead recovered about 20 points of competiveness between 2008 
and 2012 while Ireland gained 40 points. 
Italy’s loss of competitiveness is largely the result of stagnating 
productivity in the face of constant wage increases in both the 
manufacturing and services sectors. The mismatching between 
productivity and salaries is due to the fact that in Italy, unlike in the 
rest of Europe, wage negotiations are not linked to companies’ 
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performance. This discourages companies from investing in their 
human capital and hampers productivity gains. 
The difficulty in implementing robust reforms to improve 
competitiveness means that the external adjustment falls largely on 
the demand side and is more costly in terms of growth and 
employment. In Italy, for instance, reforms always come second, the 
opposite of what should happen. In this regard it is interesting to 
note that the letter the European Central Bank sent to the Italian 
Government on 5 August 2011, contained as the first 
recommendation a number of structural reforms to boost 
productivity, in particular the liberalisation of local public services 
and of closed professions, privatisations and changes in the labour 
market, welfare system and wage negotiation system. Fiscal 
adjustment came only second with the request of bringing forward 
the balanced budget target to 2013, mainly through spending cuts 
and by completing the pension reform. A third point was related to 
the public administration, in particular the abolition of the provinces. 
Later recommendations by the European Commission set the same 
priorities. Italy did the exact opposite. It first proceeded with the 
fiscal adjustment, chiefly through revenue raising measures, during 
the summer and at the end of 2011. Reforms were tackled only 
during the course of 2012 and carried out only partially. 
The combination of a tighter fiscal policy and incomplete 
structural reforms produced a strongly recessionary impact on the 
economy with negative repercussions in terms of social cohesion and 
the public’s acceptance of the measures taken. In the absence of 
economic growth malaise tends to spread among the population. The 
government’s choices are thus called into question and the blame 
usually falls on fiscal austerity measures rather than the lack of 
reforms. 
This course of action deeply hurts the economic system and 
does not help the government survive. Eventually governments fall 
for failing to revive the economy after carrying out a fiscal 
adjustment. This is what happened in Italy both in 1998, to the 
government headed by Romano Prodi, and in 2012, with the 
executive headed by Mario Monti. 
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Frustration at the economic stagnation hammers the 
government’s approval ratings and motivates the request that EU 
institutions act to stimulate demand. These requests generally refer 
to two types of proposals. The first aims to “loosen the austerity 
straight jacket” to postpone the fiscal adjustment for example by 
excluding public investments from the deficit calculation. The second 
regards EU initiatives, financed with European funds, to build cross-
border infrastructure. Albeit legitimate, these demands create 
unrealistic expectations of the European Union’s ability to promote 
growth in troubled countries and risk drawing attention away from 
the true causes, which are internal, that hamper growth. 
The idea of excluding public investment from budget deficit 
calculations has repeatedly been discussed, and each time has been 
rejected. Measuring public investments and distinguishing them 
from current expenditures is problematic but what is also difficult is 
to assess their actual contribution to economic growth. Countries that 
have poor access to financial markets can justify boosting their debt 
to finance investments only if the multiplier effect on the national 
output is such that over time it leads to a reduction of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. Otherwise, there is a risk that public debt rises further, 
sinking the country into a downward spiral. 
In most cases, the problem of insufficient public investment 
arises from policies that promoted current spending, in particular 
during a fiscal adjustment. It is politically easier to reduce the deficit 
by postponing public works rather than by cutting the salaries of 
civil servants, even when those salaries have risen excessively. Over 
time, distributing public resources in this way hurts the economy 
and leads to a reduction in growth potential. 
Cross-border investment programmes, which are financed with 
EU funds, yield results over the medium-term. They can, however, 
hardly be used as counter cyclical instruments. Besides, such 
investments are usually split among countries based on their share of 
financing, which means it is difficult to funnel sizeable funds to just a 
few specific countries. 
All in all, the EU’s tools for boosting development are limited. 
Europe is often accused of not making decisions, but the motive is 
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the lack of tools. No country wants to hand over powers that affect 
key areas for competitiveness and potential growth, such as the 
labour market or the judicial and education systems. The idea that 
economic growth can only be promoted at a European level is 
seductive, but it clashes with the continent’s institutional and 
political reality. Proof of this lies in the fact that some eurozone 
countries have been able to grow at a considerable pace while 
sticking to budget discipline thanks to internally adopted structural 
reforms. 
To ask the EU to stimulate economic growth risks creating a big 
illusion as well as frustration at the integration process. Fiscal 
discipline must come from the national level just like the ability to 
promote growth, which depends in large part on how the fiscal 
discipline has been implemented. If done well and selectively, fiscal 
discipline creates the conditions for growth and stability. Fiscal 
discipline that is late and poorly thought out becomes austerity and 
hurts growth. 
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16. A GERMAN EUROPE 
f every country became like Germany, then Germany could no longer be 
Germany. If countries with external deficits were the only ones to correct 
their payment imbalances, then demand for exports from countries running 
surpluses like Germany would fall. The economy of the whole eurozone would 
suffer without an alternative source of growth to compensate for the drop in 
demand from countries undergoing a fiscal adjustment. 
Before the financial crisis the eurozone had roughly balanced trade 
with the rest of the world. This led Europeans for a long time to 
believe they were immune to the crisis. But monetary integration in 
the area was not advanced enough to make the internal imbalances 
immune to funding problems. The divergence among national 
economies continued to rise and eventually became unsustainable 
with gaping deficits in peripheral countries such as Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland and rising surpluses in countries such as 
Germany and the Netherlands. If the crisis that originated in the 
United States had not hit Europe then the imbalances would have 
grown even further. 
The correction of imbalances within the eurozone can happen 
symmetrically or asymmetrically. An asymmetrical correction takes 
place chiefly in countries running a balance of payments deficit (such 
as Spain). But its recessionary impact extends also to surplus 
countries (such as Germany) as demand for their goods shrinks. In 
other words not all countries can have a surplus in their balance of 
payments at the same time so for deficits to be cut then surpluses 
must also fall, resulting in a negative impact on the whole area’s 
economic growth. 
A symmetrical adjustment entails a combination of measures to 
curb demand in countries running deficits (such as Spain) and 
stimulate it in surplus countries (such as Germany), which allows 
imbalances in both countries to fall while maintaining a sustained 
I 
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level of economic growth in the area. Stronger demand in a surplus 
country (Germany) helps exports from a deficit country (Spain) and 
softens the impact on growth linked to a lower demand for German 
goods from Spain. 
On paper, the symmetric adjustment is preferable, but it is not 
so simple. International institutions debate the issue whenever they 
discuss an adjustment of the US balance of payments. If the 
adjustment took place only through a contraction in US demand, 
without an increase in demand from surplus countries such as China, 
Japan or Germany, then it would lead to a slowdown in global 
demand. But surplus countries do not want to adopt expansionary 
policies that could undermine their public finances for their 
currency. The only time a concerted symmetric plan was attempted 
was in 1978 at the Bonn G7 summit, which led to European countries 
embracing fiscal stimuli in an attempt to help a correction in US 
imbalances. The outcome, however, was disappointing. The 
immediate impact was an overheating of the world economy that 
subsequently forced countries to adopt tightening measures 
precipitating a recession in the early 1980s. 
The same issue was for years on the table of EU negotiations, 
particularly when discussing the adjustment to be implemented 
within the European Monetary System. The burden of correcting 
imbalances has always fallen on countries whose currencies were 
under downward pressure, had lost competitiveness and ran an 
external deficit. The surplus countries with stronger currencies, in 
particular the German mark, acted as an anchor for the system 
through their stability policies. The adoption of the single currency 
allowed countries to overcome the asymmetry of the monetary 
policy but not of other policies that impact the balance of payments. 
The debate on the symmetry of adjustment is generally 
misguided. It focuses mainly on the correction of external imbalances 
but overlooks both the factors that led to the imbalances and the 
internal consequences of the adjustment in terms of growth and 
inflation. The reason is that while the factors that led to an external 
deficit are usually easy to pinpoint, such as excessively high costs 
and prices as well as booming demand in the face of insufficient 
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supply, the elements behind a current account surplus are not always 
that clear. It can be due to lower-than-potential growth, an increase 
in savings as people look towards retirement or a country’s 
improved competitiveness. 
A symmetric adjustment is appropriate if the country in surplus 
is growing below its potential and has room for an expansionary 
fiscal policy without compromising the sustainability of public 
finances. If, instead, the country in surplus is close to full 
employment and is growing robustly, or its public finances are 
fragile, an expansionary policy risks creating inflation and worsening 
the debt.  
In Germany, for example, the current account surplus increased 
beginning in 2001, when the German economy went into recession 
and the budget deficit rose above the 3% threshold. If fiscal measures 
aimed at stimulating demand had been taken, the deficit would have 
increased still further going against EU recommendations. The 
external surplus continued to increase in subsequent years as the 
economy rapidly recovered, despite the slowdown in countries 
running deficits and even though unemployment continued to fall. 
The public debt stabilised in 2012 at just under 90% of GDP. In these 
circumstances it is not clear whether there is room for a fiscal 
stimulus without jeopardising debt sustainability and fuelling 
inflation. 
Until the outbreak of the crisis wages in Germany had risen 
moderately and less than productivity, which allowed the country to 
recover competitiveness after unification and reduce unemployment 
even during the crisis. In this context, the labour unions are not in 
favour of salary increases that risk reducing the German economy’s 
competitiveness. Moreover, the labour market promotes a high 
degree of flexibility in terms of wages and hours worked that makes 
it possible to sustain employment even in times of shrinking demand 
(as was the case in 2009) and prevent wage increases that result in 
higher costs. 
In summary, the analysis of the scenarios prior to the crisis 
shows that imbalances within the eurozone were created primarily 
by deficit countries as a result of the excessive growth of 
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consumption and wages that were not in line with productivity. The 
correction of imbalances therefore had to fall mainly on them. This is 
why the demands for symmetric adjustment, advanced on several 
occasions in particular by Christine Lagarde, who at the time was 
France’s Minister of Finance (before she became Managing Director 
of the IMF) and claimed that “you need two to tango” have always 
been rejected by Germany. Wolfgang Schäuble, the German Finance 
Minister, has always noted that competitiveness is earned with wage 
moderation and by investing in research and development. He has 
also always said that Germany’s finances are too fragile to risk being 
jeopardised by expansive fiscal policies that would have a limited 
impact on the demand for exports from uncompetitive countries. 
Moreover, with world trade evermore integrated, global 
competitiveness cannot be measured only within the eurozone, but 
must above all be determined in comparison with of the rest of the 
world, including emerging countries that have lower costs. The 
adjustment within the eurozone cannot put at risk the ability to 
compete globally. 
From the German point of view, the external surplus is not the 
result of policy choices, but rather Germans’ high propensity to save 
due to worries about the problems associated with an aging 
population. According to this view, a mature economy like the EU 
should have an external surplus and should export capital to less 
developed countries where growth is faster. The Germans’ strong 
propensity to save, however, also reflects a system of taxation that 
tends to penalise consumption. 
The adjustment of imbalances within the eurozone depends in 
part also on the more general context. So far demand for German 
products from emerging countries has partly offset the decline from 
EU members carrying out fiscal adjustments and therefore Germany 
has been affected only minimally by the fiscal problems inside the 
eurozone. In addition, the decline in interest rates in Germany that 
followed the accommodative policies of the ECB and the influx of 
capital from other countries has created favourable conditions for the 
growth of consumption and investment. Wages began to grow faster 
in Germany than in other countries. However, Germany’s favourable 
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situation could change if the world economy began to slow, 
especially in emerging countries, and demand for German exports 
fell. 
All in all, it is inevitable that the recovery of competitiveness by 
countries with deficits will lead to an evolution of their growth 
model with less dependence on the domestic market and a greater 
exposure to international markets. This development is in part 
desirable for the countries of Southern Europe that are relatively 
closed to international trade. For the area as a whole, however, which 
is the largest economy in the world after the United States, over-
dependence on external demand, risks tying growth too much to 
exogenous developments beyond European control. 
The problem becomes alarming when you consider that many 
emerging countries, particularly those in Asia such as China, also 
base their model of development on exports. With continued 
integration of world trade, where there is still much room for growth 
and the expansion of comparative advantages, exports can be an 
important source of development for economies that are being 
integrated. But when the situation normalises, over-reliance on 
exports by all countries is unsustainable. 
A ‘German’ eurozone, with an economy that is more reliant on 
exports and not counterbalanced by a more ‘European’ Germany – 
that is to say with a more developed internal market – risks growing 
more slowly and being more susceptible to the oscillations of the 
world economy. To ensure this does not happen, it is not necessary 
to have more coordination of national fiscal policies, as is often called 
for. The margins for a strengthening of the common procedures were 
expanded with the package of measures adopted in late 2011 – in 
particular the establishment of the ‘European semester’ – in 
preparation for national budgetary policies. 
What is needed is more integration of national markets to create 
a true single market that will make it possible to develop 
autonomous growth on the continent. There are ample margins for 
greater economic integration as highlighted in the Monti report 
presented to the European Commission in May 2010. The 
unfortunate coincidence of timing that tied it to the outbreak of the 
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euro crisis encouraged European institutions to give priority to 
emergency measures. In many respects, particularly with regard to 
finance, the crisis led to a renationalisation of the markets. It is time 
to get back to basics and adopt new integration measures to favour 
the adjustment of imbalances and create the basis for more balanced 
growth. 
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17. THE EUROBOND ILLUSION 
he euro is unsustainable without a fiscal union. Issuing a single debt 
instrument, the ‘Eurobond’, does not mean that the fiscal union has been 
achieved. Countries must give up control of their budgets otherwise the 
issuance of joint public debt will spin out of control and threaten the monetary 
union’s viability. However, it is not clear how many countries are ready to take 
this political step. 
The best way to build a fiscal union is to create a single debt 
instrument. With debt guaranteed by all states, there would be no 
differences in interest rates among countries. There would be less 
risk that a country would be pushed to the brink of insolvency due to 
the unsustainable interest rates it has to pay on its debt. A common 
debt instrument, issued jointly by the eurozone countries, would also 
accelerate the integration of Europe’s financial markets. It would 
make it possible to separate banking risk from sovereign risk, thus 
avoiding a dangerous catalyst of crises. The proposal was put 
forward in various contexts and also examined by the heads of state. 
The creation of Eurobonds would mirror the path the United 
States followed to create a fiscal union after the American 
Revolution. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton convinced 
Congress that the only way to avoid a financial crisis was to pool the 
debts the states had accumulated. If Europe is not ready to take this 
step the euro is in danger, according to many economists, especially 
American. 
Following the ‘American road’ sounds attractive, but it is not as 
simple as it seems. When transferring the debt to the federal 
government, Hamilton also centralised tax revenue and the power of 
taxation. The debt, in fact, must be secured by tax revenues. The debt 
issuer must be able to generate enough resources to pay at least the 
interest. 
T 
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The transfer of power to issue debt from the individual 
countries to the European Union, through the creation of Eurobonds, 
requires the transfer of fiscal resources from the member states to the 
EU. This can be achieved only through a change in the treaty that 
shifts decision-making powers on fiscal policy from the member 
states to the EU. The issues to be addressed are numerous and 
complex. It must be decided which institution has the job of defining 
the total amount of securities to be issued and then how much will be 
transferred to the individual countries. It also must be clarified what 
happens if a country breaks the deficit ceiling and how pre-existing 
debt will be treated. These issues seem to be ignored in many of the 
proposals made for the introduction of Eurobonds. This raises the 
suspicion, especially in countries with more solid public finances, 
that the proposal is just a way to spread the risk without sharing the 
responsibility of fiscal policy, which would remain with the 
individual countries. 
The key issue is the rigidity of the budget constraints. If the 
limits for the issuance of Eurobonds are not binding and remain 
similar to those outlined in the Stability Pact, there is the risk that 
some countries would sell more debt than foreseen and the others 
would be forced to guarantee it. The sanction mechanism would not 
be enough to deter self-interested behaviour and countries would 
have the incentive to issue too much debt. Budgetary discipline 
would be lost to the detriment of the more virtuous countries. A 
similar system was in force in Yugoslavia and it proved to be 
unsustainable. 
The power to issue Eurobonds would have to be delegated to a 
European authority, an agency for common debt, which would 
distribute the funds raised on the market to the member countries 
according to a predefined plan. This solution would have two 
advantages. The first would be to avoid excessive deficits and 
therefore undisciplined fiscal policies. Such a system would have 
prevented Greece from hiding for years the true size of its deficit. 
The second advantage would be to trigger automatically the 
conditionality for countries that need to increase their debt beyond 
what was initially allowed in order to deal with an external shock or 
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an unexpected slowdown in the economy. The funds would be 
raised by the European agency and disbursed to the country under 
specific conditions regarding fiscal consolidation and adjustment 
policies. The European agency de facto would replace the bailout 
fund. 
The proposal, however, raises two types of problems. The first 
concerns the decision on the total amount of debt issued by the 
European agency and how it would be divided among the countries. 
Given that it would be a group decision taken at the European level, 
it is de facto an integration of national budgets into a single entity 
with joint decision-making power. The member states could 
maintain sovereignty over the composition of revenues and 
expenditures, but not on the overall amount, which would be 
decided centrally. 
This would be a major step forward towards political 
integration in the eurozone. Deciding together the state budget 
entails centralising an essential component of sovereignty that is 
typically exercised by national governments and parliaments. On the 
other hand, the Stability Pact already requires countries to submit 
their budgets for approval to the European Council of Ministers, 
which may draw up specific recommendations and request changes 
to the proposed budget. Nevertheless, under the current system 
ultimate responsibility lies with the member states. There are 
penalties for infringements, but they are limited in scope and are 
only applied later. 
The Eurobond puts the responsibility for the total public debt 
and the debt of each country on all eurozone countries. The transfer 
of budgetary powers to the European level must meet the criteria of 
democratic legitimacy. This requires a modification of the treaty, in 
particular to strengthen the powers of the European parliament. 
In Italy, one of the countries where there seems to be the most 
enthusiasm for Eurobonds, it is not clear whether there is as much 
willingness to cede to European institutions decision-making powers 
on the Italian budget. Fiscal policy is still considered the 
responsibility of the individual countries and many politicians do not 
miss the opportunity to complain about the lack of room for 
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manoeuvre. If the EU was responsible for deciding the overall thrust 
of the Italian budget, it would most likely follow the indications of 
the Fiscal Compact, adopted in 2012, that calls for a reduction in the 
public debt of four percentage points of GDP per year. Presented in 
these terms, greater budgetary discipline in return for Eurobonds, 
one wonders how many Italians would still be so enthusiastic about 
the proposal. 
In France, the new president François Hollande initially was in 
favour of Eurobonds to try to get some negotiating advantage with 
Angela Merkel, but he quickly backtracked well aware of his 
country’s aversion to ceding fiscal sovereignty. 
Proposals have been made to create Eurobonds without 
transferring sovereignty. For example, it has been suggested that 
Eurobonds could be issued against collateral such as equity stakes, 
real estate and even gold conferred by the respective countries to a 
common European fund according to pre-established quotas. If a 
country is unable to repay its debt, the fund takes possession of the 
collateral. This mechanism can, however, be created at the national 
level so it is not clear what the advantage of doing it together would 
be. Moreover, the transfer of some of the state’s assets to a fund as 
collateral for the issuance of new bonds increases their quality 
compared with bonds already in circulation, which will consequently 
lose value as they become relatively more risky. This would lead to a 
segmentation of the market and result in significant losses for 
holders of existing bonds with negative consequences especially for 
financial institutions that must put in their balance sheets the market 
value of their securities. 
It is worth considering what would have happened had 
Eurobonds been launched in the eurozone at the time of the euro’s 
introduction. As mentioned, the out-of-line budgets, particularly in 
Greece, probably would have been avoided in the period preceding 
the crisis. However, the external imbalances within the eurozone 
probably would still have developed because these were favoured by 
the convergence of the interest rates of the various countries’ 
government bonds (something that would have occurred even if the 
Eurobonds had existed from the beginning). In Spain and Ireland, for 
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example, the ability to borrow at low interest rates fuelled the 
financial leveraging of the banking system and favoured the use of 
easy mortgages by households to buy real estate at inflated prices. 
Eurobonds would not have prevented the accumulation of such 
imbalances, which perhaps would have been even larger. The same 
applies to other factors that created imbalances that depressed 
growth in Italy and Portugal during the decade preceding the crisis. 
At the outbreak of the crisis, the rising public deficits of these 
countries would have been financed through Eurobonds, and 
therefore at favourable rates and without the risk of contagion or a 
debt spiral during the recession. However, the amount of debt these 
countries could have issued would not have been decided by their 
respective governments, but rather by the European Union and it 
would thus have been subjected to structural reforms and corrective 
measures to the public finances. The situation would have been very 
similar to what occurred in countries that resorted to the bailout 
fund. Instead of asking the fund for aid to cope with the crisis, the 
country would have had to ask the European agency in charge of 
debt to issue additional Eurobonds. The bonds would have been 
issued only as part of an agreement that included a restructuring 
programme. The request would have been politically less penalising 
than asking the bailout fund for aid, because a larger number of 
countries would have been involved and it would have been carried 
out before the country needing the additional Eurobonds had lost 
access to financial markets. The system would certainly have been 
more efficient and less destabilising for the entire eurozone. 
The crisis would have been addressed earlier in Greece and 
would have had less devastating effects on the country and there 
would have been less contagion. The Karamanlis government would 
not have been able to finance its campaign with hidden public debt. 
The deterioration of a country’s fiscal situation would have been 
tolerated by European institutions only in exchange for corrective 
measures to public spending and reforms aimed at improving tax 
collection. The problem of the backwardness of Greece’s tax system 
would have been addressed much earlier. 
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Eurobonds would not solve the problem associated with the 
different levels of debt accumulated so far in the various countries. 
Transforming all existing debt into Eurobonds would mean 
transferring the debt of the less disciplined countries to the more 
virtuous ones, something that is unlikely to be accepted by the latter. 
One possible solution proposed by some German economists is to 
convert all the debt in excess of 60% of GDP into Eurobonds. This 
would be coupled with a strict debt reduction plan to be carried out 
in a given period of time forecast to be 20 years. In this scenario, the 
budget constraints imposed on the high-debt countries would be 
very rigid. 
This solution does not solve the problem of providing the EU 
with a safety net to deal with exogenous shocks that destabilise 
public finances. 
In summary, the introduction of Eurobonds would be an 
important step forward toward economic and political integration in 
Europe and would strengthen the solidity of the euro. However, it is 
important not to create the illusion that this proposal can be 
implemented without major modifications to the decision-making 
processes, such as fiscal policy, that are at the foundation of 
European democracies. Eurobonds entail a loss of national 
sovereignty, or rather a sharing of sovereignty between all countries 
regarding public budgets.  
| 117  
 
18. PRINTING MONEY 
o exit the crisis more rapidly the European Central Bank could print 
euros, buy the government bonds the market no longer wants and reduce 
interest rates to stimulate consumption and investment. The recipe seems 
simple, but it hides a number of pitfalls. 
Whenever central banks have intervened in the past to finance 
governments, the creation of money has led to inflation that burned 
people’s savings. This is why the European Central Bank was made 
independent and given the primary objective of ensuring price 
stability and the explicit prohibition of directly financing member 
states. 
Central banks choose their instruments of intervention 
according to the structure of their financial markets. In the United 
States, the monetary base is created primarily through the purchase 
of government bonds on the secondary market (not at the time of 
issue). The reduction of interest rates on government bonds is 
transmitted to the rates paid by private borrowers, especially 
households and businesses, and stimulates consumption and 
investment. In the eurozone the financial system is mainly based on 
bank credit. This is why the European Central Bank implements its 
monetary policy mainly through financing operations of the banking 
system rather than open market operations as the Federal Reserve 
does. In the European context the purchase of government bonds by 
the central bank is more complicated because there is no joint 
eurozone bond. To mimic what happens in the US, the ECB would 
have to buy a predefined basket of government bonds issued by all 
eurozone countries, which would be inefficient and would create 
distortions in the financial markets. The methods used by the ECB 
are therefore more suited to the European context and allow the 
central bank to protect its balance sheet more effectively, and 
T 
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therefore taxpayers since the loans are secured by the collateral 
deposited by the banks and are carried at floating interest rates. 
Comparing the operations carried out by the ECB and those of 
other central banks during the crisis shows that the overall impact on 
liquidity is comparable even if the instrument of monetary creation is 
different. The size of the ECB’s balance sheet increased mainly 
through financing to the banking system, while the Federal Reserve’s 
assets are mainly public and private securities. 
The real problem for European monetary policy is that 
monetary impulses are not transmitted uniformly to the different 
eurozone economies due to the segmentation of the money and 
financial markets that occurred as a result of the sovereign debt 
crisis. Already in the summer of 2007, with the beginning of 
international tensions, the interbank liquidity market showed its first 
signs of being under stress. Banks were no longer comfortable 
lending funds to one another. The ECB had to replace the market, 
intervening to provide liquidity directly to the banks. The problem 
worsened in 2010 when the debt crisis in some countries spread to 
their banking systems. Without access to the credit provided by the 
European Central Bank, banks in those countries would have 
collapsed and exasperated the crisis. The central bank offered 
unlimited fixed-rate financing with collateral. This was not enough, 
however. Interest rates on loans to households and businesses 
remained high because of the risk on government bonds. Acting only 
through the banking system was no longer sufficient to loosen credit 
conditions and counteract the recession. Monetary policy’s 
transmission mechanism had stopped working. The countries that 
were carrying out fiscal consolidations suffered from an overly 
restrictive monetary policy and the adjustment became almost 
impossible. 
To avoid sending the economy into a downward spiral, interest 
rates on loans to the private sector had to come down, but this could 
not happen as long as the yields on government bonds remained as 
high as they were. The interest rates on public debt are the 
benchmark for the entire financial system because they reflect 
investor confidence in the country. 
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To reduce interest rates on government bonds, fiscal authorities 
must enact a credible consolidation. The adjustment is successful 
when the planned consolidation is timely and the markets quickly 
incorporate the change of direction in their expectations. The longer a 
country waits to take steps to improve its finances, the higher the risk 
premium goes and the more drastic the adjustment steps will have to 
be. In a currency area there is a further complication. Given the 
separation between monetary policy and fiscal policy, a country 
cannot turn to the central bank to finance its debt. If the budgetary 
adjustment is not effective, there is an increasing risk of debt 
restructuring, or even default. This risk is partly endogenous. The 
higher the yield on government bonds, the more drastic the budget 
measures to bring the accounts back in order will have to be and the 
higher the risk that the economy will enter a vicious circle and spiral 
out of control. If interest rates rise beyond a given threshold, public 
finance can become unsustainable regardless of the measures taken. 
If the market becomes convinced a country has a high risk of default 
and interest rates rise, the possibility of avoiding default diminishes. 
The expectations feed on themselves and eventually become self-
fulfilling even if they were not justified to begin with.  
Markets are not always rational. Expectations are determined 
on the basis of political and economic events that can shift the system 
from an apparent sustainable equilibrium toward instability even 
when the country is solvent. In these conditions, monetary policy is 
ineffective. Market instability caused by uncertainty about the health 
of public finances hinders the task of monetary policy. 
The European Central Bank at this point could step in and buy 
a country’s government bonds thereby bringing yields down to 
sustainable levels. In this way it would contribute to restoring 
stability and improving the ability of markets to assess risk. This 
move is justified if the high yields are being caused by financial 
market instability that is making it impossible for investors to assess 
properly the underlying conditions of the economy and in particular 
the sustainability of public debt. If, instead, high government bond 
yields are due to an insufficient budget adjustment by the country 
and reflect the risk of insolvency, the central bank’s intervention 
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risks becoming monetary financing of the state. Therefore, when the 
central bank intervenes it must be certain the country’s public 
finances are sustainable. 
The European Central Bank finds itself facing a dilemma. If it 
assesses that a country’s public finances are sustainable when they 
are not, it risks carrying out monetary financing of a member state 
that can generate losses for the entire system. If, however, the central 
bank estimates that the public finances are not sustainable when in 
fact they are and decides not to intervene, it risks destabilising 
markets with knock-on effects on other countries and recessionary 
repercussions on the economy of the entire area. 
This is not a theoretical problem as it concerns the 
independence and democratic legitimacy of the European Central 
Bank and therefore of the EU itself. The European Central Bank is 
independent and can operate autonomously because it has a clear 
objective – price stability – that benefits all citizens. If the bank’s 
actions result in a deliberate redistribution of resources within the 
eurozone then it is not fulfilling its mandate and it would be 
encroaching on the responsibilities of political authorities without 
having the legitimacy to do so. It would be criticised, especially by 
countries penalised by its decisions. The very foundations of the EU 
would be undermined. On the other hand, the central bank cannot 
avoid intervening in the markets if this is necessary to achieve its 
objective, and consequently it cannot avoid taking risks, especially in 
a highly unstable situation. Therefore it is essential that any 
intervention by the bank is motivated by its statutory objective, price 
stability. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the ECB is led by a 
Governing Council composed of the six members of the Executive 
Committee, who reside permanently in Frankfurt, and the governors 
of the central banks of the 17 countries that are currently members of 
the euro. Each person has one vote so the governors of the central 
banks of Luxembourg and Malta have the same weight as their 
German and Italian counterparts, as well as that of one of the 6 
members of the Executive Committee. This system can work and be 
considered legitimate by the citizens of the various countries, in 
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particular the most populous ones, if each member participates in the 
decision-making process in a personal capacity and does not 
represent the interests of their country of origin. If the European 
Central Bank’s actions were to result in a redistribution of income in 
favour of one country or another, there could emerge the suspicion 
that the members of the Governing Council are seeking to promote 
the interests of their respective countries. That would delegitimise 
both the decision-making process that is the basis of the 
independence of the ECB and the very concept of a supranational 
and federal institution that aims to benefit its citizens. 
This system has been severely tested in recent years. On several 
occasions governments considered that the members of the 
Governing Council represent their respective countries and therefore 
are available to act on their behalf. Yet the treaty clearly specifies that 
“the governments of the EU member states must also respect the 
principle of (central bank) independence and not seek to influence 
the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or the 
national central banks in the performance of their tasks”. 
The problem was exacerbated during the crisis when it 
emerged publicly that the opinions expressed by some members of 
the Governing Council on the occasion of contested decisions, such 
as the purchase of government bonds of distressed countries, 
reflected the prevailing public opinion in their respective countries. 
The fact that two successive presidents of the Bundesbank, who sit 
on the ECB’s Governing Council, have spoken publicly against the 
purchase of government bonds – on the occasion of the first purchase 
programme agreed in May 2010 as well as the second programme in 
August 2011 and the new programme of open market transactions in 
September 2012 – led observers to assume that also the other 
members of the Governing Council were expressing opinions in line 
with the positions of their respective countries, thus undermining the 
ECB’s independence. Chancellor Merkel’s public defence of the 
ECB’s decision in September 2012, which Bundesbank President Jens 
Weidman had openly criticised, helped restore the idea that each 
member of the Governing Council acts on their own behalf and not 
that of their country. 
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In summary, in order to operate effectively the ECB must justify 
its actions based on the strategy for monetary policy adopted to fulfil 
its mandate. This is why the central bank is not – and must not be 
perceived to be – the lender of first or last resort. If that were to 
happen it would be the end of the euro. 
| 123 
 
19. BUYING TIME 
onetary policy is a powerful tool because it affects the conditions 
under which an economy, including the public sector, is funded. 
However, by itself it cannot resolve the problems connected with 
excess public or private debt. Monetary policy can only provide time so adjustment 
measures can be implemented, but if it allows too much time the incentive to 
remedy the situation decreases. Monetary policy thus risks being 
counterproductive. 
After an agreement to help Greece had been reached in May 2010, 
the financial markets realised the eurozone was not prepared to deal 
with a systemic crisis. The complexity of the negotiations with 
Greece showed that it would be difficult to pull off another rescue if 
other countries were forced to ask for help. Moreover, the economies 
in Ireland and Portugal were quickly deteriorating. 
Without an efficient safety net the euro was in danger. It was 
necessary to create a European institution able to operate like the 
International Monetary Fund to help distressed countries. The IMF’s 
programmes – based on macroeconomic and structural adjustment 
measures, a system of regular monitoring and financial aid – aim to 
restore market confidence and facilitate the country’s return to 
financing itself on the market. The eurozone lacked a mechanism 
similar to what the IMF had to deliver aid quickly to distressed 
countries. The aid package for Greece was financed with bilateral 
loans from member countries that had been negotiated with great 
difficulty. Repeating the exercise for another country would have 
been very complex. The euro was in danger as long as the EU lacked 
an efficient institutional mechanism able to deal with a member 
country’s crisis.  
In early May there were two ways to confront the growing 
market tensions. The first entailed the European Central Bank buying 
government bonds of troubled countries – mainly Greece, Ireland 
M 
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and Portugal – to counter the market instability. The central bank 
would thus become the buyer of last resort of government bonds that 
the market did not want. This would guarantee stable financial 
conditions that would calm investors and convince them to continue 
buying government bonds. This would, however, have distorted the 
central bank’s role. In financing member countries’ debt, the ECB 
would be violating the provisions of its statute prohibiting monetary 
financing of governments. At the same time, the central bank would 
be failing to fulfil its role of promoting price stability. In addition, by 
providing funding on favourable terms the ECB would have taken 
away any incentive governments might have had to consolidate 
public finances and control their debt. 
The alternative was to do nothing and leave it up to the 
governments to resolve the situation. However, without the central 
bank’s intervention the instability of the financial markets would 
have increased, leading to contagion thereby compromising the very 
objective of the ECB’s monetary policy, which is price stability. 
Increasing interest rates on medium- and long-term bonds would 
have had a recessionary effect on the economy and jeopardised the 
recovery. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the two options were 
carefully evaluated ahead of the decisions taken in the first week of 
May 2010. With the increasing tensions on the financial markets, 
there was a widespread belief that only the intervention of the 
central bank could keep the worst from happening. The negotiations 
between eurozone countries for the creation of a European monetary 
fund were proceeding slowly and the differences seemed too large to 
bridge in a short period of time.  
On May 6th, the ECB’s Governing Council met in Lisbon, one of 
the two meetings held each year away from the Frankfurt 
headquarters. In the press conference following the meeting a 
journalist asked Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the bank, if the 
Governing Council had decided to intervene in the government bond 
markets of countries under pressure. If he had replied in the 
affirmative the markets would have stabilised, at least for a while, 
but the governments would have postponed indefinitely the creation 
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of the European fund. If he had answered in the negative, the 
financial markets would have panicked. Trichet chose a middle road, 
responding simply, “we did not discuss it”. The goal was to keep the 
pressure on governments to accelerate the creation of the fund. 
Trichet’s statements created concern in the markets beginning 
on the afternoon of May 6th. The same evening, members of the 
ECB’s Governing Council still in Lisbon gathered informally to 
decide how to react to the market deterioration and how to interact 
with the governments. After a long discussion a consensus was 
reached to intervene in the government bond markets of the three 
countries in trouble, but only after the governments had decided to 
create a new institution to provide financial support to distressed 
countries and only for the amount of time necessary to make the new 
institution operational. The ECB’s intervention was only supposed to 
buy time to allow governments to create a definitive safety net.  
On May 7th, the heads of government meeting in Brussels again 
sought to put pressure on the central bank to intervene on the 
markets. Trichet refused, pointing out that it was the government’s 
responsibility to create an instrument capable of solving the problem. 
At that point, the heads of government agreed to create the bailout 
fund. 
Sunday, May 9th, the European Central Bank decided by 
majority vote to intervene in the government bond markets of 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The ECB did not publicly announce its 
decision until after European ministers ratified the practical aspects 
of their agreement in the early hours of Monday, the 10th, shortly 
after the opening of Asian markets. 
The ECB’s intervention helped calm markets and the spreads 
between various government bonds quickly declined. If the ECB had 
intervened earlier, the governments would probably have put off the 
decision to create the bailout fund. If it had not intervened at all, the 
financial markets probably would have collapsed on the morning of 
May 10th. That weekend the central bank’s role changed radically. 
The ability to push government authorities to make decisions 
contrary to their immediate desire gave the bank an unexpected 
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political role. No other central bank in the world has this power and 
no other was as equally frustrated at having to use it.  
The European markets had a period of relative calm after these 
events in early May 2010. This phase, however, was not exploited to 
strengthen the financial system or to speed up the adjustment 
process. Instead, a feeling of calm was spread. National authorities 
carried out stress tests to assess the health of their banks, but the tests 
were not coordinated among countries and were done using 
different assumptions. The publication in July 2010 of the results, 
done only under pressure from the markets, revealed the extreme 
differences between the tests of the various countries and 
consequently their unreliability as a tool for evaluating systemic risk. 
The markets soon came to believe that the problems of the European 
banking system were far more serious than what had been made 
public. 
The ratification of the bailout fund by the member countries 
took six months, much longer than expected, and it was not clear all 
countries were committed to making it a reality. Without ratification 
by all countries, the whole plan risked collapsing and that is almost 
what happened. Slovakia, in particular, decided to ratify the plan 
only under intense pressure from other countries, especially 
Germany. Moreover, the ratification process was superimposed on 
negotiations to transform the fund into a fixed mechanism to be 
included in the treaty. The negotiations took an unexpected turn 
when some countries began to suggest that private creditors should 
also be penalised whenever the fund helped a country. In the midst 
of the financial crisis this principle, enshrined in the Deauville accord 
between Merkel and Sarkozy, generated strong doubts in financial 
markets that the European leaders could handle the situation. 
The period of calm in the financial markets that followed the 
ECB’s intervention in May 2010 led the distressed countries to 
postpone their adjustment measures. In Ireland, the government 
refused to anticipate the 2011 budget despite the demands of the 
international community and the impact on the public finances of the 
banking system’s increasing difficulties. Irish banks had lost access to 
financial markets and could finance themselves only through the 
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central bank. The Irish government agreed to bring forward the 
budgetary procedure and carry out an adjustment plan partially 
financed by the International Monetary Fund only after the ECB said 
in November 2010 that it would no longer fund the banking system 
without an adjustment programme agreed to with the EU.  
Portugal also tried to put off the adjustment until after the 
elections scheduled for June 2011. Despite the central bank’s 
interventions, conditions worsened in the spring of 2011, partly as a 
result of contagion from the Greek crisis. Portugal managed to find a 
bipartisan agreement before the election that was signed by all 
parties and bound them to the same restructuring programme. 
The same scenario was repeated in the summer of 2011 when 
governments delayed enacting reforms after the new ECB 
intervention to stabilise the financial markets. 
The financial markets entered a new phase of instability in July 
2011 as a result of the Greek debt restructuring and unconvincing 
decisions taken by the European Council to strengthen the bailout 
fund. The markets began to sell massive amounts of Italian and 
Spanish government bonds, pushing interest rates to very high and 
potentially unsustainable levels. The bailout fund did not have 
sufficient funds to finance eventual programmes for the two 
countries. Only the European Central Bank’s intervention could keep 
interest rates and public debt from spiralling out of control, which 
would have further worsened the credit crunch during the recession. 
However, the central bank was concerned that as with Ireland and 
Portugal, its intervention would delay the structural changes and 
public finance adjustments that were necessary to reduce the 
imbalances in both countries. 
After a long discussion, on 5 August 2011, the ECB’s Governing 
Council decided to ask the two countries for specific commitments 
on structural reforms and public finances. The ECB would intervene 
on the markets to stabilise the yields on government bonds only if 
these commitments were publicly accepted. The commitments, 
requested with two confidential letters, were accepted publicly by 
both governments within a couple of days. The details of the 
measures were communicated to the central bank over the weekend. 
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The decision to intervene was made over the weekend of August 8th, 
but it was not unanimous. Some members of the Governing Council 
were not convinced that the commitments would be respected. 
Others requested a new letter be sent asking for more details on the 
measures that had been announced. The central bank began to 
intervene on August 9th, significantly reducing the interest rate 
differentials and restoring market stability. However, in Italy the 
implementation of the public finance measures was called into 
question in the following weeks, in particular during the 
parliamentary debt preceding the conversion of the government 
decree into law. The measures were changed several times, and in 
some cases watered down. The government did not follow through 
with the requested structural reforms relating to pensions, the labour 
market and liberalisations, which were deemed necessary by both 
the central bank and financial markets to ensure the sustainability of 
Italy’s public finances. Once again, the calm in the financial markets 
that had been gained with the central bank’s intervention had 
pushed the governments to postpone the most urgent decisions. 
As governments got used to the ECB intervening, the central 
bank’s credibility risked being undermined. This made it more 
difficult to create a consensus within the bank for new measures 
should they be needed. The interventions were progressively 
reduced during autumn 2011 despite the resurgence of pressure that 
brought interest rates back to very high levels, particularly in Italy. 
The sleep-inducing effects on governments of the ECB’s 
interventions explain why during a new phase of financial market 
tension in the summer of 2012 the central bank announced it would 
intervene to save the euro only on the condition that the countries 
submitted themselves to restructuring programmes agreed to with 
international institutions. The conditionality of the interventions 
saved the ECB from having to tell a country directly under what 
conditions it was prepared to buy its government bonds on the 
market, as had happened in the case of Italy and Spain in 2011. The 
announcement on 6 September 2012, about the new monetary policy 
instrument (the OMT) reflects the central bank’s decision to shed the 
political role of having to establish the conditions under which it 
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would intervene to avoid the risk that a country would have to leave 
the euro. That role lies with the EU’s political institutions. Only when 
these conditions are met can the central bank use all the tools at its 
disposal to ensure the irrevocability of the euro. 
The ECB’s announcement had such a strong effect on the 
markets, in particular on the interest rates in Italy and Spain, that 
both countries decided it was no longer necessary to resort to an 
adjustment programme coordinated by the European institutions 
and the International Monetary Fund. It was not understood that the 
central bank’s announcement would only have a temporary effect, 
buying time for the governments to put in place the structural and 
financial measures needed to reduce imbalances accumulated in the 
past. But if these measures are not put in place quickly, sooner or 
later the market tensions resume and intensify thereby putting the 
profligate governments under pressure. At that point the central 
bank cannot buy any more time for the governments. 
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20. SOVEREIGNTY BELONGS TO THE PEOPLE  
overeignty belongs to the people, that is until incompetent politicians cede 
it to financial markets and international institutions. When so much debt 
is issued that it must be sold to international investors, the economic 
policy decisions no longer depend only on the will of the people, but must also take 
into consideration the financial markets’ willingness to buy that debt. A country 
loses its sovereignty when it loses the confidence of investors. 
One of the main dynamics of the European crisis and one of the 
reasons why it lasted so long is the tendency of those who govern to 
dump the blame on others for the crisis and the inability to solve it. 
The favourite scapegoats are generally financial markets, foreign 
banks, creative financing, the ratings agencies and European 
institutions. They are all easy targets because each of them played a 
role in the crisis. However, it becomes problematic when the move to 
find a scapegoat leads to denouncements of a loss of popular 
sovereignty because it not only misrepresents reality, but because it 
also diverts attention from the real problems faced by people, 
especially in distressed countries. 
It began with blame being attributed to the crisis in the United 
States and the collapse of American investment banks that had 
increased their leverage and sold opaque debt instruments. The 
American financial system had in fact grown too large as it took 
advantage of the relaxation of regulations brought on by a wave of 
liberalisation initiated in the 1980s by the Reagan administration and 
continued during the Clinton years. In his book Fault Lines: How 
Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Raghuram Rajan 
explains how financial deregulation benefited all sectors of American 
society including the financial system, poor families who got easy 
access to debt, students thanks to the exponential growth of student 
loans, the real estate sector and those who benefited from increased 
consumer spending. The Federal Reserve’s policy of low interest 
S 
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rates also favoured strong consumer spending. Moreover, the growth 
of domestic demand and the profits made by the financial sector led 
to higher tax revenues for the state and allowed for tax cuts. 
The favourable regulatory conditions and macroeconomic 
policies contributed to raising indebtedness, particularly in the 
private sector, in the expectation that stronger growth and the 
persistence of low interest rates would make it easier to service the 
debt. The bursting of the housing bubble and contagion in the 
financial system dramatically reduced access to credit and forced an 
adjustment in the savings rate of American households and 
companies. 
The American subprime crisis was transmitted to Europe not 
only because the continent’s financial system had invested heavily in 
American junk bonds, but also because many eurozone countries had 
themselves accumulated too much debt. Debt was not only 
accumulated by the public sector, as in the case of Greece, but also by 
households and businesses, as in Spain and Portugal, and the 
banking system, as in Ireland. In ten years these countries 
accumulated debt owed to non-residents equivalent to 
approximately 100% of gross domestic product. 
The risks associated with the excessive accumulation of debt 
were long underestimated in Europe because financial transactions 
were denominated in euros, the same currency used by those 
granting the credit. The current account deficits were not considered 
problematic because it was assumed they would be easily financed 
like in the United States. An important difference was forgotten. In 
the United States the risk of excessive debt taken on by businesses 
and households in a particular state is diluted over the entire US 
financial system, which is fully integrated. 
In Europe, however, domestic banks are the main lenders to the 
residents of their country. When the residents have difficulty 
repaying their debts, banks in that country are the first to suffer. The 
bursting of the Spanish real estate bubble, for example, has primarily 
impacted Iberian banks. When banks have problems in the United 
States and must be recapitalised with public funds, the intervention 
takes place at the federal level and it is therefore shared by all 
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taxpayers. In Europe, however, only the taxpayers of the country 
where the bank resides are on the hook. An excess of private debt 
becomes a problem for a country’s banking sector and given the 
sector’s size results in too much public debt. When a country’s 
sovereign risk increases, foreign investors reduce their exposure not 
only to the public sector, but also to all the residents. When the yields 
on a country’s government bonds grow due to the increased risk, it 
becomes more difficult for households and businesses to find 
financing, thereby forcing the economic system into a painful 
adjustment process. 
At that point, the country needs to change course and the 
recovery of market confidence becomes the priority, given the 
necessity to continue tapping international investors to finance the 
debt. This requires the adoption of measures that are unpopular with 
both the people and those in power, but necessary in order to be able 
to continue to issue debt. Sovereignty is not unlimited in the field of 
economic policy. It depends on the ability to access financial markets. 
If that access is in the balance, the range of choices available to 
governments is drastically reduced. 
Financial markets are often procyclical, underestimating the 
risks when market conditions are favourable and overestimating 
them when fear or instability prevails. Before the crisis, financial 
markets for a long period considered the risk of an investment in 
Spanish or Italian government bonds to be similar to that of an 
investment in German bonds. In hindsight, this was incorrect. 
Markets were too optimistic about the ability of countries on the 
periphery to control their public finances, especially during a 
systemic crisis. Perhaps the markets also thought that in the event of 
difficulties the treaty’s no-bailout clause would not be respected. 
Whatever the reason, the markets financed all the eurozone countries 
with almost the same risk premium. 
The problem is that not all countries exploited equally the 
stability in the financial markets that followed the launch of the euro 
to clean up their public finances. To demonstrate this, it is useful to 
compare the cases of Italy and Belgium. 
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In 1997, Belgium had public debt equal to 122% of GDP, a 
deficit of 2.3% and a primary surplus (budget surplus excluding 
interest payments on debt) of 5%. Italy had very similar numbers: 
less debt than Belgium (117% of GDP), a deficit of 2.7% and a 
primary surplus above that of Belgium (6% of GDP). In the following 
years and until the outbreak of the crisis, Belgium maintained a 
primary surplus constantly above 4%, which allowed it in ten years 
to reduce debt by nearly 40 points to 84% of gross domestic product. 
In Italy, however, the primary surplus fell following the entry into 
the euro and reached zero in 2005. It bounced back to 3% of GDP in 
2007. In ten years, the public debt was reduced by only 14 points, less 
than half of what Belgium accomplished, reaching 103% of GDP, 
thanks in large part to the sale of public assets. After the outbreak of 
the crisis, Italy’s public debt rose by more than 20 percentage points 
to above 125% of GDP in 2012, while Belgium’s debt remained below 
the 100% threshold. 
The differing trends in public finances partly explain why 
financial markets dragged Italy into the crisis while ignoring 
Belgium. The markets evaluated positively Belgium’s greater ability 
to control public finances, despite domestic political difficulties 
linked to the relations between the country’s two main regions. This 
prevented an excessive widening of interest rates. If Italy had 
followed a consolidation path as rigorous as that of Belgium after the 
entry into the euro, then it probably would have been spared by the 
crisis. 
Financial markets do not assess a country’s risk only on the 
basis of fundamentals. They also take into account the contagion that 
may arise from systemic events, such as another country’s exit from 
the euro and the chain reaction that can pull one country after 
another into instability. After the Greek debt restructuring in June 
2011, the differentials of all the countries considered at risk increased 
whenever the Greek situation worsened and endangered the euro. 
Conversely, whenever a favourable outcome seemed possible, a 
wave of optimism engulfed the financial markets and improved the 
situation for all countries. For example, after ECB announcements of 
extraordinary actions, such as in the summer of 2012 when the bank 
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said it was ready to make unlimited purchases of bonds, the risk of 
dramatic events declined and the beneficial effects were felt above all 
by those countries most at risk. 
Even though the risk of the euro collapsing declined somewhat, 
especially following the ECB’s announcement and the outcome of the 
elections in Greece, interest rates on government bonds are unlikely 
to converge as dramatically as they did in the first years of the euro. 
Although financial markets long ignored the growing differences 
between countries, it is hard to imagine them being so short-sighted 
again. This is all the more so as fundamental data continue to show a 
big divergence among the countries. 
Picking up again the comparison between Belgium and Italy, 
the IMF forecast in the spring of 2013 that Italy’s public debt is 
expected to rise in 2013 to over 130% of GDP and then begin 
declining in subsequent years, although remaining above 120% until 
2018. Belgium’s debt is forecast to fall faster and should be back at 
about 90% of GDP within five years. These forecasts consider not 
only expected changes in revenue and public expenditure, but also 
economic growth, which in Italy is expected to be weak just as it has 
been in the past decade. Also, while Belgium is basically in the black 
on the current account side of the balance of payments, that is to say 
it is a net saver that exports capital, Italy is expected to run an 
external deficit and therefore continues to need international capital 
inflows. 
When a country needs public or private savings from the rest of 
the world to finance its debt, the primary goal of economic policy 
will inevitably be to ensure investor confidence. Consolidation 
measures are in effect submitted to the markets for scrutiny and it 
can be argued that this is a loss of sovereignty. But if a country’s 
financing is at the mercy of the markets, it is not the fault of the 
markets, but rather of those who led the country to have excess debt 
and consequently an increased risk profile. 
The distinction between international and domestic markets 
should not be pushed to the extreme. Even if a country’s entire debt 
is held by its residents and consequently there is no need for net 
inflows from the rest of the world, economic policy must still take 
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into account the confidence of domestic investors. Even if those 
investors have a bias for investing in their own country’s debt, the 
possibility that they can move their savings abroad limits the ability 
of governments to take oppressive measures. Italians remember well 
the summer of 1992 when in their bank accounts were taxed, which 
fuelled capital flight and accelerated the crisis of the European 
Monetary System. In an integrated financial system, residents can 
also quickly sell the government bonds held in their portfolio. It is 
understandable that those who govern are tempted to lay all the 
blame for the crisis and the excessive rigour of the adjustment on 
financial markets. This is done to avoid taking responsibility for past 
economic policy mistakes and to blame others for unpopular 
decisions that must be taken. It is less understandable that citizens, 
commentators and the media – those who must keep the government 
accountable – also succumb to this temptation. 
When this happens, there is indeed the risk that popular 
sovereignty will be manipulated. 
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21. CONCLUSIONS 
he European crisis is part of a wider crisis that is hitting the 
most economically advanced countries across the globe. 
Although it has manifested itself through an excess of public 
and private debt accumulated over the past years, debt is just a 
symptom of the crisis and the actual cause is much deeper. The crisis 
is connected to the changes that have engulfed the world economy in 
the last 20 years and called into question the western world’s growth 
model and the sustainability of its social systems. In addition, power 
has gone through an increasing fragmentation in Western 
democracies, as suggested by Moises Naim in his The end of Power, 
“creating a situation where gridlock and the propensity to adopt 
minimalist decisions at the last minute are severely eroding the 
quality of public policy and the ability of governments to meet 
voters’ expectations or solve urgent problems”. Those who did not 
notice these changes, or chose not to notice them, and continued to 
act individually and as a society as if nothing had changed were able 
to do so only by borrowing. The adjustments that needed to be made 
were postponed until it became impossible to delay any longer 
because the financial markets were no longer willing to finance 
further debt. At that point there was the choice of treating the 
symptoms – the excessive debt – through the adoption of traditional 
macroeconomic policies, or instead facing the deeper causes of the 
crisis with structural reforms aimed at adapting the economic and 
social system to the new global context. 
The second way, making the reforms, is politically more costly 
because it requires moves that call into question rights that powerful 
groups or even the majority of the population have acquired through 
time and now consider untouchable. The precarious situation of 
public finances has made it no longer possible to compensate those 
directly hit by the reforms. During a crisis, when the confidence of 
T
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investors has been lost, governments are tempted to treat the 
symptom rather than the disease. In an emergency situation, it is 
easier to get the population and political parties to back drastic 
changes to public finances rather than enact profound changes to the 
economic system, which consequently get delayed. 
The austerity measures decided in an emergency are the result 
of the inability of democratic systems to address in a timely manner 
and with adequate measures the problems gripping the advanced 
countries. The cure, however, is not effective because it does not 
solve the underlying problems and risks being worse than the 
disease. Austerity generates discontent and fuels disruptive forces in 
society, contributing to the emergence of populist movements and 
endangering democracy itself. 
This is not a theoretical risk. Argentina’s experience in the 20th 
century shows that in a few decades a country can slide to the 
bottom of the global economic system while still thinking that it is at 
the apex. 
How can the course be reversed? There are two roads. The first 
is to buy even more time until the economy starts growing again, at 
which point the underlying problems can be addressed under more 
favourable conditions. The second is to intervene immediately 
without postponing the most difficult decisions. 
One way to buy time is to keep following the strategy adopted 
so far, waiting for the moment when the pressure from the financial 
markets makes it clear to everyone that the alternative is worse. This 
strategy has produced some positive results in recent years as many 
countries began to correct their accumulated imbalances when they 
found their backs to the wall. This strategy also led to significant 
progress in strengthening the monetary union with the creation of 
the bailout fund, the banking union, the fiscal compact and the 
intensification of macroeconomic oversight. 
Making decisions with your back to the wall is a dangerous 
strategy because those decisions are generally not very effective and 
focus on the symptoms rather than the cause. One also cannot 
assume that democratic choices are always ‘rational’, especially at 
critical moments. The risk that populist promises amounting to 
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nothing more than a leap in the dark will be followed cannot be 
underestimated. In 2012, the Greeks got very close to exiting the 
euro, a decision that would have had dramatic effects on the 
country’s social and democratic cohesion. The history of the 20th 
century has shown that European democracies are not alien to 
making suicidal choices, especially during periods of economic 
depression. 
Decisions made under pressure from the markets will 
eventually be seen by the public as an external imposition that 
threatens the sovereignty of the people. How many times has the 
rally cry been raised against the dictatorship of the financial markets? 
Interventions made by supranational institutions are also seen as 
interference in internal affairs. Blame is assigned to scapegoats, often 
external ones such as the EU, that are seen as authoritarian figures 
sent in to impose their will rather than help.  
A second way to buy time is to add the costs of the excessive 
debt accumulated in the past to the public finances and postpone 
adjustment measures until the economy improves. This is only 
possible in countries that can still borrow at reasonable rates. The 
national central bank can be called on for help when markets are no 
longer willing to buy government bonds. This is a disguised way of 
shifting the cost of the adjustment to future taxpayers who will have 
to deal with higher inflation, while providing the public funds 
necessary to compensate for the central bank’s losses. It is convenient 
for the government to ask the central bank to print money as this 
allows the adjustment to be done with a tax, i.e. via inflation, which 
does not have to be voted on in parliament. The central banks that 
oppose this sort of intervention on the ground that it goes against 
their mandate are subjected to political pressure and calls to reduce 
their independence. 
Buying time can be useful only if in the meantime concrete 
measures to address the structural problems are enacted. If the 
measures are not taken, the conditions are created for new financial 
excesses and speculative bubbles generated by low interest rates. The 
bubbles will burst sooner or later, bringing down the markets with 
them and causing recessionary effects on the economy. Flooding the 
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markets with liquidity is useful only if it helps the system reduce its 
debt gradually and without excessive shocks to economic activity. If, 
instead, the liquidity leads to the postponement of the adjustment 
measures, it will create the conditions for a rapid emergence of a new 
crisis. 
The alternative is to take the bull by the horns and immediately 
implement the reforms necessary to better equip the economic 
system to cope with the evolving global changes caused by market 
integration, technological innovation and the aging of the 
population. This last point is especially relevant in Europe. The 
countries that enacted their reforms in time, particularly those in 
Northern Europe, were able to absorb the crisis better and also 
reduce unemployment. 
The problem, as previously mentioned, is that reforms are 
politically costly and penalise those who promote them. Asking 
those who govern to take the long view and not be influenced by 
short-term interests is intellectually stimulating, but unrealistic. 
Gerhard Schröder reformed Germany, but lost the election. It is an 
example that only a suicidal politician would try to emulate. Those 
who govern are motivated by incentives, chief among them the 
desire to be re-elected, a legitimate goal in a democratic system and 
something that has not been achieved by almost anyone in Europe in 
recent years. It is useless to say “there are no leaders like there used 
to be”. Those leaders were living in a different context, characterised 
by a trend of increasing income and population. Combining growth 
and equality was possible at the time without damaging either. 
The change in the global context and demographic trends 
created a new tension between short- and long-term choices. Those 
who govern are encouraged to give ever-more importance to 
immediate results and ever-less consideration of the long-term 
horizon. This paralyses the decision-making system and spreads the 
dangerous thesis that democracies are not able to manage the crisis 
and are doomed to decline. 
To strengthen democratic systems, it is necessary to create 
incentives to make decisions with a longer-term outlook. This can 
take place in a European context that is able to provide a coherent 
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framework for national decision-making mechanisms while 
comparing experiences and models. The periods of maximum 
development in Europe have occurred above all when the continent’s 
differences were free to express themselves in a system of 
cooperation and competition that extended not only to companies 
and economic systems, but also to methods of government. The 
preservation of this diversity within an increasingly tight political 
union helps guarantee the future of European democracy. 
What follows are some points for reflection. 
The first point concerns the need for Europeans to become fully 
aware that the European model of economic development and the 
welfare system created during the 20th century is no longer 
compatible within the new global context. This is not easy to accept 
because it is human nature to look to past trends as a guide for future 
behaviour. Structural changes are generally picked up on late, 
especially when they are epic changes that require a big adjustment. 
It is not, however, always in the interest of those who govern to bring 
to the collective attention the need to change course because it is 
politically costly to implement the policies necessary to deal with 
change. Those who govern are often tempted to minimise the 
problems in order to continue maintaining their consensus among 
the voters. If public opinion is not exposed to alternative ideas and a 
broad understanding of the global context, it is unlikely people will 
understand the nature and extent of the problem. The media plays a 
key role in this regard. A democracy in which the media are 
subjected to various forms of influence by those in power or elites 
close to them tends to lose sight of the bigger picture and lends more 
importance to short-term interests. The so-called fourth estate cannot 
play its role as ‘guard dog’, which is essential for the proper 
functioning of a democracy, if the owners of the media have 
economic interests linked to the public sector. Without a clear 
separation between the media and economic and political power 
there is an incentive for the means of communication to minimise 
difficulties, thereby creating a high risk that public attention will be 
diverted from the real problems. 
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The problem affects not only individual countries, but also the 
European Union given that there is no transnational system of 
information or means for exchanging opinions. People are informed 
through their national media, which tend to distort reality, especially 
with regard to European issues. The summits between the heads of 
government, for example, become an opportunity for political 
leaders to demonstrate to their respective publics their ability to 
influence EU decisions. The media represent results as a victory for 
one and a defeat for another as if it were a football match. The idea 
that decisions should be made for the common good gets lost along 
the way. Sometimes the well-orchestrated press conferences that take 
place after EU meetings make public certain information that 
completely distorts the way the discussions actually went. There is a 
risk the information will be manipulated unless those who report the 
news carefully scrutinise everything. The newspapers sometimes try 
to exploit nationalist sentiment, as was seen in Germany and Greece 
during the most acute phases of the crisis. It is easy to lay blame for 
the national failures on the leaders of the other countries. 
The second point regards the independence and oversight of 
the institutions tasked with providing essential input that 
governments use to set economic policy. For example, over the last 
15 years industrialised countries have systematically overestimated 
economic growth, generating overly optimistic expectations for tax 
revenues. This led governments to correct the shortages with 
measures on the revenue side rather than on the expenditure side, 
thereby further stunting growth. Growth forecasts used to set 
economic policy should be made by independent bodies that are 
subjected to transparent oversight, as is the case in the Netherlands 
and Sweden. 
Politicians have increasingly tried to influence central banks, 
which have the job of implementing anti-cyclical measures to counter 
the volatility of the financial markets and the economic systems. The 
current crisis showed the potential for monetary policy to save 
governments, but also the risk that policy can be manipulated for 
short-term purposes. In some countries like the United States and 
Japan, a dangerous shift is occurring in which some people try to 
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bring the central bank under the government’s influence. This is 
presented as a new paradigm of monetary policy, which should be 
given new duties. In several European countries, there is a call for 
“the ECB to act like the Federal Reserve”, becoming the lender of last 
resort for governments. Those making this appeal forget that in the 
United States the central bank does not intervene in the bond 
markets of the various states, nor does it buy municipal bonds. 
The independence of central banks should instead be 
strengthened, not only because of the importance of monetary policy, 
but also because of the role the banks play in banking supervision. 
These key areas are often subject to political interference. Giving the 
responsibilities for competition or banking supervision to European 
institutions reduces the influence of domestic politicians and lobbies, 
thus avoiding the pursuit of only short-term interests. 
A third point concerns the constitutional constraints that limit 
the margin of discretion of an excessively short-term economic 
policy. This is the objective of the fiscal compact, which pushes fiscal 
policy towards a medium-term outlook that is in the interest also of 
future generations. The objective of debt reduction must be a priority 
for the overly indebted countries that have a quickly aging 
population, not only because it creates the conditions for more 
sustainable growth, but also because it avoids passing the burden 
onto the weakest parts of society, in particular young people who are 
a minority in most European countries. Not surprisingly, in high-
debt countries such as Italy, political forces of all stripes have asked 
for a relaxation of the fiscal compact’s rules. Without a doubt rules 
should be interpreted, but not in a way that jeopardises the 
sustainability of public debt or facilitates manoeuvres that are not 
consistent with maintaining equilibrium in the medium term. The 
comparison between the experiences of Italy and Belgium during the 
first years of the euro, discussed in chapter 20, shows that a policy of 
continuous reduction of the public debt decreases the risk of 
contagion in the event of a financial crisis and favours faster 
economic growth. 
Incentives should be created to move the focus of economic 
policy from fiscal considerations to structural ones. The European 
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system for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances adopted in 2011 
appears to be as weak as the Lisbon process. A discussion has started 
about the possibility that European countries could reach bilateral 
contractual agreements with the European Union aimed at getting 
financial support in exchange for structural reforms. 
The responsibility for implementing structural reforms 
ultimately lies with individual governments and the people of the 
various countries. It serves no purpose and can actually be 
counterproductive to ask Europe to solve problems that result from 
the inability of national political systems to modernise their 
economies. When financial aid is requested, European institutions 
can attach specific conditions, including a call for structural changes, 
so as to avoid contagion. Otherwise, responsibility rests with 
national institutions and the weaker they are the greater their 
tendency to postpone difficult choices. Waiting until the last minute 
to make difficult decisions is an ineffective and potentially 
dangerous strategy. When problems are left unresolved for a long 
time and people grow increasingly aggravated, the relative cost of 
irrational choices decreases and the risks posed by leaps in the dark 
increases. Countries that do not have strong institutions that protect 
them from these risks are the first to head down the road of 
economic decline. 
One last point of reflection concerns the impact of demographic 
trends on economic policy choices. With an aging population, there 
is an increased tendency to seek short-term solutions and to 
postpone the adjustment. As time passes the share of electors that 
have an interest in defending what are considered acquired and 
permanent rights increases. This shifts the burden to the younger 
generations, which are a political minority and are left to pay for the 
privileges enjoyed by the majority. The result is a rejection of politics 
as evidenced by the high percentage of absenteeism and the large 
number of votes obtained by populist parties in recent elections, in 
particular in Italy. Until now, the risk this development poses for the 
survival of European democracies has been underestimated.  
All of these objectives can be pursued both at a national and 
European level. The crisis showed that to avoid excessive 
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divergences between countries and allow Europe to cope with the 
shocks that risk tearing it apart, more steps must be taken to 
complete the economic and monetary union. Further progress in 
adapting institutions is necessary to strengthen the EU’s decision-
making apparatus while simultaneously increasing its democratic 
legitimacy.  
All countries, perhaps with the exception of the United 
Kingdom, pay lip service to being in agreement, but the facts show 
that the first to oppose tighter integration are national politicians 
who do not want to lose their powers. They rebuke Europe for not 
making decisions, forgetting that they are the ones who do not want 
Europe to decide. European institutions are given more powers only 
when the countries are confronted with a crisis and it is obvious that 
it is not possible to resolve the problems at the national level. 
It is no wonder that Europeans feel Europe is detached from 
their everyday life and express doubts about ambitious institutional 
projects. The rejection in 2005 of the European constitution in France 
and the Netherlands is still smouldering. Hoping that new European 
leaders will launch a similar project in the near future risks creating 
unachievable goals. On the other hand, there are clear limits to 
continuing with a gradual integration of tasks that are being carried 
out ineffectively at the national level. The bailout fund, for example, 
entails complex, largely intergovernmental decision-making 
procedures that reduce its effectiveness and exacerbate tensions 
among countries. Doubts about democratic legitimacy have become 
evident with the emergence of more and more problems linked to a 
lack of consistency among European institutions. 
Maybe the best way to strengthen the political union is to start 
with the question of democratic legitimacy. It is interesting to note 
that this problem is a critical issue for both eurosceptics who want to 
leave the EU, such as the Conservatives in the UK, and federalists 
who are willing to cede national sovereignty only to fully democratic 
institutions. This is often noted by the German constitutional court in 
its opinions. Both groups believe – rightly or wrongly – that the 
European Parliament is not sufficiently representative of the popular 
will and has no powers to adequately control the executive power 
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held by the European Commission. Without a strengthening of the 
European Parliament, which represents the common interests of the 
people across the member countries, European integration will not 
be achieved. Boosting its power will require difficult battles, which 
are already on the horizon, because member states’ governments are 
the staunchest opponents. 
The journey’s difficulties may seem insurmountable, but 
European history of the last 60 years shows they can be overcome. 
Just five years ago it seemed unthinkable that the EU would have 
taken the steps that it has managed to take during the crisis (granted 
they were carried out in a disorderly manner and several times the 
EU risked stumbling). The path is still long. But not even the United 
States of America was created in a day, or even in a century. 
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CHRONOLOGY 
2009 
4 October  George Papandreou, the leader of Pasok, defeats out-going 
Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis in the Greek elections.  
16 October  The new Greek government announces that the deficit will be 
more than 10% of GDP in 2009. Two weeks later, the forecast 
is raised to 13%. 
2010 
14 January  The Greek government presents a plan to reduce the deficit to 
2.8% of GDP in 2012. 
13 March At a bilateral meeting, Merkel and Papandreou announce 
that “Greece does not need aid” and “Greece will not request 
aid”.  
25 March European Heads of state say they are ready to initiate a 
programme of aid for Greece in cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund.  
2 May Following a request by the Greek government made on 23 
April, eurozone countries and the IMF announce a €110 
billion aid package for Greece. 
6 May  The European Central Bank, meeting in Lisbon, says it did 
not discuss intervening to buy the bonds of member states. In 
the afternoon, financial markets suffer big declines. 
7 May  The heads of government of eurozone member countries 
announce a strengthening of macroeconomic supervision and 
a package of measures to ensure the stability of the euro. 
9 May Eurozone finance ministers announce the creation of the 
bailout fund, which has €500 billion available. The European 
Central Bank’s Governing Council decides to intervene, 
buying Greek, Irish and Portuguese bonds. 
10 May The ECB buys bonds with an immediate effect on the 
spreads. 
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23 July  The first results of the European bank stress tests are 
published. Only seven banks are found to be under-
capitalised by a total of €3.5 billion. 
29 September  The European Commission presents its proposals to reform 
the Stability and Growth Pact (the ‘six pack’).  
18 October Merkel and Sarkozy, meeting in Deauville, agree to a series of 
measures to create a permanent bailout fund that includes 
private sector involvement.  
28-29 October The heads of state accept the Merkel-Sarkozy accord on the 
bailout fund with the opposition of Trichet, President of the 
European Central Bank. 
28 November  Eurozone countries agree to an aid programme for Ireland 
worth €85 billion.  
16-17 
December  
The heads of state change the law on the involvement of the 
private sector, as requested by the central bank, and adopt 
the decision on the European Financial Stability Facility, 
which will become effective in 2013. 
2011 
25 February  Enda Kenny, leader of the opposition party, wins the Irish 
elections and becomes prime minister.  
11 March  Some modifications are made to the Greek debt restructuring 
programme, including a cut in interest rates and a 
lengthening of due dates. It is also decided that the bailout 
fund can intervene on the market buying government bonds.  
April  Rumours spread about an imminent restructuring of Greek 
debt. Standard and Poor’s, the ratings agency, estimates the 
face value of the bonds will be cut by 50-70%.  
17 May  Eurozone countries decide on a €78 billion programme of aid 
for Portugal that is signed by all of the country’s main parties 
before the election.  
5 June  The opposition party, headed by Pedro Coelho, wins the 
Portuguese election.  
15 July  The results of the second stress test on the European banks 
are published. The markets are unconvinced by the results. 
21 July The heads of state agree to a new programme of aid for 
Greece that includes another €109 billion (that are added to 
the €130 billion previously agreed to and the restructuring of 
Greek debt held by private investors, which will be voluntary 
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and will reduce the value of the bonds by about 21%. It is also 
decided to make the bailout fund more flexible by allowing it 
to take precautionary measures, intervene on the secondary 
market and contribute to the recapitalisation of banks. 
5 August The central bank writes to the Italian and Spanish 
governments to ask for the implementation of structural 
reforms and fiscal measures to calm the markets. 
7-8 August  The Italian and Spanish governments announce a series of 
consolidation measures. 
9 August The ECB decides to intervene by buying Italian and Spanish 
government bonds. 
6 September  The Swiss central bank puts a ceiling on the exchange rate 
between the Swiss franc and the euro.  
4 November  At the G20 in Cannes, Merkel and Sarkozy reject 
Papandreou’s proposal that Greece hold a referendum on the 
euro. Berlusconi accepts a strengthened programme to 
monitor Italy’s commitments to carry out fiscal and structural 
reforms, but rejects a formal adjustment programme. 
8 November  Berlusconi resigns as Prime Minister of Italy. 
9 November  Papandreou announces his resignation as Prime Minister of 
Greece. He is replaced two days later by Lucas Papademos. 
13 November  Monti is nominated to be Italian Prime Minister.  
20 November  Rajoy’s People’s Party wins the Spanish election.  
8-9 December  European heads of state (with the exception of those of the 
UK and the Czech Republic) agree to a modification of the 
Stability and Growth Pact to incorporate fiscal rules in the 
national constitutions (fiscal compact) and to strengthen the 
bailout fund. 
8 December  The European Central Bank enacts a series of measures to 
make liquidity available to the banking system including 
three two-year fixed-rate refinancing operations. 
2012 
30 March  Eurozone finance ministers agree to boost the bailout fund to 
€700 billion. 
6 May  François Hollande wins the French presidential elections. 
 Antonis Samaras’ conservative party, New Democracy, 
obtains the most votes in the Greek election, but is unable to 
form a coalition to govern.  
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7 May  The Spanish government decides to nationalise Bankia and in 
the days that follow adopts a series of measures to strengthen 
the banking system.  
17 June  
 
 
25 June 
28-29 June 
In the new Greek elections New Democracy obtains 30% of 
the vote and Antonis Samaras becomes prime minister of a 
coalition government with the socialists. 
Cyprus requests aid from the bailout fund. 
Eurozone countries agree to form a banking union with 
integrated oversight. The European Council adopts the 
Growth Pact and tasks the presidents of the European 
Council, European Commission, Eurogroup and the central 
bank to draw up a roadmap for the realisation of a full 
economic and monetary union. 
26 July  In a speech in London, the President of the European Central 
Bank says “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to 
preserve the euro (while still respecting its mandate)”.  
7 August  Juncker, President of the Eurogroup, which includes the 
finance ministers of the eurozone countries, says a Greek exit 
from the euro “would be manageable, but that does not mean 
it is desirable”. 
6 September  The central bank announces a programme of outright 
monetary transactions to buy bonds for a potentially 
unlimited amount provided the countries whose bonds are 
being bought adopt an adjustment plan. 
9 October  While on a visit to Athens, Merkel says she “hopes and 
wishes” that Greece will stay in the euro.  
27 November  Eurozone finance ministers decide on a series of measures to 
soften the conditions of Greece’s adjustment programme – 
reducing interest rates, extending maturity dates and 
introducing a programme to buy the country’s debt.  
10 December  Monti announces his resignation as Italian Prime Minister.  
13 December Eurozone finance ministers decide to create a system for 
unified banking supervision in eurozone countries that will 
be run by the European Central Bank. 
14 December The heads of state adopt a roadmap for the realisation of a 
full economic and monetary union. 
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